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Abstract
Part I comprises three chapters (2-4) that analyse the optimal combination of a univer-
sal benefit (B ≥ 0) and categorical benefit (C ≥ 0) for an economy where individuals
differ in both their ability to work and, if able to work, their productivity. C is ex-ante
conditioned on applicants being unable to work, and ex-post conditioned on recipients
not working.
In Chapter 2 the benefit budget is fixed but the test awarding C makes Type I and
Type II errors. Type I errors guarantee B > 0 at the optimum to ensure all unable
individuals have positive consumption. The analysis with Type II errors depends on the
enforcement of the ex-post condition. Under No Enforcement C > 0 at the optimum
conditional on the awards test having some discriminatory power; whilst maximum
welfare falls with both error propensities. Under Full Enforcement C > 0 at the
optimum always; and whilst maximum welfare falls with the Type I error propensity
it may increase with the Type II error propensity.
Chapters 3 and 4 generalise the analysis to a linear-income tax framework. In Chapter
3 categorical status is perfectly observable. Optimal linear and piecewise-linear tax
expressions are written more generally to capture cases where it is suboptimal to fi-
nance categorical transfers to eliminate inequality in the average social marginal value
of income. Chapter 4 then derives the optimal linear income tax for the case with
classification errors and Full Enforcement. Both equity and efficiency considerations
capture the incentives an increase in the tax rate generates for able individuals to apply
for C.
Part II (Chapter 5) focuses on the decisions of individuals to work when receiving C,
given a risk of being detected and fined proportional to C. Under CARA preferences
the risk premium associated with the variance in benefit income is convex-increasing
in C, thus giving C a role in enforcement.
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Introduction
The extent to which cash benefits should be targeted at those in need, as opposed
to being made more universally available, is a subject of much debate across welfare
states. Targeted transfers play a prominent role and can take a number of forms, where
eligibility may be conditioned on (i) a means test; (ii) belonging to some categorical
group such as the disabled or involuntarily unemployed; or (iii) some combination of
the two. A well-established result in economic theory is that ‘tagging’ individuals
who belong to some categorical group that the policymaker wishes to assist is welfare
improving because it provides the neediest individuals in society with greater support
than they would receive under a simple negative income tax system and does so without
resorting to high marginal tax rates (Akerlof, 1978).
There are, however, a number of caveats associated with targeting that the model
generating this result does not account for.1 First, categorical transfers can be both
complex and costly to administer. Take the case of disability benefits: What is the
appropriate definition of disability? How much weight should be placed on medically
verifiable criteria as opposed to an applicant’s alleged discomfort at work? Should the
benefit be means tested? These complex issues lead us to a second point: wherever the
eligibility ‘line’ is drawn, classification errors of both Type I (false rejection) and Type
II (false award) are likely to be made. Broadly speaking, these errors may be made
because (i) the ‘line’ is incorrect but the tests correctly classify individuals around the
line; (ii) the ‘line’ is correct but the tests are imperfect and misclassify individuals
around the line; or (iii) some combination of both.2 However classification errors arise,
1Akerlof (1978) does discuss a number of these issues in his summary and conclusions.
2In line with the second case, consider an awards technology that has fixed propensities to mis-
classify individuals around an eligibility threshold that accurately distinguishes between needy and
non-needy individuals. It follows that any adjustment in the eligibility threshold will involve a tradeoff
between Type I and Type II errors. The relevant authority may therefore adjust the threshold to ‘err
on the side of harshness...or on the side of generosity’ (see Goodin, 1985, p.141).
8
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they diminish the effectiveness of targeted programmes in providing support to those
in need, in addition to generating incentives for non-needy individuals to masquerade
as needy. Third, because targeted programmes focus on specific subgroups of society
they may impose stigma on their intended recipients: this may arise due to accusatory
eligibility tests or subsequent conditions placed on recipients (Moffitt, 1983). Fourth
and finally, the complex and time-consuming nature of application forms present costs
to those who apply, and these costs may greatest for those most in need (Currie,
2004). Both stigma and application costs give rise to non-take-up in targeted welfare
programmes, as the very individuals that the programmes are designed to assist are
deterred from applying.
At the other end of the spectrum, a universal benefit3 provides all individuals in society
with the same unconditional4 cash benefit. Such schemes are often advocated on the
grounds that they (i) provide all individuals in society with a guaranteed source of
income that is independent of their employment status and financial circumstances;
(ii) enhance work incentives because the benefit is not ‘withdrawn’ or ‘phased-out’
through working; (iii) are administratively simple; and (iv) are unlikely to suffer from
the take-up related issues of targeted programmes (Van Parijs, 2004). The first point
may be particularly important for individuals who are either ineligible for targeted
welfare benefits or are incorrectly denied them by Type I classification error. If the
universal benefit is financed by a linear (flat) income tax - as analysed by Atkinson
(1995) - then both the second and third points may become stronger as flat taxes
are argued to enhance work incentives whilst also lowering the administrative burden
relative to more complex piecewise schedules (Paulus and Peichl, 2009; Peichl, 2014).
In addition to these four points, Goodin (1992) advocates universal benefits on the
grounds that they are ‘minimally presumptuous’. Contrastingly, means tests often
presume that families share earnings equitably among their members; whilst categorical
benefit programmes may presume that certain conditions warrant support because they
prohibit work, whilst other conditions do not. Whenever presumptions are made they
3A number of alternative names for the universal benefit are given in the literature, such as ‘basic
income’, ‘demogrant’ or ‘citizens income’ (see Van Parijs, 2004).
4There is of course some eligibility condition: an individual must have citizenship to receive the
benefit. In this sense a universal benefit is not entirely unconditional. Atkinson (2015, p.219) discusses
how the citizenship condition may be too broad, in the sense that it can include individuals who live
abroad and do not pay taxes. In part for this reason, Atkinson proposes replacing the citizenship
condition with a participation condition; where participation may take the form of working, education,
or some other type of social contribution.
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may be either incorrect or become incorrect over time as society and the nature of
employment changes.
A key issue surrounding universal benefit proposals is their affordability and, in turn,
the level of taxation that would be required to finance payments to all individuals.
This does, of course, depend on the nature of exactly what is being proposed. As
discussed by both Atkinson (1995) and Van Parijs (2004), proposals typically take the
form of a ‘partial’ universal system whereby a universal benefit replaces some but not
all existing cash benefits.5 There is reason to think that such proposals will garner
more political support than the polar extremes of purely targeted or purely universal
welfare provision.6 Indeed, Skocpol (1991) refers to partial schemes as ‘targeting within
universalism’ and, in examining the social policy history of the U.S., points to the
relative support enjoyed by programmes that spread benefits over many individuals,
whilst also leaving room for additional support to those most in need.
With these points in mind, this thesis is structured as follows. Part I contains three
chapters (2,3 and 4) which model the optimal provision of a universal benefit (B) and
categorical benefit (C) for an economy in which individuals differ in both their ability
to work and, conditional on being able to work, their productivity (gross wage) when at
work. The categorical benefit is targeted at unable individuals and is conditioned in two
dimensions: ex-ante an applicant must be unable to work to be awarded the benefit;
whilst ex-post a recipient must not work. Applications for the categorical benefit are
taken to be costless in terms of money, stigma and time. If the benefit is only received by
unable individuals then both dimensions of conditionality are automatically satisfied.
However, the benefit may be administered with both Type I and Type II classification
errors. A Type I error arises when an unable individual is incorrectly denied the
categorical benefit, whilst a Type II error arises when an able individual is incorrectly
awarded the categorical benefit. In the case of the latter error type, the ex-post no-work
condition becomes relevant because individuals who are able to work are receiving the
categorical benefit. Whether or not they will actually choose to work while receiving
5The state of Alaska provides the primary example of an existing partial universal benefit pro-
gramme. In place since 1982, all residents of Alaska (including children) receive the same yearly cash
benefit, the size of which is a function of the five year average interest on the Alaska Permanent Fund.
This fund was set up in 1976 using oil revenue from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.
6To get a sense of the range of levels of taxation that may be considered, it is useful to note that
Atkinson (1995, pp.114-129) simulates the distributional effect of two alternative partial schemes. The
first scheme has a flat tax of 25 percent and a universal benefit of £10 per week; whilst the second
scheme has a flat tax of 40 percent and a universal benefit of £35.60 per week.
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it will depend on the enforcement of this condition.
A number of papers have analysed imperfectly targeted transfers in frameworks sim-
ilar to that described above (see Parsons, 1996; Salanie´, 2002). These papers make
polar assumptions with regard to the enforcement of the ex-post ‘no-work’ condition,
but the full implications of these differing assumptions are not directly comparable
due to other differences in the modelling frameworks. First, Parsons (1996) adopts
quasilinear preferences over consumption and leisure and assumes a homogenous able
subpopulation where each individual has a marginal product of unity. In this setting
able individuals who are tagged as unable by Type II error are allowed to work. From
an analytical perspective this corresponds to the assumption that the ex-post ‘no-work’
condition is not enforced. Indeed, a ‘dual negative income tax’ system in which tagged
able individuals are incentivised to work for less than their marginal product is found
to be optimal. The greater the accuracy of the tagging technology the closer the op-
timum comes to the full insurance outcome.7 Contrastingly, Salanie´ (2002) employs a
more general framework with standard preferences and an able subpopulation where
individuals differ over a productivity continuum. The ex-post condition that individu-
als do not work is fully enforced such that no tagged able individual will work. Given
this, the surprising feature of the analysis is that there are no application decisions to
be tagged. Instead, a fraction of the able subpopulation (corresponding to the Type
II error propensity) are tagged and do not work. This must, however, be incentive in-
compatible for higher productivity able individuals who would choose not to be tagged
because they are better off working and receiving the lower untagged/unconditional
benefit.
Chapter 2 contributes to this literature by providing a systematic comparison of optimal
welfare provision for the binary cases where the ex-post no-work condition is either (i)
not enforced; or (ii) fully enforced. To pin down the intuition for how the optimal
benefits change with classification errors, it is assumed that the government has a
fixed budget for benefit expenditure (later chapters illustrate that many of the results
generalise to an optimal tax analysis). In the baseline case where C is administered
without error the standard result arises: if the benefit budget exceeds a critical level
at which inequality in the average social marginal value of income (smvi)8 between
7The full insurance outcome corresponds to the case where consumption is independent of ability
status.
8Notice that we abstract from the term ‘net’ because the response of individual earnings to unearned
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the unable and able subpopulations is eliminated through categorical transfers, it will
be optimal to set both C > 0 and B > 0. This corresponds to a partial universal
system because both targeted and universal benefits are provided. Contrastingly, if
the budget falls at or below this critical level it will be optimal to set C > 0 but B = 0,
thus corresponding to a purely targeted system. With perfect targeting, there is thus a
clear ordering of priorities: spending should be purely categorical so long as the smvi of
the unable exceeds the average smvi of the able (see also Beath et al., 1988; Diamond
and Sheshinski, 1995; Parsons, 1996; Viard, 2001a,b).
In the main analysis C is administered with both Type I and Type II classification
errors. Under No Enforcement of the ex-post condition benefit policy is one-dimensional
in the sense that individuals receive a monetary benefit with no subsequent restriction
on labour supply. Consequently, all able individuals will apply for C and, if awarded
it, those of sufficiently high productivity will work when receiving it. Contrastingly,
under Full Enforcement of the ex-post condition benefit policy is two-dimensional in
the sense that individuals receive both a monetary benefit and a fully enforced zero
quantity constraint on labour supply. In this case the only able individuals who will
choose to apply for C will be those whose individual welfare is highest when receiving
C and not working, and thus those of sufficiently low productivity (and therefore low
opportunity cost). Application decisions in this latter setting will consequently be
endogenous to the benefit levels.
The key results from Chapter 2 are as follows. Whenever Type I errors are made it will
be optimal to set B > 0 so as to ensure that unable individuals who are incorrectly
rejected C have some source of income to consume. Under No Enforcement it is optimal
to set C > 0 only if the awards test has some discriminatory power.9 In this case the
optimal benefits are chosen so as to equate the average smvi of ‘categorical recipients’
with the average smvi of ‘non-categorical recipients’10, respectively, where classification
errors mean that both groups may be composed of unable and able individuals. If
however, the test has no discriminatory power, it is optimal to set C = 0 and spend
the entire per capita budget on the universal benefit. It is shown that maximum welfare
income has no effect on the available budget for benefit expenditure. This assumption will be relaxed
in the subsequent Chapters 3 and 4, where the benefit budget is determined endogenously by tax
revenue.
9The awards test will have discriminatory power so long as it is more likely to award the categorical
benefit to an unable applicant than to an able applicant.
10I.e. individuals who do not receive the categorical benefit.
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falls with both Type I and Type II error propensities.
Contrastingly, under Full Enforcement it is optimal to set C > 0 at all levels of dis-
criminatory power, therefore including the case of no discriminatory power. The Full
Enforcement optimum is characterised by the condition that (i) the aggregate smvi of
non-categorical recipients be equal to (ii) the aggregate smvi of categorical recipients
multiplied by the increase in their total benefit income per unit reduction in the uni-
versal benefit.11 In general, one cannot guarantee a unique solution to this condition
because application decisions are endogenous to the benefit levels. The consequence of
this endogeneity is that the two components of either aggregate smvi (i.e. individual
smvi × number of individuals) may move in opposite directions. Consider the aggre-
gate smvi of non-categorical recipients: an increase in the universal benefit lowers an
individual’s smvi but also reduces the number of individuals who apply for the categori-
cal benefit, in turn increasing the number of non-recipients. Alternatively, consider the
aggregate smvi of categorical recipients: an increase in the universal benefit may lower
their total benefit income and thus increase their individual smvi, but also reduces
the number of applicants and thus the number of categorical recipients. The overall
effect on either aggregate smvi is ambiguous: it will depend on unspecified properties
of both the utility function (e.g. third derivatives) and the distribution function (e.g.
derivatives of the pdf).
Turning to the welfare effects of classification errors under Full Enforcement, it is
shown that whilst welfare unambiguously falls with the Type I error propensity, there
are conditions where it can increase with the Type II error propensity. The intuition
here is that ‘leakage’ of the categorical benefit to lower productivity able individuals
may play a redistributive role within the able subpopulation. This will depend in part
on the proportion of able applicants who would be voluntarily unemployed when just
receiving the universal benefit, and thus on the number of able applicants whose smvi
is the same as that of unable applicants.
Finally, under both enforcement regimes between-group inequality in the average smvi
will persist at the optimum whenever classification errors are made. Extensive nu-
merical simulations with the CES preferences adopted by Stern (1976) illustrate how
the optimal benefit levels change with the propensity to make classification errors.
11An implication of this is that at the Full Enforcement optimum the average smvi of categorical
recipients will exceed that of non-categorical recipients due to the incentives that an increase in C
generates for able individuals to apply.
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Examples where welfare may increase with the Type II error propensity are also pro-
vided.
Chapters 3 and 4 proceed to generalise the analysis from Chapter 2 to an optimal linear
income tax framework. Chapter 3 analyses the case of perfect discrimination, whilst
Chapter 4 analyses the case with classification errors. In this richer setting, the benefit
budget is determined endogenously by tax revenue (net of any revenue requirement for
spending outside of welfare). In addition to choosing the optimum benefit levels, the
optimum tax rate must therefore be chosen as well.
To the best of this author’s knowledge, the analysis of categorical transfers within the
standard optimal linear income tax framework12 has thus far been restricted to the
case of perfect discrimination. In this case optimal tax formulae are typically reported
under the assumption that inequality in the average net smvi across categorical groups
is eliminated through categorical transfers at the optimum (Viard, 2001a,b). This as-
sumption allows the optimal tax expression to be written as in the uni-dimensional
model where individuals differ only in productivity: the numerator (equity consider-
ations) is the negative of the covariance between earnings and the net smvi; whilst
the denominator (efficiency considerations) captures the response of (compensated)
earnings to a change in the net-of-tax rate (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Atkinson,
1995).
It is not immediately clear, however, that this will always be a valid assumption. There
may be cases where it is suboptimal to finance categorical transfers to the point that
inequality in the average net smvi across categorical groups is eliminated. For example,
if a sufficiently large fraction of the population are dependent on categorical transfers
for consumption then the level of taxation required to equate the average net smvi of the
unable and able subpopulations may be too harmful to the latter group. This will also
depend on the size of any revenue requirement in place for spending outside of welfare.
Further, this argument is likely to hold beyond a simple linear income tax framework.
For example, progressive piecewise linear tax systems13 provide the government with
additional tools to redistribute within categorical groups; but if shifting some of the
tax burden away from lower earners in an able group (i) pushes the average net smvi
of that group further below that of the unable group; and/or (ii) lowers tax revenue
12I.e. where in the productivity dimension there are a continuum of types.
13The term progressive is here used to refer to the case of increasing marginal tax rates.
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relative to the flat tax case, this may limit further the cases where it is optimal to
eliminate between-group inequality in the average net smvi.
Chapter 314 therefore derives more general expressions for (i) the optimal linear income
tax rate; and (ii) the optimal two-bracket progressive piecewise linear tax rates, that
allow for the persistence of between-group inequality at the optimum. The optimal lin-
ear income tax rate is derived under general preferences over consumption and leisure.
The equity considerations in the numerator are now composed of both ‘between-group’
and ‘within-group’ terms. The first term is not found in standard tax expressions,
whilst the latter term is now the negative of the covariance between relative earnings
and the net smvi; where relative earnings refer to individual gross earnings as a fraction
of aggregate gross earnings.15 Numerical examples where between-group inequality in
the average net smvi persists at the flat tax optimum are provided using a variant of
framework employed by Stern (1976) (i.e. CES preferences, lognormal productivity
distribution).
Turning to the piecewise analysis, individual utility is taken to be a concave transfor-
mation of preferences that are quasilinear in consumption. There is thus no income
effect (see also Apps et al., 2014). Implicit expressions for the lower and upper tax
rates are derived, in addition to that for the earnings threshold above which individuals
face the upper marginal tax rate. Interestingly, the possibility that between-group in-
equality remains at the optimum enters into the equity considerations of the lower tax
rate, but not the upper tax rate. The intuition here would seem to be that an increase
in the lower tax rate is non-distortionary for those who choose to earn above the earn-
ings threshold, and is thus an effective tool to help reduce between-group inequality.
Numerical examples where between-group inequality persists at the piecewise optimum
(and, for comparison, the flat tax optimum) are provided using preferences with a con-
stant labour elasticity (see Atkinson, 1990; Saez, 2001).16 Individual productivity is
taken to be Pareto distributed as this is known to give rise to increasing marginal tax
rates (Diamond, 1998). For cases where between-group inequality persists under both
14A shorter version of this chapter is published in the journal Economics Letters: See Slack (2015).
15If between-group inequality is eliminated at the optimum, the expression reduces to the well-
documented optimal tax expression in the literature (see Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980).
16Under these isoelastic preferences one can also establish analytically the cases where between-
group inequality in the average smvi will persist at the flat tax optimum (for the special case where
taxation is purely redistributive). Indeed, there is a critical level of the unable subpopulation size
above which it will be suboptimal to eliminate this inequality.
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flat tax and piecewise linear tax systems, the level of between-group inequality is typ-
ically higher under the piecewise system for any given unable subpopulation size and
revenue requirement. Further, there are more cases where between-group inequality
persists under the piecewise system than under the flat tax system.
The purpose of Chapter 4 is to tread new ground and derive an expression for the
optimal linear tax rate when the categorical transfer is administered with both Type
I and Type II classification errors. In this case it is assumed that the ex-post ‘no-
work’ condition is fully enforced such that only able individuals of lower productivity
will choose to apply.17 Crucially, the application decisions of able individuals will be
endogenous to the tax rate. Indeed, an increase in the tax rate will generate both direct
and indirect behavioural responses that affect the government budget constraint. The
direct effect enters only the tax revenue side of the budget constraint and is found in
all conventional analyses: it is simply the response of gross earnings in the intensive
margin to a marginal increase in the tax rate. The indirect effect, meanwhile, captures
the fact that a marginal increase in the tax rate increases the critical productivity
at or below which an able individual chooses to apply for the categorical benefit.
Intuitively, this affects both the tax revenue and benefit expenditure sides of the budget
constraint.
To simplify the analysis, individual utility is - as in the piecewise analysis of Chapter 3 -
taken to be a concave transformation of preferences that are quasilinear in consumption.
There are thus no income effects associated with a working individual’s smvi and,
further, the size of the universal benefit does not directly influence an able individual’s
decision to apply for the categorical benefit. This assumption is of great assistance
in interpreting the optimal tax expression because a precise relationship between the
average smvi of able applicants and the shadow price of public expenditure can be
established.
In the resulting expression that characterises the optimal tax rate, an important com-
ponent of both equity (numerator) and efficiency (denominator) considerations is the
elasticity of the distribution function with respect to individual productivity, evaluated
at the critical productivity at or below which able individuals choose to apply for the
categorical benefit. Type II errors generate conflicting effects in both the equity and
17An analysis of the less realistic No Enforcement regime is documented in the appendix to this
chapter.
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efficiency considerations. In the equity dimension, Type II errors (i) mean that some
able individuals of lower productivity - who the government would not wish to tax
highly - receive the categorical benefit and do not work, which acts to raise the tax
rate; but also (ii) redistribute ‘within’ the able subpopulation through ‘leaking’ cate-
gorical transfers to these lower productivity individuals, which acts to lower the tax
rate because there may be less need to redistribute through the universal benefit. In
the efficiency dimension, Type II errors (i) mean that some able individuals of lower
productivity are awarded the categorical benefit and thus do not respond in the inten-
sive margin to the tax rate, which acts to increase the tax rate; but (ii) result in both
foregone tax revenue and additional benefit expenditure as able individuals depart the
labour force because they are awarded the categorical benefit, both of which act to
reduce the tax rate because the number of applicants for the categorical benefit are,
ceteris paribus, an increasing function of the tax rate. The efficiency considerations are
thus composed of both the direct and indirect effects discussed above.
Numerical simulations using the same isoelastic preferences employed in Chapter 3
suggest that an increase in either error propensity (i) increases the optimal marginal
tax rate; (ii) increases the optimal universal benefit; but (iii) decreases the optimal
categorical benefit. Whilst optimal welfare provision always includes some targeting,
it becomes overall more universal as the propensity to make classification errors in-
creases.
In Part I of this thesis the enforcement of the ex-post ‘no-work’ condition is binary: it
is either not enforced or fully enforced. Both are strong assumptions. In particular,
without explicitly modelling the enforcement parameters we cannot state all the condi-
tions under which full enforcement can be achieved. The size of the categorical benefit
will surely play a role in this enforcement. In reality, an individual who works (and
pays taxes18) will certainly face some risk of detection, but it is unlikely that they will
be detected with certainty. This would require perfect information sharing between the
tax authority, benefit authority and local government. There is ample evidence that
this is not the case (see Fuller et al., 2015).
With these enforcement issues in mind, Part II of this thesis abstracts from optimal
welfare design and instead focuses on the decisions of individuals to violate ex-post
conditionality, given a risk of being detected and sanctioned. In this regard, a small
18This thesis abstracts from ‘cash-in-hand’ work in the shadow economy.
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existing literature analyses individual decisions to fraudulently claim unemployment
benefits (Yaniv, 1986, 1997). Fraud is here taken to be the act of working whilst
receiving benefits. Within this literature, relatively little focus is placed on the role
that the benefit level plays in enforcement when penalties are made proportional to
the benefit level itself. The most work in this area comes from Yaniv (1986), who
analyses two alternative penalty structures from the tax evasion literature. Individual
preferences are taken to exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion. The author finds
that an increase in the benefit level (i) increases incentives to fraudulently claim when
the fine is proportional to the number of claiming days (i.e. independent of the benefit
size); but (ii) has an ambiguous effect on incentives when the fine is proportional to the
benefit size. In this latter case, an increase in the benefit level increases the expected
fine. The model abstracts from both extensive and intensive labour supply decisions:
in particular, there is no voluntary unemployment due to the disability benefit.
Chapter 5 aims to draw out more explicitly the role that the benefit level may play in
exposing fraudulent recipients to risk. Once more, there is a continuum of productivity
differentiated able individuals who may choose to apply for a categorical benefit that
is ex-ante conditional on an applicant being unable to work; and ex-post conditional
on a recipient not working. Recipients may also be required to spend a fraction of the
‘working day’ at the benefit office. There are no checks or penalties in place for an
able individual who is incorrectly awarded the categorical benefit and does not work.
This assumption is made for two reasons. First, such behaviour is extremely difficult
to detect because the able recipient exactly mimics the unable recipient (Yaniv, 1986).
Second, on the grounds of legal uncertainty applicants may be unaware of their true
eligibility. However, the act of working is detectable and provides the benefit authority
with the ‘smoking gun’ that a recipient is able to work and knowingly breaking the
rules. Any recipient detected working is made to repay the categorial benefit and also
fined at a rate proportional to the benefit size. This form of financial sanction mirrors
that ‘offered’ by benefit authorities in reality (see, for example, Department for Work
and Pensions, 2015).19
Drawing on the seminal work of Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964), the analysis captures
19In the U.K., for example, a benefit recipient who is found to be fraudulent may be offered this type
of financial sanction as an alternative to prosecution. In addition to reclaiming the benefits incorrectly
received, the benefit authority imposes a fine corresponding to 50% of the overpaid benefits (up to a
maximum of £2000) (Department for Work and Pensions, 2015).
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the expected utility of a working recipient via the utility of their expected income net
of the risk premium associated with the variance in benefit income. In general, the
risk premium is approximated as the coefficient of absolute risk aversion multiplied by
half the variance in benefit income. This variance is convex-increasing in the benefit
level. If preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion the risk premium is also
convex-increasing in the benefit level, and independent of individual productivity. An
able individual who would choose to work conditional on receiving the categorical
benefit will only apply for it if the expected benefit income exceeds the risk premium.
Given that (i) the expected benefit is linearly increasing in the benefit size; but (ii)
the risk premium is convex increasing in the benefit size, there is a critical benefit
level above which full enforcement is attained. Further, the more lenient the standard
enforcement parameters (detection probability, penalty rate), the higher this critical
benefit level.
An unsatisfactory implication of this result is that for any benefit set below the critical
level, all individuals who would choose to work conditional on receiving the benefit will
apply. If, however, recipients are required to spend a fraction of the working day at
the benefit office, those of higher productivities will not apply because the opportunity
cost of foregone earnings is too large. In this analysis the categorical benefit can still
be set to attain full enforcement, but even if it is not the range of wages for which
fraud occurs will be bounded above by a critical wage at which the opportunity cost
of foregone earnings offsets the expected benefit net of risk premium.
The remainder of this thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 1 precedes the main
analyses in Parts I and II through providing an overview of the existing economics
literature on tax/benefit programmes. Where possible, a common notation is adopted
to facilitate comparison across the various works. Part I then contains Chapters 2, 3
and 4. These chapters focus on the optimal choice of categorical and universal benefits,
given differing assumptions on both the benefit budget and tagging technology available
to the government. In Chapter 2 the benefit budget is exogenously fixed, whereas in
Chapters 3 and 4 it is endogenously determined by tax revenue. Part II contains
Chapter 5, which analyses the decision of ineligible individuals to violate an ex-post
‘no-work’ condition, given a probability of being detected and fined proportional to the
benefit size. Finally, Chapter 6 concludes the thesis.
Chapter 1
Literature Review
The design and behavioural implications of welfare programmes have received much
attention in the economics literature, both theoretically and empirically.1 This litera-
ture can be partitioned into three broad strands. First, a large theoretical literature
analyses the optimal design of welfare benefits under the alternate assumptions that
the benefit authority has (i) no formal awards technology to determine eligibility, but
instead chooses consumption bundles that satisfy incentive compatibility constraints
and induce self revelation; (ii) an awards technology that uses categorical information
to ‘tag’ only eligible individuals, but may make Type I (false rejection) errors; or (iii) an
awards technology that makes both Type I and Type II (false award) errors in tagging.
The analyses that fall under the second of these informational assumptions are firmly
grounded in the optimal income tax framework originating from Mirrlees (1971).
A small second strand of literature largely abstracts from design issues and instead
focuses on the decisions of truly ineligible individuals to fraudulently claim welfare
benefits. This literature draws from the economics of crime (Becker, 1968) and, re-
latedly, the tax-evasion literature. It does, however, recognise that there are ex-post
conditions associated with receiving benefits; such as spending a fraction of the working
day ‘signing on’ at the benefit office. These will influence individual behaviour.
Related to the second strand, a third empirical literature assesses both (i) the disincen-
tives provided by; and (ii) the scope for classification errors, in the U.S. Social Security
1Design issues and behavioural incentives are of course intrinsically related.
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Table 1.1: Some Common Notation
Notation Interpretation
θ Population proportion (typically unable or low ability)
x Individual consumption
H Labour supply
n Individual productivity/ gross wage
nl, nh Low productivity, High productivity (Unskilled, Skilled)
f(n), F (n) Productivity density function, productivity distribution function
y Individual gross earnings
y¯ Aggregate/Average gross earnings
T Tax/Transfer
t Linear income tax rate
M ;B, C Unearned income (general); Welfare benefit, Categorical benefit
Disability awards process2. In the latter case, a number of studies indicate there are
non-negligible propensities to make both Type I and Type II classification errors.
This review discusses some of the key contributions in each of these three bodies of lit-
erature. Where possible, a common notation has been adopted to facilitate comparison
across the various works (see Table 1.1).
1.1 The Design of Welfare Benefits
1.1.1 No Awards Technology: Mechanism Design
A body of literature focuses on the design of welfare benefits when the benefit au-
thority has no formal discriminatory test to determine eligibility. Instead, it chooses
consumption bundles/transfer levels which satisfy incentive compatibility constraints,
and thus prevent the non-needy from masquerading as the needy.
Diamond and Mirrlees (1978) model the optimal provision of social insurance when a
population of size 1 ex-ante identical individuals face an exogenous probability θ of
becoming unable to work. The government cannot observe whether an individual is
2This literature analyses both the insurance and assistance components of disability welfare pro-
vision.
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unemployed voluntarily or due to disability: it is therefore restricted to choosing con-
sumption levels for workers and non-workers. An able individual who works has utility
ve(xe); where xe denotes the consumption level a worker receives. Contrastingly, an
able individual who does not work has utility vo(xo); where xo denotes the consumption
level a non-worker receives. Finally, an unable individual also receives the consumption
bundle xo but faces utility u(xo). An able individual who chooses to work produces
an output of 1 such that, were there no disability or voluntary unemployment, total
resources in the economy would be 1.
The government problem is therefore described by3:
max
xe,xo
W = (1− θ)ve(xe) + θu(xo)
s.t. θxo + (1− θ)xe = (1− θ) (Budget Constraint)
ve(xe) ≥ vo(xo) (Incentive Compatibility constraint)
(1.1)
The assumption is made that an able individual will choose to work if ve(xe) = vo(xo):
This guarantees positive resources in the economy even if the incentive compatibility
constraint is binding. Given an indifference curve between the two consumption states
of (1− θ)ve(xe) + θu(xo) = k, where k is a constant, it is straightforward to establish
that:
dxo
dxe
= −
(
1− θ
θ
)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
budget slope
(ve)′
u′
(1.2)
One of two types of optimum can emerge depending on whether (ve)′ > u′ or (ve)′ ≤ u′
when evaluated at the point of indifference ve = vo. This is illustrated in Figure 1:
Panel (a) shows that if (ve)′ > u′ at this point the incentive compatibility is non-
binding and the ‘Full Optimum’ where (ve)′ = u′ can be obtained. Contrastingly, if
(ve)′ ≤ u′ the incentive compatibility constraint will bind.
Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) argue that optimal transfer programmes should place
restrictions on intended transfer beneficiaries. For example, restrictions may be placed
3Note that, because individuals are identical, the objective function here is the expected utility of
an individual who faces an exogenous probability of becoming unable to work.
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Figure 1.1: Optima from Diamond and Mirrlees (1978)
(a) Full Optimum: MRS = (1− θ)/θ
xe
xo
xo = xe
Budget Line →
ve = v0
Indiff.
curve
Full Optimum:
(ve)′ = u′
(b) Binding IC constraint optimum
xe
x0
xo = xe
Budget Line →
ve = v0
Indiff.
curve
Notes. See Diamond and Mirrlees (1978, pp.333-334)
on earnings or the consumption of goods ‘indicating’ low ability. In a simple two-
person setting, individuals differ in their wage and possibly preferences. Let nl denote
the productivity (wage) of a low ability individual, and nh the productivity of a high
ability individual, where nl < nh. Individuals have preferences over consumption (x)
and labour (H), as given by ui(xi, Hi) ; i ∈ {l, h}. Suppose that the government only
has income information and operates a tax/transfer system giving rise to the individual
budget constraint:
x =
niHi + T : niHi ≤ ZniHi − T : niHi > Z
where T is a tax/transfer depending on where earnings lie relative to the threshold
Z.
Letting H∗i denote an individual’s optimal labour supply and y
∗
i = niH
∗
i their resulting
gross earnings, the authors show that the optimal choice of Z is slightly smaller than
y∗l . To qualify for the welfare payment then, a low ability individual has to restrict their
labour supply to Z/nl < H
∗
l . This, however, only imposes a second-order welfare loss
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on them because they are still in the neighbourhood their optimal choice of H:
ul(Z + T, Z/nl) ≈ ul(y∗l + T, y∗l /nl) (Second-order welfare loss) (1.3)
However, under the assumption that uh(y∗l +T, y
∗
l /nh) = u
h(y∗h−T, y∗h/nh) - such that
a high skilled individual would be indifferent between masquerading or working their
optimal amount were Z = y∗l - it must hold that setting Z < y
∗
l imposes a first-order
welfare loss on a masquerader because they are pushed even further from their optimum
choice of H (conditional on receiving T ). Formally:
uh(Z + T, Z/nh) < u
h(y∗l + T, y
∗
l /nh) = u(y
∗
h − T, y∗h/nh) (First-order welfare loss)
(1.4)
Such a restriction rules out masquerading and further, allows the government to finance
a higher (compensatory) transfer to the low type through increasing the tax rate.
Developing the argument further, should low ability individuals also consume more
of an ‘indicator’ good such as medical care than a high ability person, there may be
a role for in-kind transfers. In this case, converting part of the cash transfer into
a quantity of the indicator good set slightly higher than the low income individual
would optimally consume generates, analogous to the first case, (i) a second-order
welfare loss for the low income type; but (ii) a first-order welfare loss for the high type
whose consumption of the indicator good is far in excess of their optimum (Nichols and
Zeckhauser, 1982).
Drawing on the work of Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) and others, Blackorby and
Donaldson (1988) are also concerned with the role non-cash transfers can play in the
prevention of non-needy individuals masquerading as needy. Their analysis takes place
in a simple two-person (able, infirm/ill), two-good (yams, medical care) model. Whilst
both the able and infirm desire yams, only the infirm desires medical care. Specifically,
the utility of an able person is given by the quantity of yams they consume, whilst
the utility of an infirm is a general strictly-quasiconcave function of yams and medical
care. For simplicity, an exogenous linear production possibility frontier constrains the
quantity of yams and medical care in the economy. The authors establish, and compare,
the first-best; second-best; and third-best Pareto optima which can arise. In a first-best
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setting, the government observes individual preferences and agents know this. The first-
best frontier can be attained as a decentralised Walrasian equilibrium where the price
of medical care relative to yams is unity (with yams normalised to price one). Next, in a
second-best setting the government only knows the population proportion of individual
types and cannot observe preferences. It designs (rations) consumption bundles which
satisfy self-selection constraints for the able and infirm4. Any second-best optima which
do not coincide with first-best allocations are characterised by overprovision of medical
care because this does not violate incentive compatibility, whilst an increase in yams
rationed to the infirms may. Turning to a third-best setting, the government faces the
same informational asymmetry but now chooses (i) a price for medical care; and (ii) an
equal income for both population types, so as to maximize the indirect utility function
of the infirm subject to the production possibility frontier. Any deviation in the price
of medical care relative to that in first-best corresponds to a tax or subsidy on medical
care and generates optima that are Pareto dominated by some second-best optima. So
with informational constraints, in many cases rationing (second-best) may be superior
to a market-solution (third-best).
Building further on the Nichols and Zeckhauser (1982) analysis of restrictions on welfare
recipients, a number of papers explore the role of conditioning transfers on unproduc-
tive work requirements (Cuff, 2000; Kreiner and Tranaes, 2005). Most recently, Kreiner
and Tranaes (2005) explore the use of workfare requirements to restrict unemployment
insurance to individuals in the labour force who become involuntarily unemployed, as
opposed to those out of the labour force who are voluntarily unemployed. In particular,
they are concerned with whether an unemployment insurance system with unproduc-
tive workfare requirements can be Pareto improving relative to a purely pecuniary
unemployment insurance system. Individual preferences over consumption (x) and
labour (H) are represented by ui(xi, Hi) i ∈ {f, v}, where f denotes an individual in
the labour force (working or involuntarily unemployed) whilst v denotes a voluntarily
unemployed individual. Letting ni denote individual productivity, a type v individual
will never choose to work because nv < u
v
H(0, 0)/u
v
x(0, 0)
5. Contrastingly, a working
type f individual optimises labour supply, H∗f , such that:
4So for the able to choose their intended consumption bundle they must receive more yams than
an infirm. Meanwhile, for an infirm to choose their intended bundle their utility from the yams and
medical care rationed to them must exceed that for consuming the yams allocated to the able.
5The right side is simply the reservation wage rate above which an individual would choose to
supply labour, as derived by setting H = 0 in the first order condition for labour supply.
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nf =
ufH(nfH
∗
f − T,H∗f )
ufx(nfH∗f − T,H∗f )
≡MRSf (nfH∗f − T,H∗f )
where T denotes a tax on workers necessary to finance an unemployment insurance
scheme (and other transfers) and MRS is the marginal rate of substitution. In the
population a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of individuals are of type f ; whilst the remainder are
of type v. For those of type f ; a fraction ρ ∈ (0, 1) receive a job offer.
An unemployment insurance scheme provides a consumption-workfare bundle {B,HR}
to involuntarily unemployed individuals, where B denotes the pecuniary benefit and
HR the work requirement. For type v individuals there is an unconditional income
support B0 ≤ B. With knowledge of the population proportion θ, the government’s
problem is described by:
max
B,B0,T,HR
E(uf ) = ρ uf (nfH
∗
f − T,H∗f )︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility from working
+(1− ρ) uf (B,HR)︸ ︷︷ ︸
utility from UI
s.t. uf (nfH
∗
f − T,H∗f ) ≥ uf (B,HR) (I1: Type f prefers work to UI)
uv(B0, 0) ≥ uv(B,HR) (I2: Type v prefers B0 to UI)
θ(1− ρ)B + (1− θ)B0 ≤ θρT (I3: Benefit Budget Constraint)
B ≤ B0 (I4: Minimum Type N support)
(1.5)
Under a pure pecuniary unemployment insurance scheme, {B, 0}, it is straightforward
to see from I2 that B0 = B , whilst from I3 we have T = B(1 − θρ)/θρ such that,
provided I1 holds:6
1− u
f
x(nfH
∗
f − T,H∗f )
ufx(B, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MB of increasing B
=
1− θ
1− θρ︸ ︷︷ ︸
MC of increasing B
≤ 1 (1.6)
6With no work requirements, the only choice variable is B, and thus the first order condition
resulting from (1.5) is:
−ufx(nfH∗f − T,H∗f ) ·
{
1− θρ
θ
}
+ (1− ρ)ufx(B, 0) = 0 :
Rearranging and adding 1 to both sides gives the result in the text.
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The left-side captures how much a type f individual values, in monetary terms, a
marginal increase in B. The right side, meanwhile, captures the extent to which
an increase in taxes necessary to increase B are misspent ‘leaking’ unemployment
insurance to individuals of type v.
The relevant question is now whether a workfare scheme, {B,HR}, can improve upon
the pure pecuniary system, for a given B0. Totally differentiating E(u
f ) and evaluating
at HR = 0 yields the below condition for dE(uf ) > 0: 7
1− u
f
x(nfH
∗
f − T,H∗f )
ufx(B, 0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
MB of increasing B
≥ −u
f
H(B, 0)
ufx(B, 0)
· u
v
x(B, 0)
uvH(B, 0)
≡ MRS
f (B, 0)
MRSv(B, 0)
(1.7)
Notice that whilst the marginal benefit (left side) is identical to the optimality condition
for the pecuniary unemployment insurance scheme {B, 0}, the marginal cost (right side)
now captures the reduction in welfare from increased workfare. If the marginal utility
of leisure of Type f individuals is sufficiently different (lower) from that of Type v
individuals, then the introduction of workfare into a unemployment insurance scheme
can be Pareto improving (Kreiner and Tranaes, 2005).
There has also been some work exploring the role of workfare when the objective is
poverty alleviation. Besley and Coate (1992) analyse the standard screening argument
for the imposition of workfare, in addition to a deterrent argument whereby ability
enhancing effort is encouraged earlier in life to avoid welfare (and thus the requirement
to engage in workfare). In a population of N individuals, a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) are of low
earning ability, nl, whilst the remaining proportion (1− θ) are of high earning ability,
nh. Quasilinear individual preferences are given by u(x,H) = x − g(H) ; g′(·) >
0, g′′(·) > 0, where x is consumption and H is labour supply. Let H∗i ; i = {l, h}
7Totally differentiating (1.5) given the choice variables T,B and HR gives:
dE(uf ) = ρu
f
x(nfH
∗
f − T,H∗f ) · −dT + (1− ρ)
{
ufx(B,H
R)dB + ufH(B,H
R)dHR
}
Noting that (i) from I2: 0 = uvxdB + u
v
HdH
R ⇒ dHR = −dBuvx(B,HR)/uvH(B,HR); whilst (ii) from
I3: θ(1− ρ)dB = θρdT ⇒ dT = dB(1− ρ)/ρ; and so:
= (1− ρ)dB
{
−ufx(nfH∗f − T,H∗f ) + ufx(B,HR)− ufH(B,HR) ·
uvx(B, 0)
uvH(B,H
R)
}
Evaluating at HR = 0, it is straightforward to obtain (1.7).
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denote optimal labour supply, where at an interior solution H∗i satisfies ni = g
′(H∗i ).
The resulting indirect utility function for a type i individual is v(ni) = niH
∗
i − g(H∗i ).
Letting Z denote an arbitrary poverty line, it is assumed that nlH
∗
l ≤ Z < nhH∗h ,
thereby giving the government a reason to implement a poverty reduction programme
to assist the low types. A welfare consumption bundle, (Bi, H
R
i ), consists of a welfare
payment, B, and an unproductive workfare requirement, HR. Notably, an individual
of either ability type receiving welfare may still work in the private sector. Intuitively,
they will choose to do so if the work requirement does not exceed their optimal labour
supply, and thus if HRi ≤ H∗i .
Turning to information structure, the government knows the distribution parameter θ
but cannot identify the type of a given individual, thereby giving rise to the problem
of incentive compatibility. The indirect utility of an individual receiving their intended
welfare package is v(ni, Bi, H
R
i ), whilst if they receive that intended for the other type
it is v(ni, B−i, HR−i). Putting this all together, the objective of the government is to
choose expenditure minimising consumption bundles that eliminate poverty and satisfy
incentive compatibility constraints. The incentive compatibility constraints depend on
whether individual earnings can be observed. Should earnings be unobservable then
we have the following incentive compatibility(IC) constraints :
v(nh, Bl, H
R
l ) ≤ v(nh, Bh, HRh )
v(nl, Bh, H
R
h ) ≤ v(nl, Bl, HRl )
(Earnings Unobservable IC constraints) (1.8)
Contrastingly, should earnings be observable then there is now a cost to high types
masquerading, as they must restrict their labour supply to H¯h satisfying nHH¯h =
nl(MAX[0, H
∗
l −HRl ]). The IC constraint is thus:
Bl+nhH¯h−g(H¯h+HRl ) ≤ v(Bh, HRh , Nh) (Earnings Observable IC constraint) (1.9)
In both cases, there exists a work requirement level that separates the two types.
Necessarily, this requirement is lower with observable earnings because masquerading
individuals are already harmed through restricting their labour supply. The optimality
of workfare relative to a purely pecuniary welfare programme rests on the extent to
which workfare reduces, or ‘crowds out’, private earnings, thereby exacerbating the
poverty gap. Intuitively, the greater nl and the lower θ, the more likely workfare
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is to be optimal. Further, workfare is more likely to be optimal where earnings are
unobservable. It may therefore be more relevant in a developing country context, as
opposed to a developed one. Where poverty is partly endogenous, in the sense that
ability is determined partly by effort earlier in life, it may be optimal to impose a
‘maximal’ work requirement that leaves a low type indifferent to welfare programme
participation, thereby incentivising effort earlier in life (Besley and Coate, 1992).
1.1.2 Awards Technology that ‘Tags’ only Needy Individu-
als.
In each of the frameworks considered so far there have been two types of individual and
the aim has been to design a mechanism that prevents the non-needy from claiming
benefits. In this section we now discuss optimal transfers when the government can
use categorical information to ‘tag’ individuals as needy and award them categorical
transfers. It will be assumed that only needy individuals are tagged, though not neces-
sarily all needy individuals. Issues surrounding masquerading are therefore abstracted
from and the awards technology does not make false award errors.
These analyses are firmly grounded in the optimal income tax framework originat-
ing from Mirrlees (1971). It is therefore natural to first discuss the standard uni-
dimensional model of optimal taxation; where individuals differ over a continuum of
productivities. This has the benefit of allowing us to explore optimal universal welfare
provision. Following the seminal contribution of Akerlof (1978), we then introduce
categorical heterogeneity into the optimal tax framework. The government will have
access to technology that allows it to partition society into categorical groups and
design tax/transfer schedules using this information.
The Uni-Dimensional Optimal Tax Framework
The standard optimal nonlinear tax framework originates from Mirrlees (1971). It also
provides the framework for optimal linear taxation (Sheshinski, 1972). Individuals have
identical preferences over consumption, x ≥ 0, and labour, H ∈ [0, 1], as represented
by the utility function u(x,H). The standard assumptions apply: u is continuous,
increasing in x (ux > 0), decreasing in H (uH < 0) and strictly concave (uxx < 0 ,
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uHH < 0 , uxxuHH − u2xH > 0). Individuals differ in the sole dimension of productivity
(n); where n is continuously distributed with density function f(n) and associated
distribution function F (n).
Social welfare takes the (generalised) utilitarian form W =
∫
G(u)f(n)dn, where G
is a monotonic concave (or linear) transformation of individual utility.8 Note that if
G(u) = u (or equivalently if G′(u) = 1) the government is strictly utilitarian and
a desire for redistribution arises solely from the concavity of individual utility. For
simplicity, we throughout focus on this case. Given this objective, the government
wishes to design a redistributive tax schedule but is constrained by the fact that it
only observes earnings (which are endogenous to the tax system) and not the two
drivers of these earnings: productivity and labour supply (effort). This gives rise to the
fundamental tradeoff between redistributive gains (equity) and behavioural responses
(efficiency). Redistribution from high earners to low earners is desirable on the grounds
of diminishing marginal utility of income, but taxes have a distortionary affect on
individual behaviour.
Benchmark: First-Best (Lump-Sum) Taxation
As a benchmark case it is useful to first outline the first-best tax optimum which
would arise if the government could in fact observe individual productivity. This will
also prove useful for the later discussion of categorical transfers, which share a number
of similarities with first-best taxation (Viard, 2001a). Note that a tax on individual
productivity is non-distortionary in the sense that individuals cannot alter the amount
of tax they pay through adjusting their labour supply.
Let M(n) be a lump-sum tax/transfer that is conditioned on individual productivity.
Individual labour supply (H∗) and the resulting indirect utility function (v) are:
H∗[n,M(n)] ≡arg max
H∈[0,1]
u[nH +M(n), H]
v[n,M(n)] ≡u[nH∗ +M(n), H∗]
(1.10)
8This welfare function is the dominant approach in much of public finance. For useful discussions
see Beath et al. (1988); Lewis and Ulph (1988); Mankiw and Weinzierl (2010); Piketty and Saez (2012);
Saez and Stantcheva (2013).
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where at an interior solution H∗ > 0 satisfies n = −uH/ux. By the envelope theorem
we have:
∂v
∂n
=uxH
∗ +
∂H∗
∂n
(nux + uH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= uxH
∗
∂v
∂M
=ux +
∂H∗
∂M
(nux + uH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
= ux
(1.11)
from which we obtain Roy’s identity vn = vMH
∗ and thus vnM = vMMH∗+vMH∗M . By
the concavity of utility and the normality of leisure it is straightforward to establish
that H∗M < 0 and thus vnM < 0: i.e. the marginal indirect utility of unearned income
is decreasing in productivity.
From (1.11) we can readily establish that:
dv
dn
=
∂v
∂n
+
∂v
∂M
M ′(n) = ux (H∗ +M ′) (1.12)
dH∗
dn
=
∂H∗
∂n
+
∂H∗
∂M
M ′(n) =
∂Hc
∂n
+
∂H∗
∂M
(H∗ +M ′) (1.13)
where Hc is compensated labour supply satisfying the Slutsky-Hicks equation:9
∂Hc
∂n
=
∂H∗
∂n
+H∗
∂H∗
∂M
(1.14)
With this by way of background, the ability-dependent tax transfer schedule M(n) is
9The expenditure minimisation problem is:
min
x,H
x− nH s.t. u(x,H) ≥ u¯
Let xc(n, u) , Hc(n, u) and the lagrange multiplier µc(n, u) denote the optimal choices. The FOC’s
characterising these choices are:
(x) : 1− µcµx = 0 , (H) : n+ µcuH = 0 , (µ) : u− u¯ = 0
Let E(n, u) = xc − nHc denote the resulting expenditure function. By the envelope theorem:
∂E
∂n
=
∂xc
∂n
(1− µcux)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−∂H
c
∂n
(n+ µcuH)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−∂µ
c
∂n
(u− u¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
−Hc = −Hc
Differentiating the identity Hc(n, u) = H∗(n,E(n, u)) w.r.t. n then gives (1.14) in the main text.
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chosen so as to:
max
M(n)
W =
∫ ∞
0
v[n,M(n)]f(n)dn (1.15)
s.t.
∫ ∞
0
M(n)f(n)dn−R = 0
Letting Mˆ(n) denote the resulting optima, we have:
vM [n, Mˆ(n)] = λ ∀ n (1.16)
The left side of (1.16) is the social marginal value of income (smvi) of a productivity n
individual, whilst the right side is the shadow price of public expenditure. Intuitively,
the condition states that the tax/transfer schedule M should be chosen so as to equate
the smvi of all ability types (Viard, 2001a,b).
Differentiating (1.16) with respect to n gives:
M ′(n) = −H∗ −
{
vM
vMM
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
≤0
HM ≤ 0 (1.17)
The optimal lump-sum transfer is therefore decreasing in productivity: i.e. higher
ability individuals will pay taxes (M < 0) to finance transfers (M > 0) to those of
lower ability. Substituting (1.17) into (1.12) and (1.13) clearly illustrates that at the
optimum we have dv/dn < 0 and dH∗/dn > 0 for all those who work. This arises
because it is efficient to encourage the most productive individuals in society to work
(see Hellwig, 1986; Helpman and Sadka, 1978; Viard, 2001a,b).10
10Suppose preferences are separable in consumption and labour and take the form u(x,H) = v(x)−
γH, where v′ > 0 and v′′ < 0. The first-best problem is now:
max
M(n)
∫ ∞
0
v[nH +M(n)]− γHf(n)dn s.t.
∫ ∞
0
M(n)f(n)dn−R = 0
The resulting FOC is v′[nH + M(n)] = λ ∀ n. This states that the marginal utility of consumption
should be equated across productivity types, and thus so too should be consumption. At the optimum
then, those with above average productivity will be taxed, whilst those with below average productivity
will receive transfers (Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2010). More eloquently: ‘the solution to this problem
in the abstract is that the richer should be taxed for the benefit of the poorer up to the point at which
complete equality of fortunes is attained’ (Edgeworth, 1897, p.553).
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Optimal Linear Income Tax Framework
In his seminal contribution on nonlinear taxation, Mirrlees (1971, p.208) discusses the
desirability of approximately linear income taxation and the administrative advantages
this would bring. Indeed, proponents of linear (flat) income taxes cite their administra-
tive simplicity and enhanced work incentives (Paulus and Peichl, 2009; Peichl, 2014).
Analytically, the analysis of linear income taxes captures the equity-efficiency tradeoff
inherent in income taxation more tractably than nonlinear taxation.
Individuals face the budget constraint x = n(1− t)H+B; where t ∈ (0, 1) is a constant
marginal tax rate on earnings and B is a tax-free universal benefit. B receives many
names in the literature, such as ‘demogrant’ or ‘basic income’ (see Van Parijs, 2004).
Atkinson (1995) employed this framework in his analysis of ‘the basic income/flat tax
proposal’.
An implication of providing a universal benefit is that there will be a reservation
productivity n¯ satisfying n¯(1−t) = −uH(B, 0)/ux(B, 0) at or below which an individual
will choose not to work. So for all n ≤ n¯: H∗ = 0; whilst for all n > n¯: H∗ > 0. To
save on notation, let y∗(n, 1 − t, B) = nH∗[n(1 − t), B] be individual gross earnings;
whilst y¯∗ =
∫
yf(n)dn is the average earnings in the economy.
In a population of size 1, the government’s problem is now described by:
max
t,B
W (t, B) =
∫ ∞
0
v[n(1− t), B]f(n)dn (1.18)
s.t. B = t
∫ ∞
0
y∗f(n)dn−R
where R is an exogenous revenue requirement for spending outside of welfare.
For the purpose discussing the results which follow, let the net smvi of a produc-
tivity individual be given by (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980; Atkinson, 1995; Viard,
2001a,b):
s(n, t,M, λ) =
ux(M, 0) : n ≤ n¯vM [n(1− t),M ] + λty∗M(n, 1− t,M) : n > n¯ (1.19)
where λ is the shadow price of public expenditure. For individuals who do not work s
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is simply the social marginal utility of income. Contrastingly, for individuals who do
work s also captures - in welfare units - the fact that an increase in unearned income
induces an individual to reduce their labour supply and thus lowers tax revenue. We
let s¯(t,M, λ) =
∫
sf(n)dn.
Let Bˆ and tˆ denote the optimal choices which result from (1.18). The first order
conditions (FOCs) characterising these optima are:
(B) : s¯
(
tˆ, Bˆ, λˆ
)
= λˆ (1.20)
(t) :
∫ ∞
0
{
−nvω + λˆ
[
y∗ − tˆ ∂y
∗
∂(1− t)
]}
f(n)dn = 0 (1.21)
where λˆ is the shadow price of public expenditure at the optimum.
Condition (1.20) states that at the optimum the average net smvi associated with an
increase in the universal benefit must equate with, in welfare units, the marginal cost of
increasing the benefit (given a population of size 1 this enters as unity). Next, following
(Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980) we can use Roy’s identity (vω = vMH
∗ = vMy∗/n) and
the Slutsky-Hicks equation11 to write (1.21) as:∫ ∞
0
y∗
(
1− vM
λˆ
− tˆ ∂y
∗
∂M
)
f(n)dn = tˆ
∫
∂yc
∂(1− t)f(n)dn
⇒
∫ ∞
0
y∗
(
λˆ− s
)
f(n)dn = tˆλˆ
∫
∂yc
∂(1− t)f(n)dn (1.22)
From (1.20) we know that s¯ = λˆ and so the left side of (1.22) can be written as
y¯∗s¯− ∫ y∗sf(n)dn = −Cov(y∗, s). Finally, dividing both sides of (1.22) by the net-of-
tax rate (1− t) thus gives the well-documented expression:
tˆ
1− tˆ =
−Cov(y, s)
λˆ
∫
yEcf(n)dn i.e.
(
Equity
Efficiency
)
(1.23)
11In terms of earnings, the Slutsky-Hicks equation can be written as:
∂yc
∂(1− t) =
∂y∗
∂(1− t) − y
∗ ∂y
∗
∂M
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where:
Ec = 1− t
y
· ∂y
c
∂(1− t)
is the compensated elasticity of earnings with respect to the net-of-tax rate.
The optimal tax expression in (1.23) has equity considerations in the numerator and
efficiency considerations in the denominator. The numerator is the negative of the
covariance between individual gross earnings and the net smvi. Under the frequently
employed assumption of agent monotonicity earnings will rise with productivity. Con-
trastingly, by ordinal properties the net smvi will fall with productivity. The intuition
is that the government would like to redistribute from those of high productivity (and
thus low smvi) towards those of low productivity (and thus high smvi).
This redistribution is constrained, however, by the efficiency considerations in the
denominator. Ceteris paribus, larger compensated elasticities of earnings favour lower
tax rates; with emphasis placed on both high productivities and productivities where
the population is most dense (Kaplow, 2008).
Moving Beyond the Uni-Dimensional Framework
Suppose that we modify the linear income tax framework so that a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1)
of the population faces a zero quantity constraint on labour supply and is thus unable
to work. The model remains otherwise the same.
In this case the government’s problem is:
max
t,B
W (t, B; θ) = θu(B, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
v[n(1− t), B]f(n)dn (1.24)
s.t. B = ty¯∗ −R
The FOCs characterising the optimal universal benefit and tax rate are now:
(B) : θux(Bˆ, 1) + (1− θ)s¯
(
tˆ, Bˆ, λˆ
)
f(n)dn = λˆ (1.25)
(t) :
tˆ
1− tˆ =
∫∞
0
y∗(λˆ− s)f(n)dn
λˆ
∫ Ecf(n)dn (1.26)
The presence of a dependent population means that we can no longer use the FOC
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characterising Bˆ to write the numerator of the optimal tax expression as the negative
of the covariance between earnings and the net smvi. Further, at the optimum we
can see that ux(Bˆ, 1) > λˆ > s¯(tˆ, Bˆ, λˆ) because the universal benefit does not remove
inequality in the average net smvi between the unable and able subpopulations. If the
government could condition transfers on disability, it would certainly seem desirable to
provide a categorical transfer to the unable (Atkinson, 1995).
Tagging Transfers: Categorical Heterogeneity
In the standard optimal tax model individuals differ in the sole dimension of produc-
tivity. However, the value of introducing additional dimensions of heterogeneity into
tax/transfer models - and exploiting this through categorical information - has been
known since Akerlof (1978). Akerlof considers a simple model in which there is a pop-
ulation composed of an equal share of high ability and low ability individuals. Low
ability individuals may only work in an easy job and earn (pre-tax/transfer) ne. Con-
trastingly, high ability individuals may choose to work in either (i) a difficult job and
earn (pre-tax/transfer) nd ; or (ii) an easy job and earn ne.
In the absence of any categorical information on ability, the government has in place
a tax/transfer system whereby those in difficult jobs pay a tax td ≥ 0 , whilst those in
easy jobs receive a transfer te ≥ 0. The utility of an individual working in an easy job
is u(ne + te), where u
′(·) > 0 and u′′(·) < 0. Meanwhile, the utility of an individual
working in a difficult job is u(nd− td)−γ, where γ captures the disutility of working in
the harder job. The assumption is made that u(nd)− γ > u(ne) such that, in absence
of any taxes or transfers, a high ability individual would always choose a difficult job.
Putting this all together, the government’s problem is described by:
max
te,td
W (td, te) =
1
2
max[u(nd − td)− γ, u(ne + te)] + 1
2
u(ne + te)
s.t. u(nd − td)− γ < u(ne + te)⇒ te = 0 (Incentive compatibility)
u(nd − td)− γ ≥ u(ne + te)⇒ td = te (Taxes = Transfers)
(1.27)
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The first condition states that if the tax system is such that high ability individuals pre-
fer easy jobs to difficult jobs then no tax revenue will be generated and consequently
te = 0. The second condition, meanwhile, states that tax revenue is used entirely
to finance transfers and, given the equal population shares, taxes equate with trans-
fers. Letting tˆd and tˆe denote the optimum transfers, it is straightforward to establish
that:12
tˆd = tˆe , u(nd − tˆd)− γ = u(ne + tˆe) (No Tagging Optimum) (1.28)
Next, when the government has can identify the fraction α ∈ (0, 1]13 of low ability
individuals as low ability, it chooses t′d, t
′
e (which may now be a tax or transfer) in
addition to a tagged transfer tl so as to:
max
t′d,t′e,tl
WTAG(t′d, t
′
e, tl) =
1
2
max {u(nd − t′d)− γ, u(ne + t′e)}
+
1
2
{αu(ne + tl) + (1− α)u(ne + t′e)}
s.t. u(nd − t′d)− γ < u(ne + t′e)⇒ αtl = −(2− α)t′e (Incentive compatibility)
u(nd − t′d)− γ ≥ u(ne + t′e)⇒ t′d = αtl + (1− α)t′e (Taxes = Transfers)
(1.29)
The incentive compatibility condition simply states that if everyone chooses easy jobs
then any tax on easy jobs must finance transfers to tagged individuals. Akerlof (1978)
12Drawing on Akerlof (1978), the proof tests two hypotheses.
(i) First, suppose that u(nd − tˆd) − γ > u(ne + tˆe) and let t˜d = tˆd + . From (1.27), a Taylor
approximation of W (t˜d, t˜e) around  = 0 yields W (tˆd, tˆe) +
1
2 [u
′(ne − tˆe) − u′(nd − tˆd)] ·  + σ,
where lim→0 σ = 0. Next, the assumption that u(nd − tˆd) − γ > u(ne − tˆe) implies, via the
fact that u′′ < 0, that u′(nd − tˆd) < u′(ne + te). From the Taylor approximation, this implies
that W (t˜d, t˜e) > W (tˆd, tˆe) for small . But this contradicts the fact that tˆd and tˆe are optimum.
The assertion that u(nd − tˆd) − γ > u(ne + tˆe) must therefore be false. (ii) Next, suppose that
u(nd − td) − γ < u(ne + te) and thus t∗e = 0 because no high skilled individuals works in a difficult
job. Total welfare thus becomes u(ne). But by the concavity of welfare this can be easily improved
upon 12u(nd)− γ + 12u(ne). Putting this all together, it must hold that u(nd − td)− γ = u(ne + te).
13Note that if α < 1 some low ability individuals are not tagged. This is analogous to a Type I
(false rejection) error.
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demonstrates that, at the optimum:
tˆl > tˆe , u(nd − t′d)− γ = u(ne + t′e) (1.30)
So it is welfare enhancing to award tagged individuals higher transfers than untagged
workers in easy jobs. An increase in the transfer size provides less of an incentive for
skilled workers to move to an easy job than in the no tagging case, where all those in
an easy job receive a non-negative transfer.
Following Akerlof (1978) , a number of papers introduce categorical transfers into the
optimal tax framework (both linear and nonlinear). These papers assume that the
government can perfectly partition society into categorical groups and thus has two
tools available to it: categorical transfers and income based taxes/transfers.
Categorical Transfers in the Linear Income Tax Framework
Viard (2001a,b) analyses categorical transfers in the the optimal linear income tax
framework. Using categorical information on exogenous characteristics which are cor-
related with ability, the planner can perfectly classify individuals into J disjoint groups,
each with its own ability distribution, fj(n). Each group represents the proportion
θj ; j = 1, ..., J of the total population, where
∑
j θj = 1 and
∑
j θjfj(n) = f(n).
In terms of information structure, the planner cannot observe ability but does know
the distribution of abilities for each group. However, because it knows the categori-
cal group to which an individual belongs, it can provide a categorical transfer Cj to
individuals in each group.
Putting this all together, the planner’s optimisation problem is described by:
max
Cj ,t
W =
∑
j
θj
∫ ∞
0
v[n(1− t), Cj]fj(n)dn
s.t.
∑
j
θjCj ≤
∑
j
θj · t
∫ ∞
0
nH∗[n(1− t), Cj]fj(n)dn−R
(1.31)
where R is an exogenous revenue requirement14.
14Viard (2001a, p.489) notes in his numerical analysis that Cj ≥ 0: a negative transfer would
harm too much the very low productivity individuals in a categorical group. Categorical transfers are
therefore financed entirely through tax revenue.
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Letting Cˆj and tˆ denote the optimal choices, the FOC characterising optimal categorical
transfers is:
∫ ∞
0
s
(
n, tˆ, Cˆj, λˆ
)
fj(n)dn = λˆ ∀ j (1.32)
At the optimum then, the role of categorical transfers is to eliminate inequality in the
average net smvi between categorical groups. Viard (2001a) notes the ‘fundamental’
similarity between categorical transfers and first-best lump-sum transfers, as can be
seen from comparing (1.32) with (1.16). Whilst lump-sum transfers eliminate inequal-
ity in the smvi between indivdiuals, categorical transfers aim to (if feasible) eliminate
inequality in the average net smvi between categorical groups. In the first case, the
planner has information on each individual, whilst in the second it only has infor-
mation on categorical groups. In the extreme case where the planner has categorical
information on characteristics which are perfectly correlated with earnings ability, the
two types of transfers coincide and the planner can eliminate inequality in the smvi
across all individuals. Analogous to first-best, optimal categorical transfers are shown
to be decreasing in group average ability under the assumption that HMM < 0 and
HMω < 0. This assumption guarantees that the net smvi is decreasing in both ω and
M . Further, categorical transfers can induce some quantiles of higher ability groups
to have greater labour supply and lower utility levels than their counterparts in lower
ability groups.
In reporting the optimal tax formula Viard (2001a,b) implicitly assumes that (1.32)
holds: this allows the optimal tax expression to be written analogously to that in
the unidimensional model where individuals differ only in productivity (i.e. equation
1.23). Chapter 3 of this thesis will return to discuss the appropriateness of this as-
sumption.
Viard (2001b) notes that categorical transfers and the income tax are imperfect substi-
tutes: The former remedies between-group inequality but not within-group inequality,
whilst the latter plays some role in addressing both. Numerical simulations using a
log-normal ability distribution and CES utility function are used to provide some sup-
port to propositions which follow from linear approximations of first-order conditions.
Whenever there is low within-group inequality or labour supply is highly elastic, the
importance of categorical transfers relative to the income tax as a redistributive tool
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is increased. Because the income tax is used to a lesser extent, a greater proportion
of the between-group inequality is remedied by the perfectly administered categorical
transfers, as captured by larger differences in transfers between-groups.
Categorical Transfers in the NonLinear Income Tax Framework
In a nonlinear income tax framework, Immonen et al. (1998) explore a similar issue to
Viard (2001a,b). Specifically, categorical information is used identify a proportion θ ∈
(0, 1) of the population as belonging to categorical group a, whilst the remaining (1−θ)
of the population fall into categorical group b. The distribution of ability within each of
the two groups is given by the density function fj(n) ; j ∈ {a, b}, with corresponding
distribution function Fj(n). There may also be heterogeneity in individual preferences,
as given by uj(x,H), where x denotes consumption and H labour time. An individual
from group j faces the budget constraint x = nH − Tj(nH), where Tj denotes the
group specific nonlinear tax schedule. An individual’s resulting indirect utility function
is vj(n). Given this, the government’s overall problem is to choose group specific tax
schedules and revenue requirements, given an overall exogenous revenue requirement
of R, so as to:
max
Tj ,Rj
W =
∫ ∞
0
[θva(n)fa(n) + (1− θ)vb(n)fb(n)]dn
s.t. Ra +Rb = R =
∫ ∞
0
[θTafa(n) + (1− θ)Tbfb(n)]dn
(1.33)
This overall problem can, however, be decomposed into a two-stage problem. In the
first stage, the government solves the within-group standard Mirrlees problem, taking
as arbitrarily fixed Rj:
max
Tj
W j =
∫ ∞
0
vj(n)fj(n)dn s.t.
∫ ∞
0
Tjfj(n)dn = Rj (1.34)
Given the optimal tax schedules from the first stage, the government then chooses the
optimal group specific revenue requirements so as to:
max
Ra
W = W a(Ra) +W
b(R−Ra) (1.35)
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The authors reconcile tensions between the Dilnot et al. (1984) argument of increasing
(decreasing) marginal tax rates in the poor (rich) groups and the conventional optimal
income tax literature result of decreasing marginal rates in income. Through numerical
simulations employing CES preferences15 and lognormal ability distributions, Immonen
et al. (1998) argue that the intuition relating the two-dimensional and one-dimensional
problems respectively, lies in group-specific revenue requirements and intergroup re-
distribution. Specifically, the revenue requirement for the poor group will differ in
magnitude and potentially sign, thereby capturing intergroup transfers.
Next, in a setting where individual ability is revealed through successful job search,
Boone and Bovenberg (2006) model the optimal combination of (i) an out-of-work
(welfare) benefit; and (ii) in-work benefits , with the latter delivered directly through
the nonlinear tax-schedule individuals face. There are two sources of inequity in the
model: disparities in ability and involuntary unemployment. Formally, ability, n, is
distributed continuously in the interval [n, n¯] with density function f(n). Individuals
have quaslinear preferences u(x,H) = v(x) − H ; v′ > 0 , v′′ < 0, where x is con-
sumption and H is labour supplied16. An individual who does not work therefore has
utility v(B), where B is the out-of-work welfare benefit. Contrastingly, an individual
who does work has utility u(n) = v[x(n)]− y∗(n)/n, where y∗ = nH∗ is gross earnings
and x(n) = y∗(n)− T (n) is net earnings.
In this static model individuals search for a job and the probability of finding a job
is given directly be the search effort e ∈ [0, 1]. The costs involved in searching with
intensity e are given by the cost function k(e).17 Individuals choose search intensity e
so as to:
u˜ = max
e
e · u(n) + (1− e)v(B)− γ · e (1.36)
Note that through finding a job an individual’s ability is revealed to the government.
15Specifically, they use functions where the elasticity of substitution between consumption and
leisure is 1 (i.e. Cobb-Douglas) and 0.5, respectively.
16As Boone and Bovenberg (2006) state, the assumption of quaslinear preferences that are concave
in consumption and linear in labour renders a utilitarian government concerned with the distribution
of consumption, but not the distribution of labour effort.
17For simplicity, we omit the precise properties of the cost function, which are stated in detail in
Boone and Bovenberg (2006, p.169).
CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 42
The utilitarian government’s problem is formally described by:
max
s,y,x
∫ n¯
n
u˜(n)f(n)dn (1.37)
s.t. B
∫ n¯
n
[1− s(n)]f(n)dn︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit expenditure on those
who do not find a job
=
∫ n¯
n
s(n)T (n)f(n)dn−R︸ ︷︷ ︸
Tax Revenue net
of Revenue requirement
The conclusions reached in the paper depend - among other things - on whether the
government can optimise with respect to both the welfare benefit level and the nonlinear
tax-schedule, or just the latter (taking the welfare benefit level as exogenously given).
In the first case, the in-work benefits may exceed the welfare benefit due to the effect
that the welfare benefit has on tax rates. Whilst high welfare benefits assist the most
needy (the unemployed), they require the tax rate to be lowered on high productivity
workers to prevent these workers departing the labour force in favour of receiving the
welfare benefit. In contrast, in-work benefits have no such disincentive effects because
the government can observe the ability of workers. Meanwhile, in the second case
the authors describe a U-shaped relationship between welfare benefits and in-work
benefits: A marginal increase in the welfare benefit from low levels substitutes for in-
work benefits because the labour force participation constraint of high ability workers is
non-binding (i.e. they are not incentivised to depart the labour force). However, higher
levels of the welfare benefit require higher in-work benefits because the participation
constraint becomes binding.
1.1.3 Awards Technology with Two-Sided Classification er-
rors
A third strand of literature explores optimal transfers when the test, or monitoring
technology, administering a given benefit makes two-sided classification errors. The
propensity to make classification errors is largely taken to be exogenous, though a few
papers do endogenize the propensities by making the test accuracy a function of the
resources dedicated to it.
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Exogenous Awards Technology
Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) model the optimal provision of (i) a disability benefit;
and (ii) a retirement benefit, when the test determining disability makes both Type I
and Type II classification errors. All individuals have the same marginal product of
unity but differ over a continuum of labour disutilities, γ ≥ 0 , which are distributed
by the continuous density function f(γ) and corresponding distribution function F (γ).
An individual who works derives utility u˜(xw) − γ, where u˜′(·) > 0 , u˜′′(·) < 0 and
xw is the consumption level associated with working. Contrastingly, an individual who
does not work will have utility u(xi) , i ∈ {d, r} , where u′(·) > 0 , u′′(·) < 0; xd
is the consumption when receiving the disability benefit; and xr is the consumption
when receiving the retirement benefit. The retirement benefit is received automatically
by anyone who is (a) not working and (b) not receiving the disability benefit. The
disability benefit, however, must be applied for. The assumption is made that xd ≥ xr.
The probability that a given individual with imperfectly observable labour disutility
γ is awarded the disability benefit is given by ρ(γ), where ρ′(γ) > 0. Drawing this all
together, we can establish that:
1. An individual will choose to work over all other options (apply for disability,
retire) if u˜(xw)−γ > u(xd) ≥ u(xr). This implies that there is a critical disutility
level, γ¯d above which an individual will apply for disability benefits, and which
satisfies:
u˜(xw)− γ¯d ≡ u(xd) (1.38)
2. Conditional on applying for the disability benefit (i.e. γ > γ¯d) and being rejected
it, an individual will work if γ¯d ≤ γ ≤ γ¯r, where γ¯r satisfies:
u˜(xw)− γ¯r ≡ u(xr) (1.39)
3. Conditional on applying for the disability benefit and being rejected it, an indi-
vidual will choose to retire if γ¯r ≤ γ.
Given a fixed budget of size β, the government chooses the consumption levels xw, xd
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and xr so as to maximize the utilitarian social welfare function:
max
xw,xd,xr
W =
∫ γ¯d
0
[u˜(xw)− γ]dF (γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Those who always work
+
∫ γ¯r
γ¯d
[ρ(γ)u(xd) + (1− ρ(γ))(u˜(xw)− γ)]dF (γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Those who apply for the disability benefit but work if rejected it
+
∫ ∞
γ¯R
[ρ(γ)u(xd) + (1− ρ(γ))u(xr)]dF (γ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Those who apply for the disability benefit and are retired
s.t. β =
∫ γ¯d
0
[xw − 1]dF (γ) +
∫ γ¯r
γ¯d
[ρ(γ)xw + (1− ρ(γ))(xw − 1)]dF (γ)
+
∫ ∞
γ¯r
[ρ(γ)xd + (1− ρ(γ))xr]dF (γ)
(1.40)
Diamond and Sheshinski (1995) demonstrate that, provided u˜′(xw) < u′(xd) ≤ u′(xr),
a sufficient condition to have xˆd > xˆr is that ρ
′(γ) > 0, as assumed. In choosing the
optimal benefit levels there is a tradeoff between (i) the reduction in labour supply
(in the extensive margin) that a marginal increase in benefits brings; and (ii) the aim
to efficiently allocate consumption across individual types. The optimal consumption
levels are chosen so as to balance the labour supply reduction associated with an in-
crease in benefits. Were labour disutility perfectly observable then it would be optimal
to provide a single benefit which equates the marginal utility of workers with that of
non-workers. However, because labour disutility is in fact imperfectly observed, the
optimal disability and retirement benefits are optimally set at lower levels to encourage
labour supply.
Within this literature, a number of papers alternatively model disability as a (0,1)
phenomenon and impose a zero quantity constraint on labour supply for the disabled.
When the benefit authority makes two-sided classification errors in tagging individuals
as disabled, Parsons (1996) shows, under a number of specific assumptions, that a ‘dual
negative income tax’ system providing incentives for tagged able individuals to work
is optimal. Individuals are ex-ante identical but face a probability θ ∈ (0, 1) of being
disabled and unable to work. Contrastingly, with probability (1−θ) an individual is able
to work. Any able individual who works has a marginal product of unity. Conditional
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on ability status, the probability that an individual is tagged is given by:
Prob. (Tagged when Disabled) = (1− pI) ; 0 ≤ pI ≤ 1
Prob. (Tagged when Able) = pII ; 0 ≤ pII ≤ 1
(1.41)
A Type I error (false rejection) is thus made with probability pI , whilst a Type II
error (false award) is made with probability pII . The assumption is made that (1 −
pI) > pII ⇔ pI + pII ≤ 1 and thus that the test awards the disability benefit to a
disabled individual with at least as high a probability as it awards it to a truly able
individual.
Individual preferences are given by u(x)−ζ ·γ, where u′ > 0; u′′ < 0; x is consumption;
γ is labour disutility; and ζ ∈ {0, 1} is a binary variable taking the value 1 if the
individual works. By definition, ζ = 0 for a disabled individual.
A ‘dual negative income tax’ system is characterised by the consumption levels xto , xo ,
xtw and xw, where the subscripts w and o capture the working and non-working states,
whilst the superscript t, or lack thereof, indicates whether or not an individual is tagged.
Under the assumption that all able individuals do in fact work, the government chooses
consumption levels so as to maximise a utilitarian social welfare function (which in this
case is equivalent to an individual’s expected utility):
max
xtn,xn,x
t
w,xw
W = (1− θ){(1− pII)[u(xw)− γ] + pII [u(xtw)− γ]}
+ θ
{
pIu(xo) + (1− pI)u(xto)
}
s.t. (1− θ) = θ {(1− pII)xw + pIIxtw}+ (1− θ){pIxo + (1− pI)xto} ,
u(xo) ≤ u(xw)− γ (Incentive compatibility constraint for untagged able),
u(xto) ≤ u(xtw)− γ (Incentive compatibility constraint for tagged able).
(1.42)
Note that resources in the economy are given by (1 − θ) because all individuals who
work produce a marginal product of unity. The analysis in Parsons proceeds as follows.
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It is first shown that the ‘dual negative income tax system’ {xto, xo, xtw, xw} must be
welfare superior to the single negative income tax system {xo, xw} with no tagging
because the latter is a available under the former (i.e. through setting xto = xo and
xtw = xw), but is not chosen whenever pI + pII < 1 - and thus whenever tagging brings
some useful information. Second, a dual negative income tax system can be welfare
improving over a ‘three price’ system {xo, xto, xw} if tagged able individuals - who are
voluntarily unemployed under the three price system because xo < xw < x
t
o - can be
induced to work for less than their marginal product. Formally then, there are gains
to be had from a dual negative income tax system relative to a three price system if
u(xto + 1)− γ > u(xto).
In a more general exposition than Parsons (1996) - and with the additional restriction
that tagged individuals are not allowed to work - Salanie´ (2002) shows that a higher
benefit (demogrant) should be awarded to those who are tagged relative to those who
are not. Once more, the proportion θ (resp. (1−θ)) of the population are unable (resp.
able) to work, and the terms pI and pII denote the propensity of the test awarding the
disability benefit to make Type I and Type II errors respectively, where pI + pII ≤ 1.
However, able individuals now differ over a continuum of productivities, n ≥ 0, with
distribution function F (n). All individuals who are not tagged as disabled receive a
demogrant B and are taxed T (nH) on any earnings, where the function T (·) may
be nonlinear and is treated as exogenous and fixed. Meanwhile, any individual who
is tagged as unable to work is (i) not allowed to work; and (ii) receives the tagged
demogrant Bt.
The disabled have preferences ud(x, l) = ud(M, 1) over consumption, x ≥ 0, and leisure,
l ∈ [0, 1], where M ∈ {B,Bt} depending on whether the individual is tagged or not.
Meanwhile, the able have utility:
va(n,M) ≡
ua[nH∗ − T (nH∗) +B, 1] if untaggedua(Bt, 1) it tagged (1.43)
The social utility of an unable individual is given by sd(M) = gd[ud(M, 1)], whilst
that of an able individual is given by sa(n,M) = ga[va(n,M)], where the function
gi; i ∈ {a, d} satisfies (gi)′(·) > 0 and (gi)′′(·) < 0. To proceed in the analysis,
Salanie´ (2002) makes the following standard assumptions:
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T ′(nH) ≥ 0 (A1)
H∗M(n,M) ≤ 0 (A2)
sanM(n,M) ≤ 0 (A3)
sdMM(M) ≤ 0 (A4a)
saMM(M) ≤ 0 (A4b)
saM(0,M) ≤ sdM(M) ∀M (A5)
(1.44)
Assumption 1 (i.e. A1) simply states that the marginal tax rate is non-negative;
A2 is the normality of leisure; A3 states that social marginal utility is decreasing in
productivity; A4 states that social utility is concave in M ; whilst A5 assumes that the
social marginal utility of an able individual with zero productivity is no higher than
that of an unable individual. Putting this all together, the government’s objective is
to choose B and Bt so as to:
max
B,Bt
W = θ
{
(1− pI)sd(Bt) + pIsd(B)
}
+ (1− θ)
{
pIIs
a(0, Bt) + (1− pII)
∫ ∞
0
sa(n,B)dF (n)
}
s.t. Bχ+Bt(1− χ)t ≤ (1− θ)(1− pII)
∫ ∞
0
tnH∗(n,M)dF (n)−R
(1.45)
where χ = θpI + (1− θ)(1− pII).
Under assumptions A1 - A5, Salanie´ (2002) demonstrates that B ≤ Bt (i.e. tagged
individuals should receive a higher benefit). Given that tagged individuals are not al-
lowed to work, the unusual feature of this model is the absence of application decisions.
Indeed, it can be seen from the second line of (1.45) that the proportion pII of all able
individuals are tagged. This must however, be incentive incompatible: all those with
productivity exceeding some critical level would rather receive the lower benefit B and
be allowed to work, as opposed to receiving the higher benefit Bt with the imposed
zero quantity constraint on labour supply.
In the Salanie´ (2002) analysis the tax schedule is exogenous and consequently no focus
is placed on how the propensity to make classification errors may affect the optimal
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tax schedule (and the benefit levels). To gain some insights into this question we turn
to Stern (1982), who compares (i) imperfect lump-sum taxation and linear income tax-
ation; with (ii) optimal nonlinear income taxation. For the purpose of this discussion,
we are concerned with the first of these. There are two ability types in the economy:
unskilled and skilled. Let nl denote the gross wage of an unskilled individual, whilst
nh > nl denotes the gross wage of a skilled individual. These wages are endogenous
to the model and are determined as the marginal product of a given production func-
tion. Both types of individual have identical preferences u(x,H) over consumption and
labour. In terms of the population, there are θ unskilled individuals and (2− θ) skilled
individuals.18
A lump-sum tax system provides a tax/transfer Ci; i ∈ {l, h} to each individual that
is conditioned on ability type. Earned income is taxed at the linear (flat) rate t ∈
(0, 1). The consumption of an individual of type i is therefore given by xi = (1 −
t)niHi + Ci. Let H
∗
i and v denote optimal labour supply and the resulting indirect
utility function, respectively. Importantly, the lump sum grants are administered with
classification errors such that (i) an unskilled individual is incorrectly classified as
skilled with probability pl; whilst (ii) a skilled individual is incorrectly classified as
unskilled with probability ph.
Given these classification error propensities, it is straightforward to see that the average
labour supply of the unskilled and skilled ability types is given by:
H¯l = (1− pl)H∗l [(nl(1− t), Cl] + plH∗l [nl(1− t), CH ]
H¯h = (1− ph)H∗h[(nh(1− t), Ch] + phH∗h[nh(1− t), Cl]
(1.46)
The wages nl and nh are driven endogenously by the production function Y = F [θH¯
l, (2−
θ)H¯h], where nl = F1 and nh = F2:
Putting this all together, the government chooses the parameters t and Cl so as to:
18For much of the analysis Stern (1982) restricts attention to the case where θ = 1 such that there
are any equal number of low and high ability individuals.
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max
t,Cl
W = θ {(1− pl)vρ[nl(1− t), Cl] + plvρ[nl(1− t), Ch]}
+ (2− θ) {(1− ph)vρ[nh(1− t), Ch] + phvρ[nh(1− t), Cl]}
s.t. χlCl + χhCh = tY −R
(1.47)
where χl = [(2 − θ)(1 − pl) + θph] denotes the number of individuals classified as
unskilled; whilst χh = [(2 − θ)pl + θ(1 − ph)] denotes the fraction classified as skilled.
The parameter ρ captures the government’s concern for equity (i.e. a concern for equity
beyond that of deceasing marginal utility of income).19 The term R is an exogenous
revenue requirement.
Adopting Constant Elasticity of Substitution (CES) preferences and a Cobb-Douglas
production function, Stern numerically simulates the optima (t, Cl, Ch) under various
parameter assumptions. With no classification errors it may be optimal to impose
a lump-sum tax on skilled individuals to finance transfers to the unskilled, with the
optimum income tax rate set at zero. So in this case Cl = −Ch > 0. However, a
positive propensity to misclassify the unskilled and skilled exposes the former to the
risk of receiving a smaller and even negative transfer. This is welfare reducing and,
consequently, the linear income tax may rise to ensure that transfers to the skilled are
positive. In summary, the simulations illustrate that the optimal linear tax rate tends
to increase with the propensity to make either error type.20
Endogenous Awards Technology Accuracy
A number of papers explore an endogenous eligibility test (monitoring technology)
that makes two-sided classification errors. First, Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) explicitly
19So if ρ = 1 we have the standard utilitarian case whereby the concern for equity arises solely from
individual risk aversion (concavity).
20In terms of the comparison between (i) imperfect lump sum taxation and (ii) nonlinear taxation,
the numerical results in Stern (1982) illustrate that the critical error propensity at which lump-
sum taxation and optimum income taxation become equally desirable is highly dependent on the
distributional values that the government has, as embodied in ρ. In particular, the greater the concern
the government exhibits for equality, the lower the size of classification errors that will be tolerated
before optimum taxation becomes preferable to an imperfect lump-sum system. In general, whenever
classification errors are sufficiently small, it is optimal to rely on lump-sum taxation.
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model the eligibility test adopted by the benefit authority and capture the interplay
between screening intensity - or test complexity - and benefit applications. Whilst
screening intensity improves the estimation of individual ability, it also imposes a cog-
nitive cost on applicants. This cognitive cost may deter some truly eligible individuals
from applying for a given benefit. The paper therefore goes beyond the standard def-
initions of Type I (false rejection) and Type II (false award) errors around a given
eligibility threshold - both of which are conditional on applying for a benefit - to also
include ‘Type Ia’ errors arising from incomplete take-up by eligibles.
Individuals differ in both (i) their innate ability (n); and (ii) the ‘precision’ with which
this innate ability can be measured (σ). Any individual who applies for a benefit B is
subject to tests which provide the unbiased estimate of their true ability ne = n+ /pi;
where  ∼ N (0, σ2) and pi is the screening intensity (e.g. number of tests). Given an
eligibility threshold of n˜, an applicant will only be awarded the benefit B if ne ≤ n˜;
and thus if  < (n˜ − n)pi. Let /σ be distributed with distribution function A(/σ).
The probability that an individual with characteristics n and σ will, conditional on
applying, be awarded benefits is therefore:
Award Probability = A
{
(n˜− n)pi
σ
}
(1.48)
Individual preferences over consumption (x) and application costs (K(pi)) are given
by, u[x − µK(pi)], where u′ > 0; u′′ ≤ 0; K ′ > 0; and µ ∈ {0, 1} denotes whether an
application has been made. Application costs are therefore an increasing function of
complexity. An individual will thus apply for the benefit B if;
A
{
(n˜− n)pi
σ
}
· {u[n+B −K(pi)]− u[n−K(pi)]} ≥ u(n)− u[n−K(pi)]
and therefore if:
A
{
(n˜− n)pi
σ
}
> A¯
{
(n˜− n)pi
σ
}
≡ u(n)− u[n−K(pi)]
u[n+B −K(pi)]− u[n−K(pi)] (1.49)
To simplify the analysis, Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) impose constant absolute risk
aversion (CARA) preferences on the utility function. This eliminates the dependence of
the reservation probability, A¯, on individual ability. The function A¯ therefore depends
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only on σ and pi. Accordingly, the threshold precision level , σ¯n at which A = A¯ (i.e.
at which the award probability renders an individual indifferent between applying or
not) is given by21:
σ¯n =
(n˜− n)pi
A−1A¯
(1.50)
Turning to the population, there are two ability types: low (nl) and high (nh). Both
ability groups has a distribution of precision parameters, σ ∈ [0,∞), as given by
Fi(σ) ; i =∈ {l, h}. Now, given an exogenously fixed budget size, β, and an income
maintenance objective of providing a minimum benefit B to those of low ability, the
government chooses (i) the screening intensity; (ii) the eligibility threshold; and (iii)
the benefit level parameters so as to:
max
pi,n¯,B
∫ σ¯l
0
A
[
(ne − n)pi
σ
]
dFl(σ)
s.t.
{∫ σ¯l
0
A
[
(ne − n)pi
σ
]
dFl(σ) +
∫ σ¯h
0
A
[
(ne − n)pi
σ
]
dFl(σ)dFh(σ)
}
B ≤ β ,
B ≥ B
(1.51)
Kleven and Kopczuk (2011) go on to show that (i) optimal targeting programmes
feature high screening intensity for the purposes of restricting the conventional Type
I and Type II errors and (ii) to go some way to combatting the negative effect of high
screening intensity on take-up by eligibles, the government can use its two remaining
instruments.
Jacquet (2014) models the optimal provision of disability and income-based (welfare)
benefits when the monitoring technology administering the disability benefit is costly
and classification errors are a function of the resources dedicated to the monitoring
technology. Individual applications are, however, taken to be costless. Individuals
differ along the two dimensions of productivity at work and labour disutility. First, an
21Setting A = A¯ gives 1σ (n
e − n)pi = A−1A¯⇒ σ¯n = (n
e−n)pi
A−1A¯ .
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individual may be disabled or able bodied and disability status is perfectly correlated
with productivity. That is, a disabled individual commands a low productivity, nl,
whilst an able individual commands a high productivity, nh, where of course nh >
nl > 0. Whilst a disabled person can only engage in low productivity work, an able
person may choose to engage in either low or high productivity work22. Turning to
the second dimension of heterogeneity, individuals differ continuously in the disutility
they experience at work - where work is modelled in the extensive margin. Notice
that this approach to modelling disability is similar to that in Diamond and Sheshinski
(1995).
However, the source of this disutility depends on whether an individual is disabled or
able. The disutility a disabled individual endures working - denoted by γd - arises due
to physical or mental pain. Contrastingly, the disutility an able individual experiences
when working - as denoted by γa - is due to distaste for work. These parameters are
distributed with density functions fd and fa and corresponding distribution functions
Fd and Fa respectively. The benefit authority is taken to know these distributions but
cannot observe an individual’s γ. Finally, individual utility takes the quasilinear form
u(x)− γ , where x denotes consumption and u′(x) > 0, u′′(x) ≤ 0.
The awards technology administering the disability benefit makes Type I errors with
probability pI(K) and Type II errors with probability pII(K), where K(pI , pII) is the
cost per applicant of running the test. It is assumed that ∂K/∂pI < 0 and ∂K/∂pII < 0.
Intuitively, this captures the idea that a reduction in the resources devoted to the
test lower its accuracy . Let xh ≥ xl > xd ≥ xw denote consumption levels when (i)
working in a high productivity job; (ii) working in a low productivity job; (iii) receiving
disability benefits; and (iv) receiving welfare benefits, respectively. Applications for
the disability benefit are costless. It is therefore straightforward to see that application
decisions are driven by labour disutilities and are independent of error propensities.
Specifically, a disabled individual with disutility γd who has been rejected the disability
benefit will only work if γ ≤ γ¯d, where:
u(xl)− γ¯d ≡ u(xw) (1.52)
In terms of application decisions, a disabled individual will only apply for xd in the
22In the model Jacquet (2014) demonstrates that it is never optimal for an able individual to choose
low productivity employment.
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first place if γ > γ¯d, where:
u(xl)− γ¯d ≡ u(xd) (1.53)
where γ¯d ≤ γ¯d because u(xd) ≥ u(xw) ⇔ xd ≥ xw. Analogous definitions of γ¯a and γ¯a
hold for able individiuals.
Jacquet (2014) adopts a ‘paternal’ objective function which gives no weight to the
disutility of able individuals (i.e. that arising from distaste for leisure). Where θ ∈
(0, 1) denotes the proportion of disabled individuals in the population, paternal welfare
is:
W P
= θ

∫ γ¯d
0
[u(xl)− γd]dFd(γd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non-take-up
+pI
〈∫ γ¯d
γ¯d
[u(xl)− γd]dFd(γd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rejected disabled who work
+
∫ ∞
γ¯d
u(xw)dFd(γd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rejected disabled not working
〉
+ [1− F (γ¯d)]u(xd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Disabled awarded the benefit

+ (1− θ)

Fa(γ¯a)u(xh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Non Applicants
+(1− pII)
〈
[Fa(γ¯a)− Fa(γ¯a)]u(xh)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rejected able who work
+ [1− F (γ¯a)]u(xw)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Rejected able not working
〉
+ pII [1− Fa(γ¯a)]u(xd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Able awarded the benefit

(1.54)
The problem is then to:
max
{xh,xl,xd,xw,pI ,pII}
W P s.t.[1− Fd(γ¯d)] {[(1− pI)xd] +K(pI , pII)}+ (1− F (γ¯d)xl
+ [1− Fa(γ¯a)] {pIIxd +K(pI , pII)}+ (1− F (γ¯d))xw
= {Fd(γ¯d) + pI [Fd(γ¯d)− Fd(γ¯d)]} (nl − xl)
+ {Fa(γ¯a) + (1− pII)[Fa(γ¯a)− Fa(γ¯a)]} (nh − xh)
(1.55)
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The author demonstrates that optimum Type I errors balance the trade-off between (i)
the increased tax revenue due to some disabled individuals working and lower resources
devoted to monitoring; and (ii) the welfare loss associated with Type I errors. Optimum
Type II errors, meanwhile, balance the trade-off between (i) the benefit that more
accurate monitoring induces able individuals who would have previously received the
benefit to work, thus increasing tax revenue; and (ii) the monitoring costs of reducing
Type II errors (Jacquet, 2014).
In an alternative approach, Boadway et al. (1999) endogenise classification errors
through the effort that social workers exert in applying a monitoring technology (awards
test) on applicants. The population consists of (i) N high ability individuals, (ii) N low
ability individuals and (iii) N disabled individuals, where the latter are unable to work.
The high ability types pay taxes, whilst the low ability and disabled types receive trans-
fers of some fashion. For high and low ability individuals preferences are described by
ui(x, y) ; i ∈ {l, h} ;ux > 0 , uy < 0 where x is consumption and y earnings. Regarding
earnings, there is a minimal earning requirement of ymin which may or may not bind.
The disabled, meanwhile, have preferences ud(x) ; (ud)′(x) > 0 , (ud)′′(x) < 0 over con-
sumption. The government chooses (x, y) bundles for individuals and may operate a
two-tier welfare system composed of a general welfare benefit - where recipients may or
may not be allowed to work - and a targeted welfare benefit for the disabled. In either
case the high ability are offered a bundle (xh, yh) and those tagged as disabled receive
a bundle (xt, 0). Under a system where general welfare recipients are allowed to work
(system A), both the bundles (xl, yl) and (xd, 0) are offered. Untagged low ability indi-
viduals choose between these, whilst untagged disabled must receive the second bundle.
For their to be incentive compatability, the bundles must satisfy uh(xh, yh) ≥ ul(xl, yl)
(to induce the high ability to work) and ul(xl, yl) ≥ ul(xd, 0) (to induce the low abil-
ity to work). Contrastingly, under a system where general welfare recipients are not
allowed to work (system B), only the bundle (xd, 0) is offered. Under this system the
only incentive compatibility constraint to satisfy is uh(xh, yh) ≥ uh(xd, 0).
Regarding the awards test, let pi denote the probability that an individual of type i is
tagged, where ph = 0 and 0 ≤ pl ≤ 1/2 ≤ pd ≤ 1, where the latter two propensities will
depend on the effort exerted by social workers. Boadway et al. (1999) further assume
that:
p ≡ (1− pd)︸ ︷︷ ︸
Pr(Type I error)
= pl︸︷︷︸
Pr(Type II error)
(1.56)
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So the term p captures the effectiveness of the awards process - where p = 1/2 cor-
responds to the case where a disabled individual is tagged with the same probability
as a low skilled individual. This arises when the social worker exerts no effort. Social
workers are risk neutral and paid ns per client, which may be a low skilled or disabled
individual with equal probability.23 However, if the social worker is found to have
made an award error (of either Type I or Type II), an absolute fine of ns is invoked
upon them. There are two ways in which errors may be detected. First, under system
A where recipients are allowed to work, any untagged welfare recipients who are not
working must be disabled and untagged by Type I error. So the identification of Type I
errors is costless under system A. Second, the government may audit welfare recipients
with probability e and, in doing so, ascertain their true ability. Auditing, however, is
costly. Tagging therefore induces administrative costs, both in terms of paying social
workers to administer the awards test and in terms of auditing welfare recipients. The
costs of targeting a benefit may outweigh the benefits of discerning the disabled from
the low skilled, and lead the government to instead operate simple negative income tax
system.
Finally, the government wishes to maximise the welfare of the disabled, and so adopts
the social welfare function:
W = plu
d(xt, 0) + (1− pd)ud(xd, 0) (1.57)
Briefly, a number of conclusions emerge from the Boadway et al. (1999) analysis. First,
if social worker effort is observable and the minimum income constraint is non-binding,
system A will always be preferable to system B because low ability individuals can be
incentivised to work even with a positive marginal tax rate. Second, if the minimum
income constraint is binding it may be difficult to incentivise untagged low ability
individuals to work without resorting to a negative income tax scheme. Accordingly
system B may be preferred to system A depending on the cost of monitoring social
workers. Third, if the earnings constraint is not binding but effort is not observable,
the balance of considerations becomes more complicated. On the one hand, system
A may allow Type I errors to be identified through separation, but this implies that
social workers should simply tag everyone. It may therefore be optimal to adopt system
B.
23Because there are N low income and N disabled individuals who would like to be tagged.
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1.2 Individual Behaviour and Risk-Taking.
A small literature explores the fraudulent receipt of welfare benefits when individuals
risk being detected and fined. This literature predominantly focuses on unemploy-
ment insurance schemes and the specific costs that benefit conditionality places on
recipients.
The most notable contribution in this literature is that of Yaniv (1986), who considers
the decision of employed individuals to claim unemployment insurance benefits for a
duration of their time endowment. Individual preferences over consumption (x) are
given by u(x); where u′ > 0 and u′′ < 0. Further, for r(x) = −u′′(x)/u′(x) preferences
satisfy r′(x) < 0 and thus exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion. Let ω denote
an individual’s wage rate and D their full time allocation in days, giving rise to an
earned income of ωD. The worker may choose to fraudulently claim an unemployment
insurance benefit of B < ω per day, by sacrificing a proportion k of each claiming day
to labour exchange duties. The model does not feature voluntary unemployment, such
that any departure from providing labour for the full time endowment arises only due
to the decision to claim unemployment insurance and the resulting labour exchange
commitments. There is also a waiting period of q days before benefits can be received
such that, for z days of claiming, benefits are only received for z − q days.
Of course, claiming unemployment insurance for days spent working comes with the
risk of being detected and fined. Let ρ denote the detection probability and Fi the
fine imposed if detected. In this simple setting, Yaniv (1986) explores two alternative
fines from the tax evasion literature: the first is proportional to the duration of fraud-
ulent claims but independent of the benefit size (a` la Allingham and Sandmo, 1972);
whilst the second is proportional to the total benefit income fraudulently claimed (a` la
Yitzhaki, 1974). Formally;
Fi =
piz ; pi > B : i = 1φB(z − q) ; φ > 1 : i = 2 (1.58)
There are two states of the world: detected and not detected. Consumption when not
detected is given by xN = ω(D− kz) +B(z − q). Meanwhile, consumption if detected
will depend on the fine structure in place and is given by:
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xDi =
ωD −Bq + z(B − ωk − pi) : if i = 1ωD −Bq(1− φ) + z[B(1− φ)− ωk] : if i = 2 (1.59)
The individual problem is given by:
max
z
ρu(xDi) + (1− ρ)u(xN) ; i ∈ {1, 2} (1.60)
Assuming that the conditions for an interior solution (z > 0) are satisfied under both
penalty structures, the optimal number of claiming days under the respective schemes
- denoted by z1 and z2 - are characterised by:
ρu′(xD1)[B − ωk − pi] + (1− ρ)u′(xN)(B − ωk) = 0
ρu′(xD2)[B(1− φ)− ωk] + (1− ρ)u′(xN)(B − ωk) = 0
(1.61)
Through comparative statics exercises on these optimality conditions, Yaniv (1986)
generates the following results. First, dzi/dB differs with the fine structure due to
differences in income and substitution effects. Unsurprisingly, we have dz1/dB > 0
because (i) the expected fine remains unchanged such that the gains to fraud increase
with the benefit (positive substitution effect); and (ii) because preferences exhibit de-
creasing absolute risk aversion the greater expected income induces more fraud (via a
positive income effect). Contrastingly, the sign of dz2/dB is ambiguous because the
expected fine is increasing with the benefit level, thus generating income and substitu-
tion effects of opposing signs. Second, the sign of dzi/dω is ambiguous under both fine
structures because an increase in the wage increases the opportunity cost of labour ex-
change time (negative substitution effect), but encourages risk taking (positive income
effect)24. Turning to the effect of the enforcement parameters on the extent of fraud,
we have dzi/dρ < 0 ∀ i, dz1/dpi < 0, dz2/dφ < 0 and dzi/dk < 0. However, the affect
24Yaniv (1986) shows how dzi/dω would change if the unemployment insurance benefit was propor-
tional to earnings, and thus given by B = βωD ; 0 < β < 1. Under fine structure F1, an increase
in the wage increases in the benefit level but has no affect on the penalty, thereby generating only a
positive substitution effect. Contrastingly, under fine structure F2, an increase in the wage increase
both the benefit level and the fine level.
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of an increase in the waiting period differs between the two schemes, with dz1/dq < 0
and dz2/dq > 0. Under the second fine structure, an increase in q serves to, ceteris
paribus, reduce the expected penalty which generates a substitution effect which more
than offsets the income effect.
Next, Wolf and Greenberg (1986) analyse the binary choice of a benefit recipient to
either (i) fully report or (ii) not report any earned income to the welfare authority, given
an earnings stream of n per month for D months and zero thereafter. Individuals know
that the formula adopted by the benefit authority for determining monthly welfare
payments is max(0, B−tn), where B is the maximum monthly benefit and t is the ‘tax’
rate on earnings. So notice that if B = tn then the individual has no welfare entitlement
for the D months each earning n. Individual utility is linear in consumption and, for
those who do not report income, includes a linear disutility/stigma term, γ > 0, which
enters negatively. Further, an individual who does not report income faces a constant
probability ρ of being detected in any period j and being fined at a rate φj proportional
to the welfare income fraudulently obtained, as given by jmin(B, tn). Whilst it is
beyond the scope of this discussion to go into further detail, note that φj will depend
on (a) whether the benefit income incorrectly obtained exceeds a fraud prosecution
threshold; and (b) what the recipient’s true entitlement is.
Putting this all together, should an individual fully comply (C) with earnings reporting
then, given a monthly discount rate of δj, their present discounted value of utility is
simply given by:
uC = δ1[n+ max(0, B − tn)] + ...+ δD[n+ max(0, B − tn) + δD+1B + ... (1.62)
Contrastingly, should non-compliance (N ) be chosen the present discounted value of
utility takes into account that an individual may be detected in any period and, once
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detected, receives only their true entitlement thereafter. Formally, we have:
uN = ρ
{
δ1[n+B − φ1 min(B, tn)− γ] + δ2[n+ max(0, B − tn)]+
...+ δD[n+ max(0, B − tn)] + dD+1B + ..
}
+(1− ρ)ρ
{
δ1[n+B − γ] + δ2[n+B − φ2 min(B, tn)− γ] + δ3[n+ max(0, B − tn)]
+...+ δD[n+ max(0, B − tn)] + dD+1B + ...
}
...
+ (1− ρ)D−1ρ
{
δ1[n+B − γ] + ...+ δD−1[n+B − γ]+
δD[n+B − φD min(B, tn)− γ] + δD+1B + ..
}
+ (1− ρ)D {δ1[n+B − γ] + ...+ δD[n+B − γ] + δD+1B + ...}
(1.63)
Note that the welfare recipient makes the compliance decision once at the start of
earnings stream. Non-compliance will thus only be chosen over full compliance if uN >
uC. Unsurprisingly, the incentive to commit fraud is decreasing in the penalty imposed
if detected, φj, the detection probability, ρ, and on the disutility, γ, an individual
endures through committing fraud.
In the literature discussed so far the fraudulent activity involves either working or
not reporting earnings. However, given that benefits benefits may be conditioned on
spending time at the benefit office and/or providing evidence of job search, there is
another compliance decision to be made. Whilst Yaniv (1986) assumes that individuals
fully comply with this dimension of ex-post conditionality, other authors do not. We
proceed to discuss this below.
Burgess (1992) develops and empirically tests a simple theoretical model capturing
the eligibility compliance decision of unemployment insurance recipients, where main-
tained benefit receipt is conditional on job-search and filing requirements. Risk-neutral
recipients make their compliance decision by comparing the net gains of compliance
(C) with those of non-compliance (N). In both cases, the net gains can be decom-
posed into (i) benefit size, (ii) search and (iii) cost components. Compliant individuals
receive a benefit of B per week with certainty, whilst non-compliant individuals face
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an expected benefit of B(1 − ρφ), where ρ is the detection probability and (1 − φ)
is the proportion of the weekly benefit payment that can be retained. The present
discounted value of engaging in job search is given by δC[F (sC, e)] and δN [F (sN , e)],
respectively, where F (·) denotes the distribution of wage offers given a chosen search
intensity, sCor sN , and e is the employment state of the labour market. Unsurprisingly,
δC[f(sC, e)] > δN [F (sN , e)]. Let an individual’s weekly time opportunity costs be k.
A compliant individual who spends the fraction sC of the week searching for employ-
ment and the fraction a ‘filing’ at the benefit office has a weekly time cost k(sC + a).
Contrastingly, a non-compliant individual does not incur a and has weekly time cost
k(sN ).
Putting this all together, the probability that an individual will choose to comply is
given by:
Prob
Bρφ︸︷︷︸
Benefit
+ δC[F (sC, e)]− δN [F (sN , e)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Search
− k(a+ sC − sN )︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost
> 0

Burgess (1992) notes that even when ρ = 0 compliance may still be chosen should the
gains in the present discounted values of job search exceed the cost of compliance. It is
straightforward to see that the returns to benefit compliance are increasing in ρ and φ
(i.e. decreasing in (1−φ)). Notice that the conditionality parameter a - corresponding
to time spent filing - enters only through the cost term and plays no productive role
through search. Accordingly, the tightening of this eligibility requirement actually
serves to reduce compliance.
1.3 Empirical Studies: Classification Error Estimates
and Labour Force Participation Disincentives.
In the models discussed in Section 1.1.3 it is assumed that the technology awarding
benefits has a propensity to make classification errors of both Type I (false rejection)
and Type II (false award). These error propensities are either exogenously given or
endogenously determined by the resources dedicated to the monitoring technology (and
the effort exerted by employees). A natural question to ask is therefore; are there
CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 61
estimates of error propensities in real-world welfare programmes? Further, how is the
scope for these errors related to the design of welfare programmes?
Both the Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental Security Income
(SSI) programmes in the U.S. provide rich case studies to answer these questions.
Both benefits are administered by the U.S. Social Security Administration (SSA) and
the disability criterion for awards is common to both programmes. Under the Social
Security Act, an individual is considered disabled if their medically verifiable physical
or mental condition prevents them from engaging in ‘substantial gainful activity’ (see
SSA, 2012, p.2)25. Further, this condition should be expected to be terminal or last
for no less than one year.
1.3.1 Estimating Classification Error Propensities
A number of studies have attempted to estimate the propensity of the SSA to make
classification errors of both Type I and Type II in awarding both DI and SSI. The first
is Nagi (1969), who used external audit data on the independent health assessment
of DI applicants by professionals (such as doctors and psychologists) and compared
these with the ultimate award decision of the SSA. Based on these comparisons, the
author inferred a Type I error propensity of approximately 48% and a Type II error
propensity of approximately 19%.
More recently, Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) treat (i) the self-declared disability status
of DI/SSI applicants in the Health and Retirement Study; and (ii) the ultimate SSA
awards decision (post any appeals), as noisy but unbiased indicators of true disability
status. They estimate the Type I error propensity to be approximately 60%, whilst
the Type II error propensity is estimated at approximately 22%. Their results are thus
quantitatively similar to those in Nagi (1969).
1.3.2 Labour Force Participation Disincentives
A growing empirical literature focuses on the labour force participation (LFP) disin-
centives generated by both Social Security Disability Insurance (DI) and Supplemental
25Substantial gainful activity was in 2011 a monthly income of $1,000 for a non-blind individual
(SSA, 2012).
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Security Income (SSI) programmes in the United States. There are a number of moti-
vating factors behind the research in this literature. First, legislation changes in 1984
required the SSA to place greater emphasis on an applicant’s ability to function in
the workplace and any pain experienced in doing so, as opposed to basing assessments
solely on strict medical criteria. With regard to difficult to verify conditions such as
mental illness and musculoskeletal disease (i.e. back pain), these changes are argued to
correspond to a reduction in the screening intensity of applicants (Autor and Duggan,
2003, 2006; Von Wachter et al., 2011). Second, the earnings replacement rate26 has
also risen markedly since 1984. The concern is that both of these changes account for
(i) the large increase in DI recipients following the 1984 legislation change; (ii) mental
illness and musculoskeletal disease being the two most prevalent claimant categories
(SSA, 2012); and (iii) the increased propensity of younger individuals to exit the labour
force and claim benefits.
The impact of the DI programme on LFP is far from clear in the literature. The basis
for this discussion stems from the method developed by Bound (1989), who uses the
labour force participation of rejected DI applicants as a control, or upper bound, for
that which could be expected from awarded applicants. The assumption is therefore
made that the tests run by the benefit authority have some discriminatory power, and
thus that rejected applicants are more capable of work than awarded applicants. Using
data on the labour market performance of rejected applicants between 1972 and 1978,
Bound shows that less than half of rejected prime age (45-64) male applicants provide
labour for a sustained period.27 He thus argues that the majority of DI recipients are
in fact disabled.
Parsons (1991), however, argues that Bounds’ analysis is flawed because it does not
factor in the persistent role that the DI programme plays in the lives of applicants
beyond an initial rejection. Owing in part to the difficulties in precisely defining the
eligibility criterion, the programme features an extensive appeals system whereby a
number of successive appeals through different bodies can be made prior to an ultimate
rejection. Given the lags between an applicant filing an appeal and the response of
the relevant authority, coupled with the numerous appeals that can be made, the
appeals process is a lengthy one. Parsons notes three reasons - that are acknowledged,
26I.e. Disability income relative to earnings.
27Bound (1989) does not consider those below 45 because less than 20% of recipients in the studied
period were younger than this age.
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but given little weight in Bounds’ analysis - as to why a rejected applicant may not
return to work. First, rejected applicants may be filing an appeal. Second, they may
be enduring a period of unemployment to strengthen a future reapplication. Third
and finally, rejected applicants may face difficulty in finding employment due to their
sustained period out of work.28
More recent studies provide little consensus. On the one had, the analysis of Chen
and van der Klaauw (2008) points to relatively low LFP disincentives induced by the
DI programme and thus supports Bound (1989). These authors adopt Bound’s com-
parator group approach on a data-set which features a number of important differences
from that used in Bound (1989). First, merged survey and administrative data from
the 1990s is used, whilst Bound only used survey data which can be unreliable given
potential misreporting. Second, data is not restricted to the DI programme, but also
includes the SSI programme. Finally, both male and female applicants are included in
the data set. The analysis suggests that, in absence of any disability benefit provision,
the LFP of recipients would be at most twenty percent higher.
On the other hand, however, the most recent study of Von Wachter et al. (2011) finds
substantial LFP for rejected younger applicants and rejected applicants who claimed for
musculoskeletal diseases and/or mental health conditions. The authors use a database
containing (i) DI administrative information on applications and awards (from 1981-
1999); in addition to (ii) information on earnings pre- and post-applications (from
1978-2006). The results depend on the age group of applicants. Whilst the conclusions
of Bound (1989) continue to hold for those in the older age category of 45-64; it is
shown that younger rejected applicants aged 30-44 exhibit substantial post-rejection
employment. As discussed in the opening of this section, younger applicants form a
much larger proportion of total applicants in the data used by Von Wachter et al.
(2011) than in that from the 70’s for Bound (1989).
Finally, Autor and Duggan (2003) estimate that the combined effects of (i) the 1984
28In a reply, Bound (1991) readdresses each of these three issues. Concerning the appeals process,
he notes that most rejected applicants in his data-set had applied at least 18 months prior to the
survey, and very few appeals processes take this period of time. Turning to reapplications, it is not
clear that enduring a sustained period of unemployment can enhance an application. In fact, it may
have the opposite effect. Whilst some rejected applicants may behave this way, it is unlikely to play
a large role. Finally, concerning the impact of processing lags lowering the employment prospects of
rejected applicants, Bound notes that, on average, the applicants studied had been unemployed for
seven months prior to making an application.
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changes to disability assessment; (ii) increasing replacement rates; and (iii) a reduc-
tion in the demand for low-skilled labour, have served to double the propensity of
high-school dropouts to exit the labour force over the period 1984-2001. The authors
identify instrumental variables to capture exogenous variation in both the ‘supply’ and
‘demand’ for DI. On the supply side, it is noted that the benefit formula is a func-
tion of the average wage in the U.S. - which has risen relative to low-skilled wages -
but does not account for state level differences in wages. As a consequence, the re-
placement rate is higher in some states than others. The supply effect of programme
expansions and contractions may thus have different effects in different states. Next,
to capture exogenous variation in the demand for DI, the authors project national
industry employment changes onto state level industry composition. In summary, the
analysis suggests that state level contractions in DI supply generate large increases in
LFP among high-school dropouts; whilst DI applications are much more responsive to
state level demand shocks following the 1984 legislation changes to eligibility.
1.4 Concluding Remarks
The purpose of this chapter has been to review some of the important contributions in
the economics literature relating to cash welfare programmes. The emphasis has been
largely placed on targeted categorical programmes and the scope for classification errors
in administering these benefits. Along the way, a number of interesting questions have
emerged.
First, the discussion in Section 1.1.2 illustrated the important contributions on categor-
ical transfers in the optimal income tax framework. These analyses typically assume
that categorical status can be perfectly observed.29 In this case, a well-established
result is that categorical transfers should be set so as to eliminate inequality in the
average net social marginal value of income across categorical groups (Viard, 2001a,b).
For the purpose of writing the optimal linear tax expression, it is assumed that categor-
ical transfers do indeed eliminate this between-group inequality at the optimum. This
allows the tax expression to be written as in unidimensional model where individuals
differ only in productivity. However, is there a more general way to write the optimal
29Indeed, Immonen et al. (1998, p.181) state that ‘individuals are unable to alter or disguise the
group to which they belong, which is observed costlessly by the government ’.
CHAPTER 1. LITERATURE REVIEW 65
linear tax tax expression to allow for cases where between-group inequality persists at
the optimum? Under what cases is this likely to arise?
Second, the discussion in Section 1.1.3 illustrated that a number of the analyses of
imperfectly targeted categorical transfers make different assumptions as to whether
recipients of an incapacity benefit are ‘allowed’ to work, but the full implications of
these differing assumptions are not directly comparable due to other differences in the
modelling frameworks. In particular, able individuals who are incorrectly tagged as un-
able are allowed to work in Parsons (1996); but not allowed to work in Salanie´ (2002).
These polar assumptions can be interpreted as no enforcement and full enforcement,
respectively, of an ex-post ‘no-work’ condition. Whilst the framework in Salanie´ is
more general (continuum of productivities, standard preferences) than in Parsons, it
abstracts from individual application decisions. Instead, a fraction of the able subpop-
ulation are simply tagged as unable and not allowed to work. This must, however,
be incentive incompatible for higher productivity individuals who would rather not be
tagged and allowed to work. With these points in mind, it would be useful to analyse
imperfectly targeted categorical transfers in a framework that both endogenises appli-
cation decisions and allows for a systematic comparison across enforcement regimes.
We could then ask the following questions: (i) How do the optimal combinations of
targeted (categorial) and non-targeted (universal) benefits differ across enforcement
regimes? (ii) What are the welfare effects of classification errors and how do these
differ across enforcement regimes?
Third, to the best of this author’s knowledge there has been no analysis of imperfectly
targeted categorical transfers in the optimal income tax framework where individuals
differ in both some categorical dimension and over a continuum of productivities.
Indeed, we saw in Section 1.1.2 that the analysis of categorical transfers in the optimal
linear income tax framework assumes perfect targeting. How would Type I and Type
II classification errors affect the equity and efficiency considerations in the optimal tax
expression? Suppose that there is an unable subpopulation who cannot work and an
able subpopulation of individuals who can work and differ continuously in productivity.
Further, suppose that the categorical benefit targeted at the unable has a fully enforced
‘no-work’ condition and individuals must choose to apply for the categorical benefit.
In this setting the additional efficiency considerations that we need to account for seem
quite clear: an increase in the tax rate may incentivise able individuals to apply for
the categorical benefit and, if awarded it, stop working.
Part I
Design Issues: Optimal Benefits
and Taxation.
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Chapter 2
Optimal Universal and Categorical
Benefit Provision:
Classification Errors and Imperfect
Enforcement.1
2.1 Introduction
Partial universal welfare programmes can be defined as those which (i) provide all
members of society with an unconditional universal cash benefit; but also (ii) allow for
additional, targeted, assistance to those considered by the policymaker to be most in
need. The concept of a universal benefit has a rich history and is known under various
alternative guises in the economic and social policy literature, such as ‘demogrant’ or
‘basic income’ (Van Parijs, 2004). The state of Alaska provides the primary example
of a real-world universal benefit programme.2 Targeted benefits take centre stage in
modern welfare systems. Of these, categorical transfers (e.g. unemployment benefits,
disability benefits) play a prominent role. The optimal balance between these two
types of support (universal, targeted) is likely to depend on the effectiveness of targeted
1This chapter represents a significant extension that I have made to the discussion paper of Slack
and Ulph (2014).
2In place since 1982, all residents of Alaska receive the same yearly cash benefit, whose size is a
function of the five year interest on the Alaska Permanent Fund. This fund was set-up in 1976 using
oil revenue from the Trans-Alaska Pipeline System.
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benefits at reaching those in need. In particular, the less that needy individuals are
assisted by targeted benefits, the more important universal provision may become in
ensuring those in need in have some form of financial support. Both types of transfers
have been extensively analysed in the economics literature (Atkinson and Sutherland,
1989; Atkinson, 1995; Callan et al., 1999; Diamond and Sheshinski, 1995; Parsons,
1996; Salanie´, 2002; Viard, 2001a,b). Further, the merits of schemes which feature
both targeted and universal dimensions have been widely discussed in the social policy
and political science literature (Mkandawire, 2005; Skocpol, 1991).3
Two important and related features of any benefit system that involves targeting are
(i) the conditions attached to targeted benefits; and (ii) the degree to which these
conditions are enforced. We discuss both in turn.
Double Conditionality. Targeted benefits are typically conditioned in two dimen-
sions: ex-ante an applicant must satisfy certain eligibility conditions to be awarded a
given benefit; whilst ex-post a recipient must comply with certain behavioural require-
ments or restrictions. For example, disability benefits may be ex-ante conditioned on
an applicant having a disability that substantially affects their ability to work; but
also ex-post conditioned on, among other things, a recipient not working or only work-
ing low permitted amounts.4 In many cases these two dimensions of conditionality
will be linked under the presumption that an individual who satisfies the former will
automatically satisfy the latter.5
Enforcement Errors. In large and complex welfare programmes both ex-ante and
ex-post dimensions of conditionality may be imperfectly enforced.
3Skocpol (1991, p.414) refers to such programmes as ‘targeting within universalism’. Drawing on
the social policy history of the United States, she notes that whilst targeted programmes in isolation
have been politically unsustainable, those that are more universal and spread benefits across groups
have received broad political support and have been effective at targeting benefits to the needy.
4Whether or not a no-work condition is imposed will depend on the nature of the disability ben-
efit. For example, the Employment and Support Allowance benefit in the U.K. allows recipients to
undertake certain permitted work activities, such as earning very low amounts per week; potentially
as part of a rehabilitation programme.
5Consider the following two examples, one more clear-cut than the other. First, an individual who
is unable to work and awarded a disability benefit on this basis will automatically satisfy any ex-post
‘no-work’ condition. Second, an involuntarily unemployed individual who is actively searching for
work, and awarded unemployment benefits on this basis, will likely satisfy any ex-post requirement
to provide evidence of job search (this will of course depend on the stringency of the job search
requirement).
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• In the case of ex-ante conditionality, classification errors of Type I (false rejec-
tion) and Type II (false award) may be made in the awards process. A number
of papers analyse the scope for classification errors in the U.S. Social Security
Disability Insurance programme. Benitez-Silva et al. (2004) estimate a Type I
error propensity of approximately 60% and a Type II error propensity of ap-
proximately 20%. These results are quantitatively similar to the earlier study of
Nagi (1969). Classification errors may arise for two broad reasons: (i) the awards
technology is imperfect and misclassifies individuals around a given eligibility
threshold; and/or (ii) the eligibility threshold itself may be incorrect (e.g. too
harsh or too lenient).6
• In the case of ex-post conditionality, the enforcement mechanisms put in place by
the benefit authority may be insufficient to fully deter recipients from breaking
the conditions placed on benefit receipt. This may arise because authorities (i)
fail to detect all recipients who break the requirements; and, further, (ii) the
sanctions imposed if detected are too lenient.
To the extent that ex-ante eligible individuals automatically satisfy ex-post conditions,
Type II errors and the subsequent behaviour of ineligible recipients will be the source
of ex-post enforcement issues.
In the context of partial universal benefit programmes three central questions therefore
arise:
1. How does the propensity of the benefit system to make Type I and Type II
errors affect (a) the decision of whether or not to provide a targeted benefit; and
(b) conditional on providing both targeted and universal benefits, the respective
levels of each?
2. How do these error propensities affect the resulting level of social welfare?
3. How do the answers to both of these questions depend on how well the ex-post
conditionality is enforced?
6Disability benefits once more provide a good example where these sources of error can arise because
(i) certain medical conditions are difficult to diagnose and verify (such as musculoskeletal illness and
mental disorders) and (ii) the eligibility definition, or ‘threshold’, will determine the weight given
to both strict medical criteria and the subjective assessment of ability to function in the workplace.
Indeed, there has been much work exploring Type II errors and the work capability of recipients in the
U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance programme (Autor and Duggan, 2006; Bound, 1989, 1991;
Chen and van der Klaauw, 2008; Parsons, 1991, 1980; Von Wachter et al., 2011).
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The existing literature on the targeting of benefits has tended to focus on part (a) of
the first question. In doing so a particular enforcement structure in relation to ex-post
conditionality has been assumed, but there has been no comparison across enforcement
regimes. Moreover, while different papers have made different assumptions about the
way ex-post conditionality is enforced, other differences in the modelling frameworks
have not facilitated direct comparison. This is illustrated in the two related contri-
butions of Parsons (1996) and Salanie´ (2002), where both papers explore the optimal
provision of targeted benefits that are administered with classification errors. Parsons
uses a framework where individuals are ex-ante identical7 but face an exogenous prob-
ability of becoming unable to work. Individuals who are incorrectly tagged as unable
by Type II error are allowed to work. Indeed, the author demonstrates that a ‘dual
negative income tax system’ in which tagged able individuals are incentivised to work
will be optimal, provided these individuals can be incentivised to work for less than
their marginal product.8 However, in a more general framework where able individu-
als differ over a productivity continuum, Salanie´ imposes the opposite restriction that
tagged able individuals are not allowed to work, and shows that it is optimal to award
a higher benefit to tagged individuals than those who are not tagged. Notably, Salanie´
does not model the decision of individuals to apply for the targeted benefit: instead,
a fixed proportion - corresponding to the Type II error probability - of able individu-
als are tagged and do not work. Yet, this must be incentive incompatible for higher
productivity able individuals who would rather receive the lower unconditional benefit
and be allowed to work. Were application decisions modelled, these higher productivity
individuals would not choose to apply.
The contribution of this chapter is to address the three questions raised above within
a framework that allows for a systematic comparison of how the answer to the first
two questions depends on how well the ex-post conditionality is enforced. We consider
a framework where individuals differ in two dimensions. First, there is a categorical
dimension: Individuals are either able to work or unable to work - modelled as a
zero-hours quantity constraint on labour supply. Second, individuals who are able to
work differ over a continuum of productivities. The government operates a tax/benefit
system that comprises four elements: (i) a constant marginal tax rate on earned income;
7In particular, Parsons (1996) assumes that all individuals have the same productivity.
8From a technical perspective, allowing tagged individuals to work corresponds to not enforcing
an ex-post ‘no-work’ requirement.
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(ii) a tax-free universal benefit (B) which is received automatically by all individuals
in society; (iii) a tax-free categorical benefit (C) which is targeted at those who are
unable to work; and, for simplicity, (iv) a fixed budget for benefit expenditure.9
The categorical benefit is ex-ante conditional on an applicant being unable to work;
and ex-post conditional on a recipient not working. Upon receiving an application, the
benefit authority applies a test to determine whether or not an applicant is eligible
to receive the benefit10. However, this test may make Type I and Type II classifica-
tion errors with fixed (exogenous) probabilities that are independent of productivity
(Salanie´, 2002). The awards test will be said to have (i) perfect discriminatory power
if the propensities to make Type I and Type II errors are both zero; (ii) no discrimi-
natory power if unable and able applicants face the same probability of being awarded
the benefit; and (iii) some discriminatory power for all intermediate cases where an
unable applicant is more likely to be awarded the benefit than an able applicant, but
there is a positive propensity to make at least one type of error.
Applications for the categorical benefit are taken to be costless in terms of money,
stigma and time. This frequently employed assumption eliminates the direct depen-
dence of application decisions on the propensity of the awards test to make errors
(Jacquet, 2006, 2014). It is assumed that no checks or penalties are in place for an
able individual who is incorrectly awarded the categorical benefit but does not work
when receiving it. There are two reasons for this: (i) such behaviour is highly difficult
to detect because the recipient does not reveal their true type through working (Yaniv,
1986); and, further, (ii) it is not immediately clear that such behaviour is ‘fraudulent’
as the applicant may be unsure of their own eligibility upon applying. The implication
is that some able individuals with low productivities may always choose to apply for
the benefit and, if awarded it, not work.
However, the application decisions of individuals with higher productivities will in-
tuitively depend on how effectively the ex-post no-work condition is enforced. As
9Note that some countries such as the U.K. now operate a welfare cap on (forecasted) benefit
expenditures. Programmes which fall under the cap include, to name a few, incapacity benefits,
income support and child benefits. One of the motivations for such a policy is that it increases
the monitoring of welfare spending and elicits policy decisions on the ‘appropriate’ level of welfare
spending (see Crawford et al., 2014; Rhodes and Mcinnes, 2014).
10No penalty attaches to an individual whose application is rejected because they are deemed to
be able-bodied. Indeed, on the grounds of legal uncertainty an applicant may be unsure of their own
eligibility upon applying.
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indicated, a number of different enforcement assumptions are made in the literature
on categorical transfers administered with classification errors.11 In this chapter we
consider two discrete alternative enforcement regimes: No Enforcement and Full En-
forcement.
• Under the No Enforcement regime there are no effective mechanisms in place to
deter able recipients of C from subsequently working. The categorical benefit
policy is therefore one dimensional: individuals receive a monetary amount C
with no enforced restriction on labour supply. In this case all able individuals
will apply: both those who would choose not to work when receiving C, and
those who would choose to work when receiving C.
• Under the Full Enforcement regime it is assumed that the probability of detec-
tion and the penalty regime are sufficiently tough that no able individual who
is wrongly awarded the categorical benefit will choose to subsequently work.
The categorical benefit policy is therefore two-dimensional: individuals receive a
monetary amount C and also a fully enforced zero quantity constraint on labour
supply. Accordingly, the only able individuals who will choose to apply for the
categorical benefit will be those of lower productivity, and thus those for whom
the opportunity cost of not working is low. The exact range of productivities
for which individuals choose to apply will be endogenous to the benefit size.
Moreover, some of those who do apply would have chosen to work under the
No Enforcement set-up and so are constrained by the fully enforced no-work
requirement.
The government’s optimisation problem is to choose the levels of categorical (C) and
11The literature on optimal benefits/transfers can be partitioned into three related strands. The
first strand focuses on the design of welfare benefits when the benefit authority has no formal discrim-
inatory test to determine eligibility. It instead chooses consumption bundles/transfer levels such that
the non-needy opt against masquerading as the needy (see Besley and Coate, 1992; Blackorby and
Donaldson, 1988; Cuff, 2000; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978; Kreiner and Tranaes, 2005; Nichols and
Zeckhauser, 1982). An important second strand analyses transfers within the optimal income taxa-
tion framework (Mirrlees, 1971; Sheshinski, 1972). In the standard model where individuals differ only
through unobservable ability, Atkinson (1995) models a universal benefit financed by a linear income
tax and allows for an unable subpopulation that cannot work. Following Akerlof (1978), a number of
papers have modelled taxes and transfers when categorical information can be perfectly observed (see
Immonen et al., 1998; Mankiw and Weinzierl, 2010; Viard, 2001a,b). The third important strand -
and most related to this chapter - models categorical transfers administered with classification errors
(see Diamond and Sheshinski, 1995; Jacquet, 2006, 2014; Kleven and Kopczuk, 2011; Parsons, 1996;
Salanie´, 2002; Stern, 1982).
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universal (B) benefits that maximise a strictly utilitarian social welfare function subject
to its budget constraint. Both the welfare function and expenditure component of the
budget constraint will depend on the enforcement regime in place and, in turn, on
the propensity of the benefit authority to make classification errors. The assumption
of a fixed benefit budget simplifies the exposition because labour supply responses to
unearned income do not affect the budget size. The purpose of making this assumption
is that it allows us to pin down more clearly the intuition for the conditions under which
it is optimal to provide a categorical benefit. Many of the key results do, however,
generalise to the cases where (a) the benefit budget is driven by tax revenue; and (b)
the government also optimises with respect to the tax rate. Indeed, characterising
the optimal linear tax rate - both with and without classification errors - deserves
more space than can be afforded here and is the subject matter of the following two
chapters.
In the absence of any form of welfare provision, there are two types of inequality in
this model.
1. Within-group inequality in the able subpopulation: Those with higher produc-
tivity have higher absolute utility but lower marginal indirect utility of income,
or social marginal value of income (smvi).12
2. Between-group inequality: Those who are able to work will have a higher average
level of utility but lower average smvi than those who are unable able to work.
As is well established from the literature on categorical transfers (Viard, 2001a,b), the
purpose of the categorical benefit in this model is to reduce and, if possible, eliminate,
inequality in the average smvi between the two subpopulations. When the benefit
authority can perfectly discriminate between unable and able applicants this chapter
demonstrates (as a baseline case) that it is always optimal to set C > 0 ; but B > 0
only if the benefit budget exceeds a critical level which, if spent entirely on categorical
transfers, would equate the smvi of the unable with the average smvi of the able. There
is thus an ordering of priorities: the first aim is to eliminate between-group inequality in
the average smvi through categorical spending, whilst the second is to reduce inequality
in the smvi throughout the population through universal spending.13 Contrastingly,
12Under a strictly utilitarian objective function the social marginal value of income is simply the
marginal (indirect) utility of income.
13Intuitively, social welfare will be raised more through categorical spending than universal spending
so long as the smvi of an unable individual exceeds the average smvi of the able subpopulation.
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whenever the test administering the categorical benefit makes Type I and/or Type II
errors, this chapter demonstrates that between-group inequality the average smvi will
never be eliminated at the optimum.
The major conclusions of this chapter are as follows:
• Under a No Enforcement regime:
1. It is optimal to set C > 0 whenever the test administering C has some discrimi-
natory power. In this case the optimal benefits are chosen to equate - if budget
feasible - the average smvi of categorical recipients with the average smvi of those
not receiving the categorical benefit. A positive propensity to make Type I er-
rors guarantees B > 0 at the optimum to ensure rejected unable individuals have
some source of income to consume. However, if Type I errors are never made
and the benefit budget is insufficiently large for categorical spending to equate
the average smvi of categorical recipients with that of non-recipients, it will be
optimal to set B = 0. Finally, if the test administering C has no discriminatory
power it is optimal to set C = 0 and spend the entire benefit budget on B.14 The
intuition is that whenever the test has no discriminatory power (i) a targeted
system does no better between-group than a pure universal system because the
unable and able receive, on average, the same in benefit income; and further (ii)
a targeted system does worse within group than a pure universal system because
classification errors introduce horizontal inequities.
2. The associated value function of social welfare (i.e. maximum social welfare) is
decreasing in the propensity to make both Type I and Type II errors, respectively.
• Under a Full Enforcement regime:
1. It is optimal to set C > 0 for all levels of discriminatory power, thus including
the case of no discriminatory power. The intuition rests on the fact that, even
if the test administering the categorical benefit has no discriminatory power, a
targeted system (i) provides the unable with more in benefit income, on average,
than the able; and (ii) redistributes within the able subpopulation through leak-
14An exception arises in the extreme case where the test has a zero propensity to make Type I errors
but always makes Type II errors. In this case of no discriminatory power there is no optimisation
problem to solve because all individuals in the economy receive the same benefit income. Consequently,
any budget-feasible combination of B and C generates the same level of welfare.
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age of the categorical benefit to lower productivity individuals. If Type I errors
occur with positive propensity then it is always optimal to set B > 0. So under
Full Enforcement it is always optimal to adopt a system with targeting: a pure
universal system is never chosen.
2. Whilst maximum welfare is unambiguously decreasing in the propensity to make
Type I errors, there are conditions under which it can be increasing in the propen-
sity to make Type II errors. In particular, this is more likely to occur the larger
the proportion of able applicants who are voluntarily unemployed (due to the
universal benefit) and who thus have the same smvi as the unable.
One cannot in general guarantee a unique solution to the Full Enforcement optimisation
problem. The optimal benefits are characterised by the condition that (i) the aggregate
smvi of those not receiving the categorical benefit be equal to (ii) the aggregate smvi
of categorical recipients multiplied by the increase in their total benefit income per
unit reduction in the universal benefit. However, because the number of individuals
who apply for the categorical benefit is endogenous to the benefit levels an increase
in the universal benefit may generate conflicting effects on the two components of
either aggregate smvi (i.e. individual smvi × number of individuals). For example,
an increase in the universal benefit lowers the smvi of each individual who does not
receive the categorical benefit, but also reduces the number of individuals who apply
for - and thus receive - the categorical benefit. The overall effect is ambiguous: it will
depend on unspecified properties of both the utility function (e.g. third derivatives)
and the distribution function (e.g. derivatives of the pdf). As will be discussed below,
numerical simulations suggest that the assumption of a unique optimum is valid in
most cases - and identify the cases where it is not.
In line with much of the literature on optimal tax/benefits, we turn to numerical simu-
lation methods to gain further comparative statics insights (see, for example, Immonen
et al., 1998; Viard, 2001a,b). The purpose of the simulations is twofold: (i) to establish
how the optimal benefit levels change with the propensity to make Type I and Type II
classification errors, respectively; and (ii) to provide examples where maximum welfare
increases with the Type II error propensity under the Full Enforcement regime. For
this, we employ CES preferences and take individual productivity to be exponentially
distributed. The numerical results we obtain are consistent with those established in
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the theory. The analysis of the Full Enforcement case is particularly sensitive to the
value of the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption, which we sys-
tematically vary between 0.5 and 0.99. At lower values of the elasticity the welfare
function may not be concave in the benefit levels and, consequently, care has to be
taken in searching for a global optima.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 2.2 sets out the model
and discusses how the different enforcement assumptions affect individual application
decisions for the categorical benefit. Section 2.3 then presents the main analysis: here
the optimum benefit levels are characterised and the effects of errors on maximum
social welfare are determined under both enforcement assumptions. Section 2.4 then
numerically simulates the optimal benefits under both enforcement regimes. This pro-
vides insights into how the optimal benefit levels change with the propensity to make
classification errors. Finally, Section 2.5 concludes the chapter.
2.2 The Model
2.2.1 Background: Individuals
Individuals in the economy have identical preferences given by the utility function
u(x, l), where x ≥ 0 denotes consumption and l ∈ [0, 1] denotes leisure respectively.
The standard assumptions apply: u is continuous, differentiable, strictly increasing in
both arguments (ux > 0, ul > 0) and strictly concave (uxx < 0, ull < 0, uxxull−u2xl > 0);
with both goods normal (uluxx − uxuxl < 0).
We also assume:
lim
x→0
ux(x, l) = +∞ (2.1)
An individual with net wage ω ≥ 0 and unearned income M ≥ 0 chooses labour supply,
H ∈ [0, 1], so as to maximise utility. The resulting optimal labour supply (H∗) and
indirect utility (v) functions are given by:
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H∗(ω,M) ≡ arg max
H∈[0,1]
u(ωH +M, 1−H)
v(ω,M) ≡ max
H∈[0,1]
u(ωH +M, 1−H) = u(ωH∗ +M, 1−H∗)
(2.2)
Formally, H∗ satisfies:
ω ≤ ul (ωH
∗ +M, 1−H∗)
ux (ωH∗ +M, 1−H∗) ; H
∗ ≥ 0
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
Let ω¯(M) ≡ ul(M, 1)/ux(M, 1) denote the reservation wage at or below which an
individual with lump sum unearned income M will choose not to work. Formally,
ω¯ satisfies H∗[ω¯(M),M ] = 0. Furthermore, given that leisure is normal ω¯′(M) >
0.15
For ω ≤ ω¯(M) we have H∗(ω,M) ≡ 0 which implies v(ω,M) ≡ u(M, 1), from which
it follows that vM(ω,M) ≡ ux(M, 1) and vMM(ω,M) = uxx(M, 1) < 0. So, over this
range of net wage rates the marginal indirect utility of unearned income is constant
and independent of the wage rate.
For ω > ω¯(M) we have H∗(ω,M) > 0. Further, by the normality of leisure:
H∗M =
ωuxx − uxl
2ωuxl − ω2uxx − ull =
(uluxx − uxuxl)/ul
[2uxl − (ul/ux)uxx − (ux/ul)ull] < 0 (2.3)
16By the envelope theorem the marginal indirect utility of unearned income is vM(ω,M) =
ux(ωH
∗ +M, 1−H∗), whilst from (2.3) it also follows that:
vMM = uxx +H
∗
M (ωuxx − uxl) =
u2x(u
2
xl − uxxull)
uxul[2uxl − (ul/ux)uxx − (ux/ul)ull] < 0 (2.4)
15Formally, ω¯′(M) = (uxuxl − uluxx) /u2x > 0.
16The denominator of (2.3) is positive by the concavity - and thus quasiconcavity - of the utility
function. See, for example, Simon and Blume (1994).
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Roy’s identity (i.e. vω = vMH
∗) and the assumption that leisure is normal together
imply that vωM = vMω = vMMH
∗ + vMH∗M < 0. So over this range of net wages the
marginal indirect utility of unearned income is a strictly decreasing function of the net
wage. Formally:
∀ ω > ω¯(M) : vωM < 0⇒ vM(ω,M) < vM(ω¯(M),M) = ux(M, 1) (2.5)
2.2.2 The Population and Tax-Benefit System
In a population of size 1, there are two distributional issues. First, the fraction θ ∈ (0, 1)
of individuals face a zero quantity constraint on labour supply and are thus unable to
work. Absent any provision of state financial support, these individuals would have
no source of income to consume. Second, the remaining fraction (1− θ) of individuals
are able to work, but differ continuously in their productivity, thereby giving rise to
earned income inequality.
There is a tax-benefit system comprising four elements:
1. A constant marginal tax rate, t ∈ (0, 1), on all earned income;
2. A tax-free universal benefit, B ≥ 0, paid automatically to everyone17 ;
3. A tax-free categorical benefit, C ≥ 0, that is targeted - potentially imperfectly -
at those who are unable to work and is received in addition to B ;
4. A fixed benefit budget, β > 0, to be spent on the universal and/or the categorical
benefits.
In all that follows we take the tax rate as exogenously fixed. Assuming a constant
marginal tax rate allows productivity and productivity differences to be captured
through the net wage, ω ≥ 0. Net wages are distributed with density f(ω), where
f(ω) > 0 ∀ ω ≥ 0 and ∫∞
0
f(ω)dω = 1. The associated distribution function is
F (ω) =
∫ ω
0
f(z)dz , where 0 ≤ F (ω) ≤ 1. Note from (2.5) that:
∫ ∞
0
v(ω,M)f(ω)dω > u(M, 1) ;
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω,M)f(ω)dω < ux(M, 1) (2.6)
17With just these first two elements, we would have effectively a simple negative income tax system.
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Conditional on everyone receiving the same unearned income, this simply states that
the average utility of the able exceeds that of the unable and, by diminishing marginal
utility of income, the average marginal utility of income for the able must be lower than
that of the unable. This latter inequality can be reduced through targeting additional
resources at the unable subpopulation (we have of course yet to specify the objective
function of the government).
Whilst B is automatically received by everyone, C must be applied for and is subject
to the following double conditionality :
• Ex-ante conditionality: An applicant for C must be unable to work to be awarded
it.
• Ex-post conditionality: A recipient of C must not subsequently work.18
An individual who has applied for C is subject to a test to determine whether they
are indeed unable to work. If deemed unable to work, they are awarded the benefit.
However, this test may be imperfect and, in statistical parlance, subject to Type I
(false rejection) and/or Type II (false award) classification errors. A Type I error
occurs when an individual who is unable to work is incorrectly classified as being able
to work and consequently rejected C. We denote the probability of a Type I error
occurring by pI ∈ [0, 1]. Contrastingly, a Type II error arises when an individual who
is able to work is incorrectly awarded C. For simplicity, we assume that the probability
of Type II error is independent of productivity and denote this by pII ∈ [0, 1] . In what
follows, we confine our attention to error propensities satisfying:
pI + pII ≤ 1 (2.7)
The level of discriminatory power that the test has can be simply characterised by:
pI + pII

= 0 : Perfect Discriminatory Power
∈ (0, 1) : Some Discriminatory power
= 1 : No Discriminatory power
So the test has perfect discriminatory power if no classification errors are made. In this
18Indeed, since C is targeted at the unable, it is de facto conditional on not subsequently working.
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setting the categorical benefit is only awarded to unable applicants and, further, all
unable applicants are awarded it. Contrastingly, the test has no discriminatory power
if it awards the categorical benefit to an able applicant with the same propensity that
it does an unable applicant - i.e. the test brings no useful information in distinguishing
between the two types of applicant. Finally, for all intermediate cases where p1 +pII ∈
(0, 1), we say that the test has some, but not perfect, discriminatory power; because
it is more likely to award the categorical benefit to an unable applicant than an able
one.
Trivially, if pII = 0 ex-post conditionality is automatically satisfied because all recip-
ients of the categorical benefit are unable to work. Contrastingly, pII > 0 generates
a host of enforcement issues: whether or not an able recipient of C will choose to
work will depend on - in addition to their underlying productivity - the strength of the
enforcement regime in place. We turn to discuss this in the following section.
2.2.3 Benefit Applications and Enforcement.
Applications for C are taken to be costless in terms of money, stigma and time. This
frequently employed assumption eliminates the direct dependence of application deci-
sions on pI and pII because individual welfare in the rejected state coincides with that
from having not applied (Jacquet, 2006, 2014).19
It follows that an unable individual will always choose to apply for C. Contrastingly,
the application decision of an able individual will depend on the enforcement mecha-
nisms in place to detect ineligible recipients and, conditioning on this, their underlying
productivity. First, it is assumed that there are no checks or penalties in place for
an able individual who applies for C and, if awarded it, subsequently complies with
ex-post conditionality through not working. There are two reasons for making this
assumption: (i) such behaviour is highly difficult to detect because the recipient does
not reveal their true type through working (Yaniv, 1986); and, further, (ii) it is not
immediately clear that such behaviour is ‘fraudulent’ as the applicant may be unsure
of their own eligibility upon applying. Given this assumption, all able individuals with
19As will be discussed, which able individuals will apply for the categorical benefit will depend on
the size of the benefit itself, which - at the optimum - will in turn be an implicit function of pI and
pII . There will therefore be an indirect dependency of application decisions of the able on pI and pII .
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ω ≤ ω¯(B + C) will apply for C for sure, where ω¯(B + C) > ω¯(B) ∀ C > 0.20
However, which individuals commanding the higher productivities ω¯(B + C) < ω will
choose to apply for C will depend on how effectively the no-work condition is enforced.
In this regard, we analyse two binary enforcement assumptions where the no-work
requirement is either (i) not enforced at all; or is (ii) fully enforced. Both alternative
assumptions are detailed below.
No Enforcement
In this first case we assume that there are no effective mechanisms in place to deter
an able recipient of C from working should they wish to. In this sense, benefit policy
is one-dimensional because recipients receive only the monetary amount C, with no
subsequent restrictions on labour supply. Accordingly, all able individuals along the
net wage continuum will choose to apply for C. Of the proportion (1 − pII) who are
correctly denied the benefit, all those with ω ≤ ω¯(B) will choose not to work, whilst
those with ω¯(B) < ω will work. Turning to the proportion pII who are awarded C,
all those with ω ≤ ω¯(B + C) will not work, whilst those with ω¯(B + C) < ω will
work.
Full Enforcement
In this second case, we alternatively assume that there are totally effective mechanisms
in place that fully deter any able individual from working whilst receiving C. The
benefit policy now has two dimensions: individuals who are awarded the benefit receive
both the monetary amount C and a fully enforced zero quantity constraint on labour
supply. As under No Enforcement, all those with ω ≤ ω¯(B+C) will apply for C because
they would choose not to work when receiving it even if there were no restrictions on
labour supply. However, those with ω > ω¯(B + C) will only choose to apply for C if
ω ≤ ω¯(B,C), where:
v[ω¯(B,C), B] ≡ u(B + C, 1) (2.8)
20Recall that ω¯(M) = ul(M, 1)/ux(M, 1) is the reservation wage at or below which an individual
chooses voluntary unemployment.
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Figure 2.1: Work Decision and Utility under Alternative Enforcement Regimes
(a) No Enforcement
ω0
Utility
u(B, 1)
ω¯(B)
u(B + C, 1) v(ω,B)
ω¯(B,C)
v(ω,B + C)
ω¯(B + C)
(b) Full Enforcement
ω0
Utility
u(B, 1)
ω¯(B)
u(B + C, 1) v(ω,B)
ω¯(B,C)
v(ω,B + C)
ω¯(B + C)
Policy Constrained Individuals
Notes. The bold unbroken lines denote recipients of the categorical benefit; whilst the bold broken
lines denote non-recipients of the categorical benefit. Under No Enforcement (panel (a)) all individuals
choose to apply for C. Of those awarded it all those with ω ≤ ω¯(B+C) choose not to work; whilst all
those with ω > ω¯(B + C) instead work. Alternatively, under Full Enforcement (panel(b)) only those
with ω ≤ ω¯(B,C) apply for C. Of the individuals awarded it, notice that those with ω¯(B+C) < ω ≤ ω¯
would have chosen to work under the No Enforcement regime.
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Figure 2.2: The critical wages ω¯(B), ω¯(B + C) and ω¯(B,C)
l0
x
1
B
B + C
B + ω¯(B)
B + ω¯(B + C)
B + ω¯(B,C)
1−H∗(ω,B)
u1
u0
Notes. The figure provides graphical intuition for the critical net wages ω¯ and ω¯. u0 is the indifference
curve associated with the utility level u(B, 1); whilst u1 is the indifference curve associated with the
utility level u(B+C, 1). The function ω¯(M) captures the corner solution case where H∗[ω¯(M),M ] =
0 and thus v(ω,M) = u(M, 1). Contrastingly, ω¯(B,C) captures the interior solution case where
H∗[ω¯(B + C), B] > 0 and thus v(ω,B) > u(B, 1) but v(ω¯, B) = u(B + C, 1).
So ω¯(B,C) is the net wage at which an able individual is just indifferent between (i) not
working and receiving total benefit income B+C, and (ii) working as much as desired
and receiving only B in benefit income. It is straightforward to show that:
ω¯C =
ux(B + C, 1)
H∗(ω¯, B) · vM(ω¯, B) > ω¯B =
ux(B + C, 1)− vM(ω¯, B)
H∗(ω¯, B) · vM(ω¯, B) > 0 (2.9)
and thus ω¯C − ω¯B = 1/H∗(ω¯, B). Note that ω¯B > 0 by the normality of leisure;
which implies that the marginal utility of consumption is increasing in leisure along an
indifference curve.21
Finally, given that v[ω¯(B + C), B + C] ≡ v[ω¯(B,C), B] ≡ u(B + C, 1), it must hold
21Let x(l) satisfy u[x(l), l] = k, where k is a constant. Differentiating w.r.t. l thus gives x′(l) =
−ul/ux. From this it follows that:
dux[x(l), l]
dl
= uxxx
′(l) + uxl =
uxuxl − uluxx
ux
> 0
by the normality of leisure.
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that:
ω¯(B + C) < ω¯(B,C) ∀ C > 0 (2.10)
where limC→0 ω¯(B,C) = ω¯(B).
Policy Constrained Individuals
Under Full Enforcement, the only recipients of C for whom the enforced zero quantity
constraint on labour actually binds are those with ω¯(B+C) < ω ≤ ω¯(B,C). To see this,
note that under the No Enforcement regime these individuals would optimally choose
to work when receiving C. They are therefore constrained by the fully enforced benefit
policy. Figure 2.1 illustrates this: the figure depicts the work decision and resulting
utility of individuals over the net wage continuum under both the No Enforcement and
Full Enforcement regimes. The bold unbroken lines denote utility when receiving the
categorical benefit, whilst the bold broken lines denote utility when not receiving it.
Figure 2.2, meanwhile, illustrates that the budget constraints with slope ω¯(B+C) and
ω¯(B,C), respectively, are tangent to the same indifference curve, but the tangency in
the former case occurs at a corner solution (H = 0), whilst the latter occurs at an
interior solution (H > 0).
2.3 Analysis
We now turn to the main theoretical analysis. When the test administering the categor-
ical benefit makes Type I and/or Type II classification errors with positive propensity
the key questions we wish to answer are:
1. For what levels of discriminatory power would it be optimal to adopt: (i) a pure
universal system (B > 0, C = 0); (ii) a partial universal system (B > 0, C > 0);
or (iii) a pure targeted system (B = 0, C > 0)?
2. How does maximum social welfare change with the propensity to make classifi-
cation errors?
3. How do the answers to these questions differ between the No Enforcement and
Full Enforcement regimes?
In all cases, the social welfare (objective) function that the government seeks to max-
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imise is strictly utilitarian, and thus given by the sum of individual (expected) utilities.
A desire for redistribution therefore arises solely from the concavity of individual util-
ity. We will throughout adopt the notational convention of letting the superscripts
P , N and F denote Perfect Discrimination, No Enforcement and Full Enforcement,
respectively.
To proceed, we initially analyse the first design question under the baseline case of
Perfect Discrimination.
2.3.1 Perfect Discrimination
When the test administering C can perfectly discern unable applicants from able ap-
plicants, social welfare is given by:
W P (B,C; θ) = θu(B + C, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
v(ω,B)f(ω)dω (2.11)
Given the fixed budget size β available for expenditure on B and C, the problem is to
choose B and C so as to maximise social welfare. Formally:
max
B,C
W P (B,C; θ) s.t. B + θC = β ,B ≥ 0 , C ≥ 0 (2.12)
Notice that the budget constraint must hold with equality because, if underspent,
welfare could always be raised through paying a higher B to all individuals. If we
denote the optimum benefit levels by BˆP (β, θ) and CˆP (β, θ) respectively, we have:
Proposition 1. CˆP > 0 and BˆP ≥ 0 satisfy:
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
P )f(ω)dω ≤ ux(BˆP + CˆP , 1) ; BˆP ≥ 0 (2.13)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
Proof: See Appendix.
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Corollary 1.
BˆP
{
>
=
}
0 if β
{
>
≤
}
β¯P (2.14)
where β¯P is defined by:
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, 0)f(ω)dω ≡ ux
(
β¯P
θ
, 1
)
(2.15)
Proposition 1 states that (i) it is always optimal to provide a categorical benefit; but
(ii) it will only be optimal to provide a universal benefit if categorical transfers have
been financed up the point where inequality in the average smvi between the unable
and able subpopulations is eliminated. It thus follows directly from Corollary 1 that
there will be a critical budget (β¯P ) which, if spent solely on categorical transfers, will
equate the smvi of the unable with the average smvi of the able. For any budget
exceeding this level it will be optimal to provide a universal benefit.22 Finally, notice
that in any optimum BˆP + CˆP > β > BˆP .23
The result that the categorical benefit should be set so as to equate the average smvi
across categorical groups (in our case the unable and able) is well established in the
optimal tax-benefit literature (Atkinson, 1995; Beath et al., 1988; Immonen et al., 1998;
Viard, 2001a,b)
To provide some intuition for Proposition 1, let V P (β, θ) ≡ W P (BˆP , CˆP ; θ) denote
maximum social welfare and let WU denote welfare under a pure universal system (i.e.
22There is therefore an ordering or priorities. The first priority is to eliminate, budget allowing,
between-group inequality in the average smvi - i.e. support unable individuals because they are the
most needy in society from the perspective of smvi. Conditional on the benefit budget being sufficiently
large for this to be achieved and, further, there being money left over, the second priority is to spend
the remainder of the benefit budget on the universal benefit. This in turn reduces inequality in the
smvi within the able subpopulation.
23Perfect Discrimination One Dimensional Problem. From the budget constraint we could
alternatively define CP (B;β, θ) = (β − B)/θ and solve the unconstrained one-dimensional problem
maxB∈[0,β]WP (B,CP ; θ). This yields the first order condition:
θux(Bˆ
P + CP , 1) · (1 + ∂CP /∂B) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM (ω, Bˆ
P )f(ω)dω ≤ 0 ; BˆP ≥ 0
If we substitute in ∂CP /∂B = −1/θ the results in the main text directly follow.
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B = β, C = 0), where:
WU(β, θ) ≡ θu(β, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
v(ω, β)f(ω)dω (2.16)
Since the pure universal system is always a feasible choice, but is rejected in favour
of a system which targets a categorical benefit at the unable, it must follow that
V P (β, θ) −WU(β, θ) > 0. To see this, note that a first-order Taylor approximation
around β gives:
V P −WU ≈ θux(β, 1) ·
(
BˆP + CˆP − β
)
+ (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω ·
(
BˆP − β
)
= θ(1− θ)
[
ux(β, 1)−
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω
]
CˆP > 0
By diminishing marginal utility of income, social welfare can always be raised aboveWU
by transferring some benefit income away from those who are able to work towards the
unable. Of course, the relative amounts that we would choose to transfer will depend
on the proportion of the population who are unable.
With this section serving as a baseline case, we now turn to analyse optimal welfare
provision when the test administering the categorical benefit makes classification errors.
We first study the No Enforcement regime, and then subsequently turn to the Full
Enforcement regime.
2.3.2 Imperfect Discrimination: No Enforcement
With no enforcement mechanisms in place to restrict the work behaviour of able in-
dividuals who receive C, we know that all able individuals will apply for C. Social
welfare is therefore now given by:
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WN(B,C; θ, pI , pII)
= θ {(1− pI)u(B + C, 1) + pIu(B, 1)}
+ (1− θ)

pII
〈
F [ω¯(B + C)]u(B + C, 1) +
∫∞
ω¯(B+C)
v(ω,B + C)f(ω)dω
〉
+(1− pII)
〈
F [ω¯(B)]u(B, 1) +
∫∞
ω¯(B)
v(ω,B)f(ω)dω
〉

(2.17)
Notice that WN(B,C; θ, 0, 0) = W P (B,C; θ) - i.e. when there are no classification
errors in the awards process the welfare function in (2.17) reduces to its Perfect Dis-
crimination counterpart in (2.11).24 The first line on the right side of (2.17) illustrates
that horizontal inequity in utility levels is introduced into the unable subpopulation
through Type I errors. These individuals derive consumption solely from unearned
income and so any disparities in their utility arise due to unequal treatment by the
benefit system. The proportion pI are incorrectly denied C, whilst the proportion
(1− pI) are correctly awarded it. The second line, meanwhile, concerns the able sub-
population. Again, classification errors introduce inequalities into this subpopulation
as the individual welfare rankings now differ from the case where pII = 0. Consider,
for example, those with ω ≤ ω¯(B): these individuals are voluntarily unemployed and
share the same welfare level u(B, 1) when pII = 0, but when pII > 0 some have welfare
u(B + C, 1) whilst others have welfare u(B, 1).
The government budget constraint is given by:
B + [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]C ≤ β (2.18)
24Writing social welfare as in (2.17) illustrates the voluntary unemployment induced by Type II
classification errors. We could instead write social welfare more compactly as:
WN = θ {(1− pI)u(B + C, 1) + pIu(B, 1)}+(1−θ)
{∫ ∞
0
〈pIIv(ω,B + C) + (1− pII)v(ω,B)〉f(ω)dω
}
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Properties of the budget constraint. Let CN(B; β, θ, pI , pII) denote the level
of categorical benefit that exhausts the budget constraint for any B ∈ [0, β]. For-
mally:
CN(B; β, θ, pI , pII) =
β −B
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] (2.19)
It is straightforward to see that ∂CN/∂B < −1 and thus d[B + CN ]/dB = 1 +
∂CN/∂B < 0. An increase in the universal benefit therefore reduces the total benefit
income of categorical recipients.25
Optimisation problem. The optimisation problem of the government is given by:
max
B,C
WN(B,C; θ, pI , pII)
s.t. B + [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]C = β ,
B ≥ 0 , C ≥ 0.
(2.20)
To proceed, let us define (i) the aggregate smvi of those not receiving the categorical
benefit (henceforth ‘non-categorical recipients’) and (ii) the aggregate smvi of categor-
ical recipients, respectively, by:
σNNR(B; θ, pI , pII) ≡ θpIux(B, 1) + (1− θ)(1− pII)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω,B)dF (ω)
(2.21)
σNR (B,C; θ, pI , pII) ≡ θ(1− pI)ux(B + C, 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω,B + C)dF (ω)
The subscript NR denotes ‘non-categorical recipients’, whilst the subscript R denotes
categorical recipients. We let the corresponding averages be given by σ¯NNR ≡ σNNR/[θpI+
(1 − θ)(1 − pII)] and σ¯NR ≡ σNR /[θ(1 − pI) + (1 − θ)pII ], respectively. It is useful to
note that ∂σ¯NNR/∂pI > 0 and ∂σ¯
N
NR/∂pII > 0. Intuitively, a ceteris paribus increase in
25The choice set of B and C is clearly convex because ∂CN/∂B < 0 whilst ∂2CN/∂B2 = 0.
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either pI or pII acts to increase the proportion of non-categorical recipients who are in
fact unable, and thus acts to increase the average. By parallel argument, it also holds
that both ∂σ¯NR /∂pI < 0 and ∂σ¯
N
R /∂pII < 0.
If we now denote the optimal benefit levels by BˆN(β, θ, pI , pII) and Cˆ
N(β, θ, pI , pII)
respectively, we have:
Proposition 2a:
(i) ∀ pI + pII < 1 CˆN > 0 and BˆN ≥ 0 satisfy:
σ¯NNR
(
BˆN ; θ, pI , pII
)
≤ σ¯NR
(
BˆN , CˆN ; θ, pI , pII
)
; BˆN ≥ 0 (2.22)
where the pair of inequalities in (2.22) hold with complementary slackness.
(ii) ∀ pI + pII = 1 (a) CˆN = 0 and BˆN = β if pI > 0; but (b) any (B,C) satisfying
B + C = β will be optimal in the extreme case where pI = 0 (and pII = 1).
Proof: See Appendix 26
Corollary 2: BˆN > 0 if pI > 0 ; otherwise Bˆ
N
{
>
=
}
0 as β
{
>
≤
}
β¯N , where β¯N is the
critical budget level satisfying
σ¯NNR(0; θ, 0, pII) =
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, 0)dF (ω) = σ¯
N
R
(
0,
β¯N
θ + (1− θ)pII ; θ, pI , pII
)
(2.23)
Proof: See Appendix
To discuss Proposition 2a, it is useful to distinguish between the cases where pI > 0
and pI = 0. Suppose first that pI > 0: Proposition 2a states that a necessary and
sufficient condition to provide a categorical benefit is that the test administering it has
26Unconstrained uni-dimensional problem. We could alternatively substitute the func-
tion CN into the welfare function in (2.17) and solve the unconstrained uni-dimensional problem
maxB∈[0,β]WN (B,CN ; θ, pI , pII). This yields the first order condition:
θpIux(Bˆ
N , 1) + (1− θ)(1− pII)
∫
vM (ω, Bˆ
N )f(ω)dω
≤
{
θ(1− pI)ux(BˆN + CN , 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫
vM (ω, Bˆ
N + CN )f(ω)dω
}
· −(1 + ∂CN/∂B) ; BˆN ≥ 0
Substituting in (1 + ∂CN/∂B) = −[θpI + (1 − θ)(1 − pII)]/[θ(1 − pI) + (1 − θ)pII ] and rearranging
then gives the same expression as in (2.22).
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some positive discriminatory power. If this holds then the benefit levels are chosen
in accordance with (2.22). The term to the left of the first inequality in (2.22) is the
average smvi of non-categorical recipients, whilst the term to the right is the average
smvi of categorical recipients. The complementary slackness condition implies that
spending should be exclusively categorical up to the point where the average smvi
of categorical recipients is equated with that of non-categorical recipients. Corollary
2 immediately follows from (2.22). Given our assumption in (2.1) that limx→0 ux =
+∞ a universal benefit will always be provided to ensure rejected unable individuals
have some source of income to consume. At the optimum then, the average smvi of
non-categorical recipients is equated with the average smvi of categorical recipients.
However, if the awards test has no discriminatory power it will be suboptimal to
provide a categorical benefit. Instead, the entire benefit budget should be spent on
the universal benefit.
Suppose alternatively that pI = 0: in this case the story in Proposition 2a is a little
more nuanced, but the main message remains. If the awards test has positive discrimi-
natory power it will certainly be optimal to provide a categorical benefit. Given that all
able individuals receive the categorical benefit, there is no guarantee that it will be opti-
mal to provide a universal benefit. Indeed, it follows from (2.23) and Corollary 2 that it
will only be optimal to provide a universal benefit if the benefit budget exceeds a critical
level (β¯N) which - if spent entirely on categorical transfers - would equate the average
smvi of non-categorical recipients with the average smvi of categorical recipients. How-
ever, if the awards test has no discriminatory power then the social welfare function to
be ‘maximised’ is simply WN(B,C; θ, 0, 1) = θu(B+C, 1)+(1−θ) ∫ v(ω,B+C)f(ω)dω,
such that any combination of B and C satisfying B +C = β is ‘optimal’. Any budget
feasible combination of the benefit levels yields the same level of welfare and there is
no optimisation problem to solve. Note that within this framework this is equivalent
to a pure universal system.27
For the ease of exposition, we assume that pI > 0 for the remainder of the No Enforce-
ment analysis.
27That is, we abstract from any differences in costs there may be between administering a universal
benefit and administering a categorical benefit.
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Intuition for Proposition 2a To provide the intuition for Proposition 2a we com-
pare welfare under an arbitrary budget feasible targeted system (B ∈ [0, β), CN > 0)
with that under a pure universal system (B = β, CN = 0):
WN −WU
= θ

〈(1− pI)u(B + CN , 1) + pIu(B, 1)〉 − u[B + (1− pI)CN , 1]
+〈u[B + (1− pI)CN , 1]− u(β, 1)〉

+ (1− θ)

∫∞
0
〈
pIIv(ω,B + C
N) + (1− pII)v(ω,B)
〉− v[ω,B + pIICN ]f(ω)dω
+
∫∞
0
〈
v[ω,B + pIIC
N ]− v(ω, β)〉 f(ω)dω

(2.24)
The two curly braces multiplied by θ and (1 − θ) concern the unable and able sub-
populations, respectively. Within both pairs of braces the first line captures within-
group considerations, whilst the second line captures between-group considerations. By
the concavity of individual utility the first line must be negative in both cases: i.e.
the utility of consuming the average benefit must exceed the expected utility; where
B + (1 − pI)CN is the average benefit income for the unable and B + pIICN is the
average benefit income for the able. Within-group, therefore, an imperfectly targeted
programme does worse than a pure universal programme. Next, the sign of the second
line will differ between the two pairs of braces whenever pI + pII < 1. In this case the
unable receive a higher benefit income on average through targeting than under a pure
universal system, whilst the able receive a lower benefit income on average through
targeting than under a pure universal system. However, both second lines are instead
zero if pI + pII = 1. This arises because a targeted system provides no more benefit
income on average to the unable than the able.28 Consequently, if pI + pII = 1 a
28Note that we can write the benefit budget as:
β = B + [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]C = θ [B + (1− pI)C]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average benefit
(unable)
+(1− θ) [B + pIIC]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average benefit
(able)
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targeted system does worse than a pure universal system within-group and no better
between-group. This explains why CˆN = 0 when pI + pII = 1. Finally, one can also do
a Taylor Approximation of WN −WU around β and make use of the budget constraint
to obtain:
WN −WU ≈ θux(β, 1) · [B + (1− pI)C − β]
+ (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω · [B + pIIC − β]
= θ(1− θ)[1− pI − pII ]
{
ux(β, 1)−
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω
}
C
This will be positive so long as pI + pII < 1, which further illustrates that the pure
universal welfare level can be improved upon through targeting a categorical benefit
at the unable whenever the test administering it has some discriminatory power.
The intuition for Corollary 2 is twofold. First, if Type I errors are made but no uni-
versal benefit is provided then unable individuals who have been wrongly denied the
categorical benefit would have no source of income to provide consumption. Accord-
ingly, a universal benefit must be provided whenever Type I errors are made. Second,
even if there are no Type I errors, the first priority of a benefit system is to support
the most needy - in this case those who are unable to work - and a universal benefit
should be used only if the budget is above a critical level.
Recall that at the Perfect Discrimination optimum inequality in the average smvi be-
tween the unable and able subpopulations will be eliminated if the benefit budget is
sufficiently large. The following proposition asserts that this no longer holds when
classification errors are made.
Proposition 2b: Let inequality in the average smvi between the unable and able sub-
So: B+ (1− pI)C > β > B+ pIIC ∀ pI + pII < 1, but B+ (1− pI)C = β = B+ pIIC ∀ pI + pII = 1.
To see that welfare is improved through the unable receiving more on average than the per capita
budget (but consequently the able receiving less), note that a Taylor Approximation of θ〈u[B + (1−
pI)C]− u(β, 1)〉+ (1− θ)
∫ 〈v[ω,B + pIIC]− v(ω, β)〉f(ω)dω around β yields:
θ[B + (1− pI)C − β]
[
ux(β, 1)−
∫ ∞
0
vM (ω, β)f(ω)dω
]
≥ 0
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populations be given by:
δN ≡ [pIux(B, 1) + (1− pI)ux(B + C, 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average smvi (unable)
−
∫ ∞
0
[(1− pII)vM(ω,B) + pIIvM(ω,B + C)]f(ω)dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average smvi (able)
(2.25)
Then if pI > 0 and/or pII > 0 it will hold that δ
N > 0 at the optimum because:
ux(Bˆ
N , 1) > ux(Bˆ
N+CˆN , 1) ≥ λˆN ≥
∫
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)f(ω)dω >
∫
vM(ω, Bˆ
N+CˆN)f(ω)dω
(2.26)
where (i) ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) = λˆN only if pII = 0; whilst (ii)
∫
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)f(ω)dω = λˆN
only if pI = 0 and β is sufficiently large.
Proof: See Appendix
We now turn our attention to how classification errors affect maximum social welfare,
as defined by the value function V N(β, θ, pI , pII) ≡ WN(BˆN , CˆN ; θ, pI , pII). Using
(2.26) we can establish the following result:
Proposition 2c: Maximum social welfare is decreasing in the propensity to make
classification errors of either Type I or Type II. Formally :
∂V N
∂pI
< 0 ,
∂V N
∂pII
< 0 ; ∀ 0 ≤ pI + pII < 1 (2.27)
Proof: See Appendix
Proposition 2c implies that improvements in the discriminatory power of the awards
technology - corresponding to a ceteris paribus reduction in pI and/or pII - will be
unambiguously welfare improving. Suppose, alternatively, that genuine improvements
in discriminatory power are not possible, but instead a reduction in pI (pII) can only
be brought about through making the awards test more lenient (stringent), which
in turn implies an increase in pII (pI). There would therefore be a tradeoff be-
tween error propensities, discriminatory power held fixed (see Goodin, 1985). The
welfare effects of a change in the propensity to make either error type would then de-
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pend on the relative size of |∂V N/∂pI | and |∂V N/∂pII |, respectively. In particular, if
|∂V N/∂pI | > |∂V N/∂pII | then an increase in the leniency of the awards test may be
welfare improving. Contrastingly, if |∂V N/∂pI | < |∂V N/∂pII | then an increase in the
stringency of the awards test may be welfare improving.
Without adopting restrictive assumptions on the third derivatives uxxx and vMMM ,
comparative statics results concerning the effect of pI and pII on the optimal benefit
levels are scarce. The exception is the effect of an increase in the Type I error propensity
on the optimal universal benefit:
Proposition 2d: ∂BˆN/∂pI > 0
Proof: See Appendix
The intuition for this result follows directly from the optimality condition in (2.22).
Indeed, consider the effect of an increase in pI on both σ¯
N
NR and σ¯
N
R , when evaluated
at (B,C) = (BˆN , CN):
dσ¯NNR(Bˆ
N , CN ; θ, pI , pII)
dpI
=
∂σ¯NNR
∂pI︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
∂σ¯NNR
∂B︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
·∂Bˆ
N
∂pI
(2.28)
dσ¯NR (Bˆ
N , CN ; θ, pI , pII)
dpI
=
∂σ¯NR
∂pI︸︷︷︸
<0
+
∂σ¯NR
∂B︸︷︷︸
<0
·

∂BˆN
∂pI
[
1 +
∂CN
∂B
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂CN
∂pI︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
 (2.29)
where in writing (2.29) we have used the property that ∂σ¯NR /∂B = ∂σ¯
N
R /∂C. Sup-
pose that ∂BˆN/∂pI = 0. Then one can readily establish from (2.28) and (2.29) that
dσ¯NNR/dpI > 0 whilst dσ¯
N
R /dpI < 0. The average smvi of the two groups thus move
in opposite directions and we are no longer at an optimum. Similarly, if we suppose
∂BˆN/∂pI < 0 it will also be the case that dσ¯
N
NR/dpI > 0 whilst dσ¯
N
R /dpI < 0. Ac-
cordingly, the only way to restore balance (i.e. σ¯NNR = σ¯
N
R ) following an increase in
pI is to lower the average smvi of those non-categorical recipients through increasing
B, which explains why ∂BˆN/∂pI > 0. Indeed, setting (2.28) equal to (2.29) we can
readily establish that:
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∂BˆN
∂pI
=
∂σ¯NNR
∂pI
−
[
∂σ¯NR
∂pI
+
∂σ¯NR
∂B
· ∂C
N
∂pI
]
∂σ¯NR
∂B
[
1 +
∂CN
∂B
]
− ∂σ¯
N
NR
∂B
> 0 (2.30)
Notice that the result ∂BˆN/∂pI > 0 does not guarantee that ∂Cˆ
N/∂pI < 0. Indeed,
because an increase in pI means that fewer unable individuals receive the categorical
benefit we can establish from the budget constraint that:
∂CˆN
∂pI

>
=
<
 0 if ∂Bˆ
N
∂pI

<
=
>
 θ(β − Bˆ
N)
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] = θCˆ
N
Remark: If we make the strong assumption that vMM = −k ∀ ω ≤ ω¯(M); but
vMM = 0 ∀ ω > ω¯(M), where k > 0 is a constant, then:
∂CˆN
∂pI
< 0
This would arise under quadratic preferences u(x, l) = [x − αx2] − γ(1 − l); where α
and γ are constants and k = 2α. A well documented feature of these preferences is that
ux > 0 only if x < 1/(2α). Viard (2001a) similarly assumes that vMM is a negative
constant to obtain comparative statics predictions.
The effects of an increase in pI or pII on the optimal benefit levels are discussed further
in the numerical analysis of Section 2.4.
This concludes our discussion of the No Enforcement regime. We now proceed to
analyse the Full Enforcement regime.
2.3.3 Imperfect Discrimination: Full Enforcement
When the condition that recipients of C do not work is fully enforced, we know from
(2.8) that the only able individuals who apply for C will be those with ω ≤ ω¯. For
individuals with ω > ω¯ the opportunity cost of not working is simply too high. Given
that the unable always apply for C, we can therefore write social welfare under the
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Full Enforcement regime as:
W F (B,C; θ, pI , pII) = θ {(1− pI)u(B + C, 1) + pIu(B, 1)}
+ (1− θ)

∫∞
0
v(ω,B)f(ω)dω
+pII
∫ ω¯
0
〈u(B + C, 1)− v(ω,B)〉 f(ω)dω

(2.31)
The first line is the aggregate welfare of unable individuals and is written exactly as
under the No Enforcement analysis. The second line, meanwhile, is the aggregate
welfare of able individuals. Within the second pair of curly braces the first term
captures the average welfare over the able subpopulation were no able individuals to
be awarded the categorical benefit, whilst the second term captures the welfare gain
to able applicants who are awarded the categorical benefit by Type II error.29
The government budget constraint is given by:
B + χ(B,C; θ, pI , pII)C ≤ β (2.32)
where χ ≡ θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pIIF (ω¯) denotes the number of categorical recipients in
the economy. Conversely, 1 − χ = θpI + (1 − θ)[1 − F (ω¯)pII ] denotes the number of
individuals not receiving the categorical benefit.
Properties of the budget constraint. Let CF (B; β, θ, pI , pII) denote the level of
the categorical benefit that exhausts the budget constraint for any given B ∈ [0, β].
Formally:30
29To arrive at the expression for welfare in (2.31), note that average welfare over the able subpop-
ulation when the fraction F (ω¯) apply for the categorical benefit is:∫ ω¯
0
[pIIu(B + C, 1) + (1− pII)v(ω,B)] f(ω)dω +
∫ ∞
ω¯
v(ω,B)f(ω)dω
= pII
∫ ω¯
0
[u(B + C, 1)− v(ω,B)] f(ω)dω +
∫ ∞
0
v(ω,B)f(ω)dω
30There must be a unique root C = CF to the condition χ(B,C; θ, pI , pII) ·C = β−B because the
left side is unambiguously increasing in C (and zero when C = 0) whilst the right side is constant.
CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL BENEFITS WITH IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT 98
B + χ(B,CF ; θ, pI , pII) · CF = β (2.33)
Differentiating (2.33) w.r.t B thus gives:
∂CF
∂B
= −
[
1 + (1− θ)f(ω¯)pII ω¯BCF
]
χ+ (1− θ)f(ω¯)pII ω¯CCF ≤ 0 (2.34)
From this we can directly establish that:
dω¯(B,CF )
dB
= ω¯B + ω¯C ·
(
∂CF
∂B
)
=
χω¯B − ω¯C
χ+ (1− θ)f(ω¯)pII ω¯CCF < 0 (2.35)
The total effect of an increase in the universal benefit is therefore to reduce the number
of individuals who apply for the categorical benefit. Note that this does not necessarily
imply that the total benefit income of categorical recipients falls. This requires d[B +
CF ]/dB = 1 + ∂CF/∂B < 0 and thus ∂CF/∂B < −1, which in turn corresponds to
the condition that:
(1− θ)f(ω¯)pIICF < (1− χ)H∗(ω¯, B)
For simplicity, we will throughout assume this to be the case.
Finally, to guarantee convexity of the feasible set of choices of B and C it is throughout
assumed that ∂2CF/∂B2 ≤ 0, which requires:
2f(ω¯)
dω¯(B,CF )
dB
∂CF
∂B
≥ CF
 f
′(ω¯)
[
dω¯(B,CF )
dB
]2
+f(ω¯)[ω¯BB + 2ω¯BCC
′
F + ω¯CC(∂C
F/∂B)2]
 (2.36)
The left side is unambiguously positive, but the sign of the terms within curly braces
on the right side depend on as yet unspecified properties of (i) the distribution func-
tion (necessary to sign f ′(ω)) and (ii) the third derivatives of individual preferences
(necessary to sign ω¯BB, ω¯CC and ω¯BC). For this reason one cannot conclusively show
that ∂2CF/∂B2 ≤ 0. However, the subsequent numerical analysis in Section 2.4 will
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illustrate that the convexity assumption is readily satisfied in all considered cases.
Optimisation Problem. The optimisation problem of the government is thus now
given by:
max
B,C
W F (B,C; θ, pI , pII)
s.t. B + χ(B,C; θ, pI , pII) · C = β ,
B ≥ 0 , C ≥ 0
(2.37)
We will assume that there is a unique solution to the above optimisation problem.
However, the concavity of the welfare function W F with respect to the choice vari-
ables is not guaranteed under Full Enforcement due to the endogeneity of application
decisions. We will return to discuss this both below and in the numerical analysis in
Section 2.4. The latter will illustrate that this assumption is appropriate in a large
range of cases - and identify cases where it is not.
Analogous to the analysis of No Enforcement, let us define the aggregate smvi of non-
categorical recipients and categorical recipients by, respectively:
σFNR(B,C; θ, pI , pII) =
θpIux(B, 1) + (1− θ)
{∫ ∞
0
vM(ω,B)dF (ω)− pII
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω,B)dF (ω)
}
,
(2.38)
σFR(B,C; θ, pI , pII) = ux(B + C, 1) · χ
Once more the subscript NR denotes non-categorical recipients, whilst the subscript
R denotes categorical recipients.
If we now denote the optimal benefit levels by BˆF (β, θ, pI , pII) and Cˆ
F (β, θ, pI , pII),
we have:
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Proposition 3a: CˆF > 0 ∀ pI + pII ≤ 1 and BˆF ≥ 0 satisfy:
σFNR
(
BˆF , CˆF ; θ, pI , pII
)
≤ σFR
(
BˆF , CˆF ; θ, pI , pII
)
·
{
(1− χ) + (1− θ)pIIf(ω¯)(ω¯B − ω¯C)CˆF
χ+ (1− θ)pIIf(ω¯)ω¯CCˆF
}
, BˆF ≥ 0
(2.39)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
Proof: See Appendix.
Corollary 3: BˆF > 0 if pI > 0, but otherwise Bˆ
F > 0 if :
σFNR
(
0, CF ; θ, 0, pII
)
> ux
(
CF , 1
) · χ{(1− χ) + (1− θ)pIIf(ω¯)(ω¯B − ω¯C)CF
χ+ (1− θ)pIIf(ω¯)ω¯CCF
}
The principal message from Proposition 3a is that it is optimal to provide a categor-
ical benefit at all levels of discriminatory power, therefore including the case of no
discriminatory power. Condition (2.39) characterises the optimum. The left side is
the aggregate smvi of individuals not receiving the categorical benefit. Contrastingly,
the right side is the aggregate smvi of categorical recipients multiplied by the increase
in their total benefit income per unit reduction in the universal benefit. This is made
more transparent through the below remark.
Remark: From (2.34) we can write the terms within curly braces on the right side of
(2.39) more compactly as · − (1 + ∂CF/∂B) > 0. 31
31Unconstrained uni-dimensional problem (Full Enforcement). Analogous to footnote 26
we could alternatively substitute the function CF into the welfare function in (2.31) and solve the
unconstrained uni-dimensional problem maxB∈[0,β]WF (B,CF ; θ, pI , pII). The resulting first order
condition is:
θpIux(Bˆ
F , 1) + (1− θ)
{∫ ∞
0
vM (ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω − pII
∫ ω¯
0
vM (ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω
}
≤ ux(BˆF + CF , 1) · −(1 + ∂CF /∂B)χ ; BˆF ≥ 0
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The increase in total benefit income associated with a reduction in the universal benefit
is a function of the terms ω¯B and ω¯C , capturing the fact that a ceteris paribus increase
in either benefit generates incentives to apply for the categorical benefit. However,
because ω¯B < ω¯C a direct implication of (2.39) is that at the optimum the smvi of
categorical recipients will exceed the average smvi of non-categorical recipients.
To see why we cannot in general guarantee a unique solution to the optimality condition
in (2.39), it is useful to substitute the function CF into both σFNR and σ
F
R and establish
how these functions change with the universal benefit. Formally:
dσFNR(B,C
F ; θ, pI , pII)
dB
= θpIuxx + (1− θ)
{∫ ∞
0
vMMdF (ω)− pII
∫ ω¯
0
vMMdF (ω)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (1− θ)pIIf(ω¯) · −dω¯(B,C
F )
dB
vM(ω¯, B)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
(2.40)
whilst:
dσFR(B,C
F ; θ, pI , pII)
dB
= χ · [uxx(1 + ∂CF/∂B)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ux ·
[
(1− θ)pIIf(ω¯)dω¯(B,C
F )
dB
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(2.41)
The total effect of an increase in the universal benefit on σFNR and σ
F
R is in both cases
composed of two conflicting effects. In the case of σFNR an increase in the universal ben-
efit (i) increases the benefit income of each individual and thus lowers their individual
smvi; but also (ii) increases the number of non-categorical recipients through reducing
the number of individuals that apply for the categorical benefit. Alternatively, in the
case of σFR an increase in the universal benefit (i) lowers the total benefit income of
each individual and consequently increases their smvi; but also (ii) reduces the number
of categorical recipients. Notice that in either case the size of the second effect will
depend on the responsiveness of ω¯ to changes in benefit income. Ceteris paribus, the
less responsive this critical net wage is the lower the absolute size of this effect. In
Substituting in (2.34) for ∂CF /∂B then gives the expression in (2.39).
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both cases the overall effect is ambiguous and will depend on unspecified properties
of both the utility function (e.g. third derivatives) and the distribution function (e.g.
the derivative of the pdf). These conflicting effects can result in non-concavity of the
welfare function and multiple stationary points.32 We will discuss this in greater depth
in the numerical analysis of Section 2.4.
The conditions under which a universal benefit should be provided follow directly from
(2.39) and are given in Corollary 3. As under the No Enforcement analysis, it is
optimal to provide a universal benefit whenever the test administering the categorical
benefit has a positive propensity to make Type I errors. This ensures that unable
individuals who are incorrectly denied the categorical benefit have some source of
income to consume. Contrastingly, if Type I errors never occur it is only optimal to
provide a universal benefit if, when evaluated at (B,C) = (0, CF ), the total welfare
gain of a marginal increase in the universal benefit to non-categorical recipients exceeds
the total welfare loss to categorical recipients.
Intuition for Proposition 3a. To provide the intuition for the main result in Propo-
sition 3a, which states that a categorical benefit should be provided no matter what
the discriminatory power of the test administering it, we take a Taylor approximation
of W F −WU around β to obtain:
W F −WU ≈ (1− θ)C

θ[1− pI − F (ω¯)pII ]
〈
ux(β, 1)−
∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω
〉
+ pIIF (ω¯)
〈
F [ω¯(β)]
F (ω¯)
ux(β, 1)−
∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω
〉

(2.42)
The first line within curly braces is always positive because a targeted system awards,
on average, the unable with more benefit income than the able for all levels of discrim-
32It is also useful to note that:
d
dB
{
σFR(B,C
F ; θ, pI , pII) · −(1 + ∂CF /∂B)
}
= χ · {uxx · −(1 + CF )2 − ux∂2CF /∂B2}︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+ux · −(1 + ∂CF /∂B)
{
(1− θ)f(ω¯)pII dω¯(B,C
F )
dB
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
The assumption that ∂2CF /∂B2 < 0 thus acts to compound the effect of a reduction in total benefit
income on a categorical recipient’s smvi.
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inatory power. This arises because able individuals of high productivity (i.e. ω > ω¯)
choose not to apply for C. Next, the second line within curly braces is likely to be
positive for a small categorical benefit where ω¯ ∼ ω¯(β)⇒ F (ω¯) ∼ F (ω¯). This line cap-
tures the fact that Type II errors actually redistribute within the able subpopulation
because only those with ω ≤ ω¯ will apply for the benefit. Indeed, the closer F (ω¯)/F (ω¯)
to unity the larger this effect is and this arises precisely because able individuals with
ω < ω¯ are formally equivalent to unable individuals from the perspective of smvi.
In terms of benefit design then, the principal difference between the No Enforcement
and Full Enforcement regimes is that under the latter a targeted system (pure or
partial) is chosen in all cases, whereas under the former a targeted system (pure or
partial) is only chosen if the test administering C has some discriminatory power.
From the first order conditions characterising the optimal benefit levels (see Appendix)
we can establish the following result.
Proposition 3b: Let inequality in the average smvi between the unable and able sub-
populations be written as:
δF = [pIux(B, 1) + (1− pI)ux(B + C, 1)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average smvi (unable)
−
{∫ ∞
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω + pII
∫ ω¯
0
[ux(B + C, 1)− vM(ω,B)] f(ω)dω
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Average smvi (able)
(2.43)
Then for pI > 0 and/or pII > 0 it will hold that δ
F > 0 at the optimum because:
1
F (ω¯)
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω > ux(Bˆ
F+CˆF , 1) ≥ λˆF > 1
1− F (ω¯)
∫ ∞
ω¯
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω
(2.44)
where ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) = λˆF only if pII = 0.
Proof: See Appendix
Proposition 3b states that classification errors of either type prevent the elimination
of between-group inequality in the average smvi, even if the benefit budget would be
sufficiently large to eliminate the inequality under Perfect Discrimination.
We now turn to discuss how classification errors affect maximum social welfare, as
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defined by the value function V F (β, θ, pI , pII) ≡ W F (BˆF , CˆF ; θ, pI , pII). From (2.44)
we can write the following result.
Proposition 3c: Maximum social welfare is decreasing in the propensity to make
Type I classification errors, but can be increasing in the propensity to make Type II
classification errors. Formally:
∂V F
∂pI
< 0 ,
∂V F
∂pII
{
≤
>
}
0 (2.45)
where: (i)
∂V F
∂pII
= (1− θ)F (ω¯)·{[
u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− u(BˆF , 1)− λˆF CˆF
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
Benefit to individual of receiving C
conditional on facing zero labour
constraint (net of exchequer cost)
−
∫ ω¯
ω¯(B)
[
v(ω, BˆF )− u(BˆF , 1)
] f(ω)
F (ω¯)
dω︸ ︷︷ ︸
Cost of facing zero labour constraint
conditional on receiving B
}
and (ii) a sufficient condition for welfare to be increasing in Type II errors is that:
F (ω¯(B))
θ(1− pI)
(1− θ)pII + F (ω¯)
· ω¯f(ω¯)
F (ω¯)︸ ︷︷ ︸
elasticity of F w.r.t. ω,
evaluated at ω¯
· Cˆ
F ω¯C
ω¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
elasticity of ω¯ w.r.t. C
evaluated at CˆF
−
[
1− F (ω¯(B))
F (ω¯)
]
> 0
(2.46)
Proof: See Appendix
We can make a number of observations from (2.46). First, the closer F (ω¯(B))/F (ω¯)
is to unity the more likely that ∂V F/∂pII > 0. This arises precisely because the
categorical benefit is being ‘leaked’ predominantly to able applicants who have the
same smvi as unable applicants. Second, the higher pI and/or pII the larger the
first term in (2.46) and thus the more likely that ∂V F/∂pII > 0. We will see from
the numerical examples which follow that an increase in the propensity to make either
error type is likely to lower the categorical benefit, which in turn will increase ω¯ relative
to ω¯. Finally, the smaller θ is - and thus the fewer unable individuals in society - the
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more likely that ∂V F/∂pII > 0.
2.3.4 Welfare Comparison: No Enforcement vs. Full Enforce-
ment
Given our analysis of optimal welfare provision under the alternative enforcement
regimes of No Enforcement and Full Enforcement, it is natural to ask under which
regime is social welfare highest? Clearly, if pII = 0 then there are zero enforcement
issues and welfare under both regimes will coincide. Contrastingly, if pI + pII = 1 then
it must hold that V F > V N = WU because the pure universal outcome is not chosen
under the Full Enforcement regime. We are therefore concerned with the intermediate
cases where 0 < pI + pII < 1 and pII > 0.
Suppose that we fix B at any budget feasible value B¯ ∈ (0, β). From (2.19) and (2.33)
the resulting categorical benefit sizes under the alternative enforcement regimes are
then CN and CF , respectively. For a finite benefit budget it must hold that F (ω¯) < 1
and so CN < CF .
For a given B¯ there will be a critical productivity at which the welfare of a categorical
recipient under No Enforcement equates with the welfare of a categorical recipient
under Full Enforcement. Formally, let ω¯NF satisfy u(B¯+CF , 1) ≡ v (ω¯NF , B¯ + CN).33
This critical net wage is illustrated graphically in Figure 2.3. A comparison of the two
welfare regimes (B¯, CN) and (B¯, CF ) thus yields:
33Note that ∀ ω < ω¯(B¯ + CN ) we have v(ω, B¯ + CN ) = u(B¯ + CN , 1) < u(B¯ + CF , 1). There will
therefore be a critical productivity ω¯NF as asserted in the main text.
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Figure 2.3: Welfare comparison and the critical productivity ω¯NF .
ω
u
u(B¯, 1)
u(B¯ + CN , 1)
u(B¯ + CF , 1)
v(ω, B¯)
v(ω, B¯ + CN )
ω¯(B¯) ω¯(B¯ + CN ) ω¯NF ω¯
Notes: From the relationship v(ω, B¯ + CN ) = u(B¯ + CF , 1) = v(ω¯, B¯) it must hold that ω¯NF < ω¯
W F (B¯, CF ; θ, pI , pII)−WN(B¯, CN ; θ, pI , pII)
= θ(1− pI)[u(B¯ + CF , 1)− u(B¯ + CN , 1)︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
]
+ (1− θ)pII

∫ ω¯NF
0
[
u(B¯ + CF , 1)− v(ω, B¯ + CN)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
f(ω)dω
+
∫ ω¯
ω¯NF
[
u(B¯ + CF , 1)− v(ω, B¯ + CN)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
f(ω)dω
+
∫∞
ω¯
[
v(ω, B¯)− v(ω, B¯ + CN)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
f(ω)dω

(2.47)
34The first line concerns the unable subpopulation and is unambiguously positive. Un-
34It is important to stress that we are not comparing the value functions for No Enforcement and Full
Enforcement here. However, we can always (and will below) set B¯ = BˆN and compare an arbitrary
Full Enforcement system with the optimum No Enforcement system (or vice versa). If there are
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able individuals are on aggregate better of under Full Enforcement than No Enforce-
ment because (i) those awarded the categorical benefit receive CF > CN ; whilst (ii)
those not awarded the categorical benefit receive the same as they would under No
Enforcement (i.e. B¯) and are thus no worse off. The second line concerns the able
subpopulation: as can be seen from the terms within curly braces there are three
considerations. First, categorical recipients with ω ≤ ω¯NF are by definition better off
under Full Enforcement than under No Enforcement. Within this range of wages notice
that recipients with ω¯(B¯ + CF ) < ω ≤ ω¯ would like to work under the Full Enforce-
ment regime, but they would not be willing to accept a reduction of (CF − CN) in
their benefit income in return for a full relaxation of the no-work requirement. Second,
however, categorical recipients with ω¯NF < ω ≤ ω¯ are worse off under Full Enforce-
ment than under No Enforcement. These individuals would be willing to accept the
lower categorical benefit size in return for a full relaxation of the no-work requirement.
Third, individuals with ω > ω¯ do not apply for the categorical benefit under Full En-
forcement because they are better off working and receiving only the universal benefit.
They are therefore worse off than their counterparts under No Enforcement who work
and receive the categorical benefit.
Suppose that we set B¯ = BˆN (and consequently CN = CˆN). In this case (2.47)
becomes a comparison of (i) welfare under an arbitrary Full Enforcement system where
B = BˆN and C > CˆN ; with (ii) maximum welfare under No Enforcement. An arbitrary
Full Enforcement system thus does better than an optimal No Enforcement system for
both the unable subpopulation and, within the able subpopulation, individuals of lower
productivity (i.e. ω ≤ ω¯NF ). If the welfare losses to those with higher productivities
(i.e. ω > ω¯NF ) do not offset the redistribute gains from awarding higher transfers to
the unable and those of lower productivity, it will certainly be the case that a Full
Enforcement scheme with optimally chosen welfare benefits can improve upon a No
Enforcement scheme.
We shall revisit this question in the numerical analysis which follows.
conditions where the former exceeds the latter then there will certainly be conditions where optimal
Full Enforcement welfare exceeds optimal No Enforcement welfare.
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2.4 Numerical Simulations
The purpose of this section is twofold: (i) to obtain insights into how the optimal
benefit levels change with the propensity to make classification errors of either type;
and (ii) to provide examples where welfare under the Full Enforcement regime can
indeed be increasing in the propensity to make Type II classification errors. To satisfy
both objectives, we turn to numerical methods.
In line with much of the optimal tax/benefit literature (Immonen et al., 1998; Mirrlees,
1971; Stern, 1982; Viard, 2001a,b), we take individual preferences to be of the constant
elasticity of substitution (CES) form:
u(x, l) =

[
αx
E−1
E + (1− α)l E−1E
] E
E−1
: E 6= 1
xαl1−α : E = 1
(2.48)
where E is elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption. The properties
of this function are well documented in the literature (see Appendix for the derivation
of labour supply and indirect utility.).
The choice of productivity distribution is influenced by the sufficient condition in (2.46),
which is more likely to hold the closer F (ω¯)/F (ω¯) < 1 is to unity. This suggests that
a productivity distribution with a thick lower tail may give rise to conditions where
welfare can be increasing in the propensity to make Type II errors. There are a number
of candidates that satisfy this criterion; such as the Exponential Distribution or the
Pareto Distribution. The former does not require the imposition of a minimum pro-
ductivity and so we choose this. Individual productivities are therefore exponentially
distributed with density function:
f(n) = µe−µn (2.49)
and distribution function
F (n) = 1− e−µn (2.50)
where µ > 0 is a scale parameter and n = ω/(1− t) is individual productivity.
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We note at the outset that many of the results obtained in this section concerning
the effect of classification errors on optimal benefits continue to hold under alternative
distributional assumptions.35
In the simulations that follow the choices of parameter values are: µ = 3; E ∈
{0.5, 0.6, 0.7 0.8, 0.9, 0.99}; α = 0.6; θ ∈ {0.05, 0.1} ; t = 0.3; and β = 0.1. For
µ = 3 the average productivity (maximum earnings) in the economy is 1/3. Analogous
to Stern (1976), the parameter α = 0.6 is chosen such that the average productivity
individual works roughly two-thirds of their time endowment (unity) when E = 0.5.
The choices of the unable subpopulation size (θ) seems sensible in light of real-world
statistics. For example, Mcinnes (2012, p.4) reports that 6.7% of those in the United
Kingdom aged 16-64 (i.e. working age) claimed Incapacity Benefit/ Earnings and Sup-
port Allowance (ESA) in 2011. Note that higher values of θ would also be permissible36:
Atkinson (1995, Ch.2) - who refers to those who are unable to work as the ‘sick and
retired’ - considers θ = 0.15 (and higher). Finally, the chosen budget size of β = 0.1
corresponds to 30% of maximum earnings. This value is slightly larger than tax rev-
enue at t = 0.3 (when able individuals receive no unearned income), but the results do
not qualitatively change at lower budget sizes. Indeed, examples at the lower budget
size β = 0.05 are available from the author upon request.
2.4.1 Baseline Case: Perfect Discrimination Simulations
To provide baseline numerical results, Figures 2.4 and 2.5 display the Perfect Discrim-
ination optima for the cases where E = 0.5 and E = 0.99, respectively. Both figures
contain four subplots. The subplots on the left side are drawn for θ = 0.05, whilst the
subplots on the right side are drawn for θ = 0.10. Each subplot has the budget size β
on the horizontal axis. Subplots (a) and (b) illustrate how the average smvi of the two
subpopulations change with β, where for each value of β the optimal benefit levels are
chosen. Subplots (c) and (d) illustrate how the optimal benefit levels change with β.
35Simulation results under the frequently employed assumption that productivity is lognormally
distributed are available from the author upon request.
36To put these values further in context, the UK population size was estimated at 63.2 million in
2011/12, with 66 percent (42.1 million) of working age. Of these, approximately 13 percent (5.7 mil-
lion) were estimated to be disabled, where the disability definition adopted includes, non-exhaustively,
those with a long term illness or substantial difficulties engaging in daily activities (see ONS, 2012;
ODI, 2014).
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Figure 2.4: Perfect discrimination optima and average smvi (E = 0.5)
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(c) Optimal Benefits (θ = 0.05)
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(d) Optimal Benefits (θ = 0.1)
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Notes. This figure captures how the average smvi of the unable and able subpopulations changes with
the budget size when the benefits are optimally chosen. The subplots on the left side are drawn for
an unable subpopulation size of θ = 0.05; whilst the subplots on the right side are drawn for θ = 0.10.
β¯ is the critical budget level satisfying ux
(
β¯/θ, 1
) ≡ ∫ vM (ω, 0)f(ω)dω. Whenever β < β¯ we have
BˆP = 0 whilst CˆP > 0 increases with β. At β = β¯ - and thus CˆP = β¯/θ - categorical spending
eliminates inequality in the average smvi between the unable and able subpopulations. For β > β¯ we
have BˆP > 0 and CˆP > 0, such that a combination of the universal and categorical transfers are used
to keep the average smvi of the two subpopulations equal.
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Figure 2.5: Perfect discrimination optima and the average smvi (E = 0.99)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
β
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
sm
vi
β¯
(a) smvi at the Optimum (θ = 0.05)
av. smvi (able)
smvi (unable)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
β
0.8
0.9
1.0
1.1
1.2
1.3
1.4
1.5
1.6
sm
vi
β¯
(b) smvi at the Optimum (θ = 0.1)
av. smvi (able)
smvi (unable)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
β
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
B
en
efi
t
L
ev
el
s
β¯
(c) Optimal Benefits (θ = 0.05)
BˆP
CˆP
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
β
0.0
0.1
0.2
0.3
0.4
0.5
B
en
efi
t
L
ev
el
s
β¯
(d) Optimal Benefits (θ = 0.1)
BˆP
CˆP
Notes. A comparison with Figure 2.4 illustrates that β¯ is lower when E = 0.99 than when E = 0.5.
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Figure 2.6: Variation of β¯ with E .
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Notes: On the horizontal axis is the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption (E),
whilst on the vertical axis is the budget size (β¯) required to eliminate inequality in the average smvi
between the unable and able subpopulations, when spent entirely on categorical transfers.
The vertical line labelled β¯ corresponds to β¯P in (2.15). It is thus the critical budget
size at which there are just enough resources to eliminate inequality in the average
smvi between the unable and able subpopulations through categorical transfers.
Both figures illustrate that whenever β < β¯ the smvi of the unable exceeds the av-
erage smvi of the able at the optimum. In this case the optimal universal benefit is
zero and the optimal categorical benefit is increasing in the budget size. Increasing
categorical transfers lower the smvi of the unable towards the average smvi of the able.
Consequently, the smvi of the unable is falling with the budget size. At β = β¯ the
average smvi of the two subpopulations is equated. For β > β¯ it is optimal to provide a
universal benefit, where both the universal and categorical benefits are chosen to keep
the average smvi of the two subpopulations equated.
Comparing the left and right columns within both figures illustrates, unsurprisingly,
that an increase in the unable subpopulation size increases the critical budget β¯. This is
easily verified: differentiating the identity ux(β¯/θ, 1) ≡
∫
vM(ω, 0)f(ω)dω with respect
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to θ gives ∂β¯/∂θ = β¯/θ > 0. Comparing Figure 2.4 with Figure 2.5 illustrates that an
increase in the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption increases the
universal benefit and lowers the categorical transfer. This arises because an increase in
E lowers inequality in the average smvi between the two subpopulations. This can be
seen from the fact that, ceteris paribus, β¯ falls with E , as illustrated in Figure 2.6.
2.4.2 No Enforcement Simulations
Figures 2.7 to 2.12 display how the No Enforcement optimum benefit levels and maxi-
mum social welfare change with the propensity to make both Type I and Type II errors.
Each figure is drawn for a different E ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99}. Within each figure
there are six subplots. The subplots on the left side (a,c, and e) are drawn for θ = 0.05;
whilst those on the right side (b,d and f) are drawn for θ = 0.10. Subplots (a) and (b)
display the optimal universal benefit; subplots (c) and (d) display the optimal categor-
ical benefit; whist subplots (e) and (f) display maximum welfare under these choices as
a proportion of welfare under the Perfect Discrimination optimum (this ensures values
are between 0 and 1). On the horizontal axis in each subplot is the propensity to make
Type II errors; varied in between 0 and 1. The different curves within a given subplot
are drawn for different Type I error propensities, where pI ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4}. To
generate each subplot pII was increased from 0 to 1 in discrete intervals of 0.02 and at
each stage the optimal benefit levels were simulated.
The most immediate observation from each figure is that the simulation results are con-
sistent with the underlying theory in Proposition 2a. At the point of no discriminatory
power (i.e. pI +pII = 1) we observe that: (i) if pI > 0 then Cˆ
N is set at zero whilst BˆN
is set at the per capita budget size β; but (ii) if pI = 0 any combination of C and B
that satisfy the budget constraint will be optimal. The intuition is clear: when Type
I errors are never made but Type II errors are always made the categorical transfer is
effectively administered as a universal transfer because it is received by all individuals
in society. It is useful to note, however, that setting pI at a very low value such as
0.0001 will guarantee that BˆN = β and CˆN = 0 at the point of no discriminatory
power.
Within each figure, subplots (a) to (d) illustrate that a ceteris paribus increase in pI
increases BˆN and tends to decrease CˆN . The observation that BˆN increases with pI
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Figure 2.7: No Enforcement Optima for E = 0.5
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Notes. WU/V P is the horizontal line in panels (e) and (f).
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Figure 2.8: No Enforcement Optima for E = 0.6
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Notes. WU/V P is the horizontal line in panels (e) and (f).
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Figure 2.9: No Enforcement Optima for E = 0.7
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(d) CˆN (θ = 0.10)
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(e) V N/V P (θ = 0.05)
pI = 0.4
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.980
0.985
0.990
0.995
1.000
V
N
/V
P
WU/V P
(f) V N/V P (θ = 0.10)
Notes. WU/V P is the horizontal line in panels (e) and (f).
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Figure 2.10: No Enforcement Optima for E = 0.8
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(e) V N/V P (θ = 0.05)
pI = 0.4
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.986
0.988
0.990
0.992
0.994
0.996
0.998
1.000
V
N
/V
P
WU/V P
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Notes. WU/V P is the horizontal line in panels (e) and (f).
CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL BENEFITS WITH IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT 118
Figure 2.11: No Enforcement Optima for E = 0.9
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(e) V N/V P (θ = 0.05)
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Notes. WU/V P is the horizontal line in panels (e) and (f).
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Figure 2.12: No Enforcement Optima for E = 0.99
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Bˆ
N
(a) BˆN (θ = 0.05)
pI = 0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.00
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
Bˆ
N
(b) BˆN (θ = 0.10)
pI = 0.1
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Cˆ
N
(c) CˆN (θ = 0.05)
pI = 0.2
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.00
0.05
0.10
0.15
0.20
Cˆ
N
(d) CˆN (θ = 0.10)
pI = 0.3
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.992
0.993
0.994
0.995
0.996
0.997
0.998
0.999
1.000
V
N
/V
P
WU/V P
(e) V N/V P (θ = 0.05)
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Notes. WU/V P is the horizontal line in panels (e) and (f).
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is thus consistent with the theoretical result of ∂BˆN/∂pI > 0 in Proposition 2d. The
intuition is as described in that section.
Next, the effect of Type II errors on the optimal benefit levels is somewhat more
complicated. In particular, each figure illustrates that BˆN is non-monotonic in pII
whenever pI > 0. Bˆ
N tends to initially fall with pII when pII is low and discriminatory
power is reasonably high; but then rises with pII at higher values of pII and thus lower
levels of discriminatory power. As discriminatory power approaches zero BˆN converges
to the per capita budget size β. Overall, CˆN tends to fall with pII ; but falls less steeply
in the region where BˆN is falling.
To provide the intuition for how BˆN and CˆN change with pII we return to the optimality
condition in (2.22). Recall this states that at the optimum the average smvi of non-
categorical recipients (i.e. σ¯NNR) should equate with the average smvi of categorical
recipients (i.e. σ¯NR ). Consider the effect of an increase in pII on both σ¯
N
NR and σ¯
N
R ,
when evaluated at (B,C) = (BˆN , CN):37
dσ¯NNR(Bˆ
N , CN ; θ, pI , pII)
dpII
=
∂σ¯NNR
∂pII︸ ︷︷ ︸
>0
+
∂σ¯NNR
∂B︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
·∂Bˆ
N
∂pII
(2.51)
dσ¯NR (Bˆ
N , CN ; θ, pI , pII)
dpII
=
∂σ¯NR
∂pII︸︷︷︸
<0
+
∂σ¯NR
∂B︸︷︷︸
<0
·

∂BˆN
∂pII
[
1 +
∂CN
∂B
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+
∂CN
∂pII︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
 (2.52)
At an interior optimum it must hold that dσ¯NNR/dpII = dσ¯
N
R /dpII . We can therefore
establish that:
∂BˆN
∂pII
=
∂σ¯NNR
∂pII
−
[
∂σ¯NR
∂pII
+
∂σ¯NR
∂B
· ∂C
N
∂pII
]
∂σ¯NR
∂B
[
1 +
∂CN
∂B
]
− ∂σ¯
N
NR
∂B
(2.53)
The denominator is unambiguously positive and so the the sign of ∂BˆN/∂pII will
37Recall that, as defined in (2.19), CN is the level of categorical benefit that exhausts the benefit
budget for any B ∈ [0, β].
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depend on the relative sizes of the terms in the numerator. In this regard it is useful
to note that ∂2σ¯NNR/∂p
2
II > 0 but both ∂
2σ¯NR /∂p
2
II < 0 and ∂
2CN/∂p2II < 0. This helps
explain why we observe that ∂BˆN/∂pII < 0 when pII is low, but ∂Bˆ
N/∂pII > 0 at
higher values of pII .
To complete this part of the discussion, each figure illustrates that the extent to which
BˆN falls with pII (when pII is low) is decreasing in the size of pI . The intuition for
this observation follows directly from the theoretical result that ∂BˆN/∂pI > 0.
Notice that in both Figure 2.7 (E = 0.5) and Figure 2.8 (E = 0.6) there are cases where
BˆN = 0 despite the fact that pI > 0. This implies that at the corner solution B = 0
the average smvi of categorical recipients must (weakly) exceed that of non-recipients.
At higher values of E (i.e. Figures 2.9-2.12) this does not arise and BˆN > 0 whenever
pI > 0. Recall that in the theory there are no corner solutions when pI > 0 due to
the assumption that limx→0 ux = +∞. To shed some light as to why corner solutions
can occur under CES preferences it is useful to note that we can write the smvi of an
unable individual/non-worker as:
ux = αM
− 1E
[
αM
E−1
E + (1− α)
] 1
E−1
= α
{
M
1−E
E
[
αM
E−1
E + (1− α)
]} 1
E−1
= α
[
α + (1− α)M 1−EE
] 1
E−1
and thus:
lim
x→0
ux = α
E
E−1 (2.54)
which is finite and increasing in E . In particular, this limiting case takes the values:
1.67 when E = 0.5; 2.15 when E = 0.6; 3.29 when E = 0.7; 7.72 when E = 0.8; 99.23
when E = 0.9 and 9.18 × 1021 when E = 0.99. It is the lower values when E = 0.5
and E = 0.6 that result in their being corner solutions when BˆN = 0 despite pI > 0.
Consider, for example, subplot (a) in Figure 2.7. We can see that BˆN is zero - or
very close to identically zero - when pI = 0.1 and pII = 0.4. As stated, this can
only arise if the average smvi of categorical recipients weakly exceeds that of non-
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recipients under a purely targeted system. This can be easily verified: setting B = 0,
C = β/[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] and choosing parameters pI = 0.1, pII = 0.4, β = 0.1 ,
θ = 0.05 and µ = 3 gives:
σ¯NNR = 0.96989 < σ¯
N
R = 0.97663
which explains why BˆN = 0 at the optimum despite pI > 0.
The effects of changes in the values of the parameters E and θ are analogous to the
Perfect Discrimination simulations. First, a comparison across Figures 2.7 to 2.12
illustrates that an increase in E tends to increase the universal benefit and lower the
categorical benefit. Conversely, within each figure it can be seen that a ceteris paribus
increase in θ from 0.05 to 0.10 serves to increase the resources devoted to the categorical
transfer and, consequently, lower the resources dedicated to the universal transfer.
Unsurprisingly, an increase in the unable subpopulation size raises the importance
of categorical transfers due to the greater need for redistribution between the two
subpopulations.
Subplots (e) and (f) of each figure plot maximum social welfare under No Enforcement
as a proportion of that under Perfect Discrimination. This has the attractive property
that the scale on the vertical axis is between 0 and 1, with 1 capturing the Perfect
Discrimination outcome. Each figure illustrates that social welfare under the optimal
choices BˆN and CˆN is unambiguously decreasing in the propensity to make Type I
and/or Type II classification errors. The results are thus consistent with the theory in
Proposition 2c. The horizontal line in both subplots is labelled WU/V P and therefore
captures the Pure Universal level of welfare as a fraction of the Perfect Discrimination
welfare level. The purpose of including this line in the subplots is to illustrate that
whenever pI + pII = 1 (including the case where pI = 0) a Pure Universal system is
chosen and, consequently, V N = WU .
Finally, Figures 2.13 to 2.15 illustrate how the average smvi of categorical recipients
and non-recipients change with pII for various values of pI . Figure 2.13 is drawn for
E = 0.8, Figure 2.14 is drawn for E = 0.9 and Figure 2.15 is drawn for E = 0.99. Within
each figure, the subplots on the left column are drawn for θ = 0.05, whilst those on the
right column are drawn for θ = 0.10. Each figure clearly illustrates that for all cases
where pI + pII < 1 (i.e. some discriminatory power) the average smvi of categorical
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Figure 2.13: σ¯NNR and σ¯
N
R evaluated at the Optimum. (E = 0.8, β = 0.1)
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Notes. The purpose of this figure is to illustrate that the numerical results satisfy the optimality
condition in Proposition 2a. On the horizontal axis in each subplot pII is varied between 0 and 1
in discrete increments of 0.1. For each value of pII (and other parameters) the optimal benefits are
calculated and substituted into the functions σ¯NNR and σ¯
N
R . In all cases where pI + pII < 1 we observe
σ¯NNR = σ¯
N
R , thus satisfying the optimality condition in Proposition 2a.
CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL BENEFITS WITH IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT 124
Figure 2.14: σ¯NNR and σ¯
N
R evaluated at the Optimum. (E = 0.9, β = 0.1)
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(c) pI = 0.1 (θ = 0.05)
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(d) pI = 0.1 (θ = 0.10)
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Figure 2.15: σ¯NNR and σ¯
N
R evaluated at the Optimum. (E = 0.99, β = 0.1)
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recipients and non-recipients are equated, thus satisfying the optimality condition in
Proposition 2a. These figures therefore provide a useful validation of the optimal
benefits simulated in Figures 2.10 - 2.12 and this is the reason for including them. Of
course, when pI + pII = 1 only a universal benefit is provided and, consequently, the
average smvi of ‘recipients’ and ‘non-recipients’ departs.
This completes our discussion of the No Enforcement simulation results. We now
proceed to discuss the case of Full Enforcement.
2.4.3 Full Enforcement Simulations
Under No Enforcement the constraint set is unambiguously convex and the objec-
tive function is unambiguously concave. This rendered the search for an optimum
in the numerical analysis relatively straightforward given the single stationary point
corresponding to a global (interior) optimum. Turning to the Full Enforcement case,
however, we know from Section 2.3.3 that - without specific assumptions on both the
productivity distribution and third derivatives of individual preferences - we cannot
guarantee either the convexity of the constraint set or the concavity of the objective
function.
To proceed with the Full Enforcement numerical analysis we must therefore exercise a
little caution and first examine both the convexity of the constraint set and how the
welfare function changes with the choice variables. It is below demonstrated that the
constraint set is indeed convex in all considered cases. However, social welfare is not
always concave in the choice variables. Whilst this is not a problem in itself provided
a sufficient number of starting points are employed in the search for a global optima,
there are a small number of cases in which multiple optima emerge. These cases are
restricted to lower values of E and are detailed below.
Convexity of the constraint set For the constraint set to be convex it must hold
that ∂2CF/∂B2 ≤ 0 ∀B ∈ [0, β], where CF is as defined in (2.33). Figure 2.16 plots
how the function ∂CF/∂B < 0 changes with B ∈ [0, β] for both E = 0.5 and E = 0.99.
The figure is composed of eight subplots, where each successive subplot has a higher
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Figure 2.16: The Function ∂CF/∂B over B ∈ [0, β].
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
B
10.6
10.4
10.2
10.0
9.8
9.6
9.4
C
F
/
B
(a) pII=0 (pI =0)
E=0.5
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
B
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
C
F
/
B
(b) pII=0.1 (pI =0)
E=0.99
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
B
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
C
F
/
B
(c) pII=0.2 (pI =0)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
B
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
C
F
/
B
(d) pII=0.3 (pI =0)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
B
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
C
F
/
B
(e) pII=0.4 (pI =0)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
B
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
C
F
/
B
(f) pII=0.5 (pI =0)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
B
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
C
F
/
B
(g) pII=0.6 (pI =0)
0.00 0.02 0.04 0.06 0.08 0.10
B
10
9
8
7
6
5
4
3
C
F
/
B
(h) pII=0.6 (pI =0)
Notes: CF is the level of the categorical benefit that exhausts the budget constraint for any given
level of B ∈ [0, β]. ∂CF /∂B < 0 therefore captures how CF changes with B. For the budget
constraint to be convex we require that CF either decreases linearly (such that ∂CF /∂B < 0 is
constant and ∂2CF /∂B2 = 0) or CF decreases more rapidly as B increases (such that ∂CF /∂B < 0
is decreasing and ∂2CF /∂B2 < 0). In subplot (a) ∂CF /∂B is a negative constant because pII = 0
and, consequently, the budget constraint is linear. In the remaining subplots ∂CF /∂B < 0 becomes
more negative with B and thus ∂2CF /∂B2 < 0.
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value of pII . In all cases pI = 0 and θ = 0.1
38. Each subplot in which pII > 0 clearly
illustrates that ∂CF/∂B is negative and falling with B, from which we can directly
infer that ∂2CF/∂B2 < 0. Notice that in all cases ∂CF/∂B < −1 such that an increase
in B unambiguously lowers the total benefit income of categorical recipients.
The objective function Figure 2.17 plots how the welfare functionW F (B,CF ; θ, pI , pII)
changes with B. The figure is generated as follows: for a given value of B ∈ [0, β] we
calculate the resulting level of C that satisfies the budget constraint (i.e. CF ) and
substitute both benefit levels into the Full Enforcement welfare function. The subplots
on the first row are generated for E = 0.5, those on the second row are generated for
E = 0.7, whilst those on the third row are generated for E = 0.99. The subplots on
the left column are drawn for pI = 0, whilst those on the right column are drawn for
pI = 0.2. Finally, the different curves within each subplot are drawn for different values
of pII . Subplots (a) and (b) clearly illustrate that there is a critical value of pII at which
there are two global optima. In subplot (a) this critical value is given by pII ≈ 0.213.
The first of these optima is a purely targeted system (corner solution), whilst the sec-
ond is a partial system providing a small categorical benefit. In subplot (b) the critical
value is pII ≈ 0.154 and both equilibria are partial systems. For values of pII at or
just above these two critical values welfare provision will therefore shift between the
two equilibria. In the simulation results which follow we will thus observe a ‘jump’ in
the benefit levels around these critical values of pII . Importantly, this behaviour of
the objective function is not observed at higher values of E - as illustrated through
subplots (c) to (f) - and there are thus no further problems of multiple equilibria.
The intuition for the multiple equilibria observed in subplots (a) and (b) of Figure 2.17
follows from our discussion in Section 2.3.3 concerning how the functions σFNR and σ
F
R ·
−(1 + ∂CF/∂B) change with the universal benefit, when evaluated at (B,CF ). Recall
from (2.40) and (2.41) that in both cases an increase in B generates two conflicting
effects. In terms of σFNR an increase in B (i) lowers the smvi of each individual;
but also (ii) increases the number of non-categorical recipients through reducing the
number that apply for the categorical benefit. In terms of σFR · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) an
increase in B (i) increases a categorical recipient’s smvi because their total benefit
income falls; but also (ii) reduces the number of categorical recipients. Notice that the
38Extensive examples with variation in both θ and pI are available from the author upon request
but are omitted to save on space.
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Figure 2.17: Full Enforcement Objective Function
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Notes: In each subplot θ = 0.1. Subplots (a) and (b) are drawn for E = 0.5. In subplot (a) the
parameter value pII ≈ 0.213 gives rise to two global optima. The first of these optima is a purely
targeted system (corner solution) whilst the second is a partial system with a small value of the
categorical benefit. In subplot (b) the parameter value pII ≈ 0.154 gives rises to two global optima.
Both optima are this time partial systems (i.e. interior solutions). Contrastingly, for the cases where
E = 0.7 (subplots (c) and (d)) and E = 0.99 (subplots (e) and (f)) no problems of multiple equilibria
arise at any value of pII .
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Figure 2.18: σFNR and σ
F
R · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) evaluated over (B,CF ). (E = 0.5)
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(f) pII = 0.154 (pI = 0.2)
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Notes: In each subplot E = 0.5 and θ = 0.1. The subplots in the left column are generated for pI = 0,
whilst those in the right column are generated for pI = 0.2. The parameter pII is increased as we
move down the columns. Note that in subplots (e) and (f) pII is set at the critical values established
in Figure 2.17. Intersections between the functions σFNR and σ
F
R · −(1 + ∂CF /∂B) correspond to
stationary points on the welfare function.
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Figure 2.19: σFNR and σ
F
R · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) evaluated over (B,CF ). (E = 0.99)
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Notes: In each subplot E = 0.99 and θ = 0.1. The structure of the figure is as in Figure 2.17.
In all cases σFR · −(1 + ∂CF /∂B) monotonically increases with B and there is unique intersection -
corresponding to a stationary point on the welfare function - between σFNR and σ
F
R · −(1 + ∂CF /∂B).
The value of B (and resulting value of C) at each unique intersection gives rise to a global maximum
of the welfare function.
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first effect is compounded by the fact that ∂2CF/∂B2 < 0. These conflicting effects can
given rise to non-monotonicity in either function. This non-monotonicity can lead to
multiple stationary points and, in the special cases illustrated in Figure 2.17, multiple
optima.
To illustrate this, Figure 2.18 plots how both σFNR and σ
F
R · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) change
with the benefit levels. The purpose of this figure is to explain subplots (a) and (b) in
Figure 2.17 and so the parameter values are chosen accordingly (i.e. E = 0.5, θ = 0.1).
The subplots on the left column are generated for pI = 0, whilst those on the right
column are generated for pI = 0.2. The value of pII is increased as we move down
the columns. In the special case where pII = 0 the effect of an increase in B on the
number of individuals who apply for the categorical benefit necessarily disappears and
so σFR ·−(1+∂CF/∂B) unambiguously increases with B; whilst σFNR unambiguously falls
with B, thus resulting in a unique intersection between the two functions. However,
as pII is increased from zero the two conflicting effects associated with an increase in
B result in a point of inflexion in σFR · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B). This in turn can result in
multiple values of B for which σFNR = σ
F
R · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B). Indeed, in subplots (e)
and (f) the parameter pII is set at the critical values illustrated in subplots (a) and
(b) of Figure 2.17, respectively. In subplot (e) there are two intersections between
the the two functions: the benefit levels at the first of these corresponds to a global
minima, whilst those at the second correspond to maxima that generate the same
welfare level as the corner solution where B = 0. Contrastingly, in subplot (f) we
observe three intersections: the benefit levels at the first and third are both interior
optima, whilst those at the second correspond to minima. Finally, as pII is increased
further (subplots (g) and (h)) the effect of an increase in B on the number of benefit
applicants (i.e. reduced applications) initially dominates the increase in the smvi of
categorical recipients, thus causing σFR · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) to initially fall. In these cases
there is a unique value of B at which σFNR = σ
F
R · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B).
That we do not observe multiple optima at higher values of E would seem to stem from
the fact that ω¯ is increasing in E when M < 1 (see Figure 2.20). If we re-examine
equation (2.41) we can note that higher values of ω¯ (i) increase χ and thus place more
weight on the effect of a reduction in total benefit income on the smvi of categorical
recipients; but also (ii) will imply a lower value of f(ω¯) under the Exponential distri-
bution, thus lessening the effect of a reduction in the number categorical recipients.
Further, at higher values of E the number of applicants for the categorical benefit tends
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Figure 2.20: ω¯ and E .
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Notes: The figure provides graphical intuition for how ω¯ changes with E , where E0 < E1 denote
different levels of the elasticity of substitution. Notice that the indifference curve x(l)|E0 is shallower
than x(l)|E1 at high values of l. This arises because the reservation wage, ω¯ = ( 1−αα )M
1
E , is increasing
in E when M < 1.
to be less responsive to changes in the level of B (and in turn the total benefit income of
categorical recipients). The implication of both of these observations is that, at higher
values of E , the effect of a reduction in the total benefit income of categorical recipients
and their corresponding increase in smvi will tend to dominate the effect of a reduc-
tion in the number of applicants, thus causing σFR · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) to monotonically
increase with B (see Figure 2.19).
Discussion of the numerical results We now proceed to discuss the numerical
results. Figures 2.21 to 2.26 illustrate how the Full Enforcement optimal benefit lev-
els and resulting maximum welfare change with the propensity to make classification
errors. Each figure is generated for a different E ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99}. The
format of these figures parallels Figures 2.7 to 2.12 from the No Enforcement analysis.
The subplots in the left column of each figure are generated for θ = 0.05, whilst those in
the right column are generated for θ = 0.10. The parameter pII is increased in discrete
increments of 0.02 from 0 to 1 on the horizontal axis. The different curves within each
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Figure 2.21: Full Enforcement Optima for E = 0.5
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Notes. The vertical lines in subplots (a) to (d) capture discontinuities in the optimal benefit functions.
Note that the results in subplots (b) and (d) are consistent with the discussion surrounding Figure
2.17: i.e. we observe discontinuities at the parameters (pI , pII) = (0, 0.213) and (pI , pII) = (0.2, 0.154),
respectively. The horizontal line WU/WP in subplots (e) and (f) gives the Pure Universal welfare
level as a fraction of the Perfect Discrimination welfare.
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Figure 2.22: Full Enforcement Optima for E = 0.6
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Notes. WU/V P is the horizontal line in panels (e) and (f).
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Figure 2.23: Full Enforcement Optima for E = 0.7
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Notes. WU/V P is the horizontal line in panels (e) and (f).
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Figure 2.24: Full Enforcement Optima for E = 0.8
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Figure 2.25: Full Enforcement Optima for E = 0.9
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Figure 2.26: Full Enforcement Optima for E = 0.99
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.080
0.082
0.084
0.086
0.088
0.090
0.092
0.094
0.096
0.098
Bˆ
F
(a) BˆF (θ = 0.05)
pI = 0
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.080
0.082
0.084
0.086
0.088
0.090
0.092
0.094
0.096
0.098
Bˆ
F
(b) BˆF (θ = 0.10)
pI = 0.2
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
Cˆ
F
(c) CˆF (θ = 0.05)
pI = 0.4
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.02
0.04
0.06
0.08
0.10
0.12
0.14
Cˆ
F
(d) CˆF (θ = 0.10)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.990
0.992
0.994
0.996
0.998
1.000
V
F
/V
P WU/V P
(e) V F/V P (θ = 0.05)
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
pII
0.990
0.992
0.994
0.996
0.998
1.000
V
F
/V
P
WU/V P
(f) V F/V P (θ = 0.10)
Notes. WU/V P is the horizontal line in panels (e) and (f).
CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL BENEFITS WITH IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT 140
subplot are generated for a different value of pI ∈ {0, 0.2, 0.4}.39 The subplots on the
first row of each figure illustrate how the optimal universal benefit changes with pII .
Those on the second row illustrate how the optimal categorical benefit changes with
pII . Finally, those on the third row illustrate how optimal welfare as a fraction of the
Perfect Discrimination welfare level changes with pII .
Given our pre-emptive discussion of the multiple equilibria that arise when E = 0.5,
we will primarily focus the present discussion on Figures 2.22 to 2.26 (i.e. E = 0.6 to
E = 0.99). In these figures the optimal benefit functions are smooth and continuous.
With respect to Figure 2.21 (E = 0.5), it is comforting to note that the optimal
benefit functions exhibit discontinuities are the critical parameters (pI , pII) established
in Figure 2.17. This is discussed further in the caption immediately immediately below
the figure.
The first point to make is that the simulation results are consistent with the theory
in Proposition 3a. That is, the optimal categorical benefit is positive for all levels of
discriminatory power; including the case of no discriminatory power (i.e. pI + pII =
1).
Subplots (a)-(d) in each figure illustrate that an increase in pI serves to increase Bˆ
F and
lower CˆF . The intuition remains the same as before: because some unable individuals
are incorrectly rejected the categorical benefit more resources are devoted towards the
unconditional transfer to prevent the consumption of these individuals becoming too
low (and consequently their smvi becoming too large).
The effect of an increase in pII on the optimal benefit levels is more complicated.
Figures 2.21 to 2.26 illustrate that BˆF is non-monotonic in pII , whilst Cˆ
F tends to fall
with pII throughout much of the interval pII ∈ (0, 1].40 In more detail, BˆF tends to (i)
fall with pII when pII is small; (ii) rise with pII as pII is increased further; and may
also (iii) fall with pII at higher values of pII . The initial fall in Bˆ
F limits the extent to
which CˆF falls with pII at low values of pII . The intuition would seem to be that when
pII is small few able individuals receive the categorical benefit and so a reduction in the
universal benefit can be used to keep the categorical support near the level when pII =
0. The extent of the initial fall in BˆF will depend negatively on the size of pI ; and thus
39To ensure that the differences between each curve are visible we have restricted pI to these values
(i.e. we have omitted pI = 0.1 and pI = 0.2).
40At higher values of pII the optimal categorical benefit may rise.
CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL BENEFITS WITH IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT 141
on the number of unable individuals who are incorrectly denied the categorical benefit
and rely on the universal benefit for consumption. The increase in BˆF as pII increases
further is accompanied by a necessary large decrease in CˆF . Here, the intuition would
seem to be that it is optimal to lower the categorical benefit so as to restrict the number
of able individuals who apply down to those of lower productivities.41 Indeed, Table
2.1 illustrates that for each E ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99}; F (ω¯) falls with both pI
and pII .
We now turn to discuss the effect of Type I and Type II classification errors on maxi-
mum welfare. In line with Proposition 3c subplots (e) and (f) in each figure illustrate
that an increase in pI lowers maximum welfare for all values of pII . The intuition
remains the same as under No Enforcement: Type I errors introduce horizontal in-
equity into the unble subpopulation and consequently raise their average smvi. Unlike
the No Enforcement regime, however, the simulations illustrate that an increase in pII
may not be welfare decreasing. In particular, Figures 2.23 through to 2.26 illustrate
that welfare is increasing in pII for pII sufficiently high. The intuition rests on the
fact that ‘leakage’ of the categorical benefit into the able subpopulation still plays a
redistributive role because it is received only by lower productivity able individuals.
As pII increases the welfare gain to this portion of the able subpopulation may become
sufficiently large so as to offset any further welfare losses to the unable who are harmed
by receiving lower transfers than they would under Perfect Discrimination.
This effect of Type II errors on maximum welfare is more pronounced the larger is E
and the smaller is θ. The intuition for why welfare is more likely to be increasing in
pII at higher values of E can be seen from the sufficient condition in (2.46) and Table
2.1. Expression (2.46) implies higher values of F (ω¯)/F (ω¯) are more likely to give rise
to the result that welfare is increasing in pII ; precisely because higher values of this
ratio imply that able applicants for the categorical benefit are very similar to unable
applicants in terms of their smvi. Table 2.1, meanwhile, clearly illustrates that at the
optimum F (ω¯)/F (ω¯) is increasing E . This effect is predominantly driven by the fact
that the reservation productivity ω¯ is unambiguously increasing in E when M ∈ (0, 1)
(recall our discussion of Figure 2.20).
Comparing the subplots in the left and right columns of Figures 2.21 - 2.26 once
41Note that the effect of a reduction in the categorical benefit on the number of able individuals
who choose to apply for the categorical benefit was not available under the No Enforcement regime
because there all able individuals apply irrespective of the benefit size.
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more illustrates that an increase in θ tends to lower the universal benefit as more
resources are devoted to categorical transfers. Note that this does not imply that
the categorical benefit size necessarily increases, because targeted resources are spread
over more unable individuals. Next, comparing Figures 2.21 - 2.26 illustrates that
an increase in E serves to increase the universal transfer and lower the categorical
transfer.
Finally, Figures 2.27 to 2.29 provide useful confirmation that the simulated Full En-
forcement optima satisfy with equality the optimality condition in equation (2.39) of
Proposition 3a. Figure 2.27 is drawn for E = 0.8, Figure 2.28 is drawn for E = 0.9,
whilst Figure 2.29 is drawn for E = 0.99. Each figure plots how both σFNR and
σFR · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) change with pII , when evaluated at the optimal benefit levels. In
all cases the two functions are equated.
2.4.4 Welfare Comparison Simulations
This section provides numerical examples of how maximum welfare under the No En-
forcement regime compares with that under the Full Enforcement regime. Figures 2.30
to 2.32 display maximum welfare under the two regimes as a fraction of the Perfect
Discrimination welfare level. Figure 2.30 is drawn for E = 0.8; Figure 2.31 is drawn for
E = 0.9; whilst Figure 2.32 is drawn for E = 0.99. On the horizontal axis in the each
subplot pII is varied from 0 to 1. The subplots on the left column are generated for
θ = 0.05, whilst those in the right column are generated for θ = 0.10. The parameter
pI is increased as we move down through the subplots.
At higher levels of discriminatory power we observe cases where maximum welfare
under No Enforcement exceeds that under Full Enforcement. In these cases the Full
Enforcement system provides a lower benefit income to categorical recipients so as to
reduce the number of able individuals who apply for the categorical benefit and, in turn,
the number of quantity constrained able individuals in the economy. The welfare losses
relative to No Enforcement for the unable are not offset by the redistributive welfare
gains within the able subpopulation and, consequently, welfare under Full Enforcement
is lower than under No Enforcement. Contrastingly, at lower levels of discriminatory
power we observe that the Full Enforcement system outperforms the No Enforcement
system in all cases. Note that in some of these cases the benefit income for categorical
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Figure 2.27: σFNR and σ
F
R · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) evaluated at the Optimum (E = 0.8)
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Notes. The purpose of this figure is to illustrate that the numerical results satisfy the optimality
condition in Proposition 3a. That is, in each subplot (i) the aggregate smvi of non-categorical recipients
is equated with (ii) the aggregate smvi of categorical recipients multiplied by the reduction in their
total benefit income associated with an increase in the universal benefit.
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Figure 2.28: σFNR and σ
F
R · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) evaluated at the Optimum (E = 0.9)
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Figure 2.29: σFNR and σ
F
R · −(1 + ∂CF/∂B) evaluated at the Optimum (E = 0.99)
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Figure 2.30: Welfare Comparision E = 0.8, β = 0.1.
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Figure 2.31: Welfare Comparision E = 0.9, β = 0.1.
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Figure 2.32: Welfare Comparision E = 0.99, β = 0.1.
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recipients is still lower than under No Enforcement, but the redistributive gains within
the able subpopulation are sufficiently large.
2.5 Concluding Remarks
Real world targeted benefits typically feature what this chapter terms double condi-
tionality : ex-ante the award of a benefit is conditioned on an applicant meeting some
initial eligibility conditions, whilst ex-post a recipient must typically conform with cer-
tain behavioural requirements. For example, an ex-ante condition for being awarded a
disability benefit may be that an individual faces significant physical or mental diffi-
culties in working; whilst an ex-post condition may be that a recipient does not work
when receiving the disability benefit.
In large and complex welfare systems where ex-ante eligibility may be difficult to
ascertain, the test awarding benefits is likely to be susceptible to, in statistical parlance,
classification errors of both Type I (false rejection) and Type II (false award). The latter
error type gives rise to enforcement issues because benefits are awarded to individuals
for whom they are not intended, and thus individuals who may choose not to comply
with the ex-post requirements in place. Both the propensity of an awards test to make
classification errors and the effectiveness of the enforcement of ex-post requirements
will influence the design of welfare programmes, in particular with regard to the weight
placed on targeted transfers over those that are made universally available.
The literature on optimal transfers administered with classification errors typically
assumes specific enforcement structures in relation to ex-post conditionality: recipients
of a disability benefit that is targeted at those unable to work are either allowed to
work (as in Parsons, 1996); or not allowed to work (as in Salanie´, 2002). Moreover, the
models employed differ sufficiently so as not to allow for a systematic comparison across
enforcement regimes. There has also been little attention devoted to understanding
how the propensity of the awards test to make classification errors of either type affects
maximum social welfare and, further, how this differs depending on the enforcement
regime in place.
In relation to these gaps in the literature, this chapter posed three questions at the
outset. First, how does the propensity of an awards test to make classification errors
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of Type I and/or Type II affect the choice between (i) a pure universal system; (ii)
a partial universal system where both targeted and universal benefits are provided;
and (iii) a purely targeted welfare system? Further, conditioning on providing both
benefits, how does the propensity to make these errors affect the optimal levels of
the universal and targeted benefits, respectively? Second, how does an increase in
the propensity to make either type of error affect maximum social welfare? Third,
how do the answers to both of these questions depend on how effectively the ex-post
conditionality is enforced?
To answer these questions this chapter has considered a framework where individuals
differ in both their ability to work - modelled as zero quantity constraint on labour
supply - and, conditional on being able to work, their productivity when at work.
Given a fixed benefit budget the government chooses the optimal combination of (i)
a universal benefit received unconditionally by all; and (ii) a categorical benefit that
is imperfectly targeted at the unable and has an ex-post no-work requirement. We
analyse the cases where the ex-post no-work requirement is either not enforced at all,
or is fully enforced.
The principal messages are as follows:
• Under a No Enforcement regime:
1. It is optimal to provide a categorical benefit whenever the test administer-
ing it has some discriminatory power. In this case the optimal benefits are
chosen so as to equate - if budget feasible - the average smvi of categorical
recipients with the average smvi of those not receiving the categorical bene-
fit. A positive propensity to make Type I errors guarantees the provision of
a universal benefit, such that a partial universal system is optimal. However,
if Type I errors are never made and the benefit budget is not large enough
to finance categorical transfers to the level that equates the average smvi of
categorical recipients with that of non-recipients, a purely targeted system
will be optimal. Finally, if the awards test has no discriminatory power a
pure universal system is chosen.
2. Maximum social welfare is decreasing in the propensity to make both Type
I and Type II classification errors.
• Under a Full Enforcement regime:
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1. It is optimal to provide a categorical benefit at all levels of discriminatory
power, thus including the case of no discriminatory power. It is therefore
never optimal to adopt a pure universal system. The optimal benefits are
chosen to equate (i) the aggregate smvi of those not receiving the categorical
benefit with (ii) the aggregate smvi of categorical recipients multiplied by
the increase in their total benefit income per unit reduction in the universal
benefit. A positive propensity to make Type I errors once more guarantees
the provision of a universal benefit, such that a partial universal system is
optimal.
2. Whilst maximum welfare is unambiguously decreasing in the propensity to
make Type I errors, there are conditions under which it can be increasing
in the propensity to make Type II errors. In particular, this is more likely
to arise the larger is the fraction of able applicants who are voluntarily
unemployed (due to the universal benefit), as these individuals have the
same smvi as unable applicants.
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Appendix A Proofs
Proof of Proposition 1
Solving the maximisation problem in (2.12) yields the following FOCs characterising
BˆP and CˆP :
(B) : θux(Bˆ
P + CˆP , 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
P )f(ω)dω ≤ λˆP , BˆP ≥ 0
(C) : ux(Bˆ
P + CˆP , 1) ≤ λˆP , CˆP ≥ 0
(A.1)
The pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness and λ denotes the shadow
price of public expenditure. Given that the budget constraint must be exhausted (i.e.
BˆP + θCˆP = β), we now test the following two hypotheses:
(i) BˆP = β, CˆP = 0 (Pure universal system)
If BˆP = β and CˆP = 0 the FOCs in (A.1) become:
θux(β, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω = λ
ux(β, 1) ≤ λ
Combining both equations gives the contradictory statement:∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω ≥ ux(β, 1)
It cannot hold that the average smvi of the able weakly exceeds that of the unable
when both subpopulations receive the same benefit income. The assertion that CˆP = 0
must therefore be false. Instead, we must have CˆP > 0. The shadow price of public
expenditure is therefore equal to the smvi for the unable at the optimum.
(ii) BˆP = 0, CˆP = β/θ (Pure targeted system)
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If BˆP = 0 and CˆP = β/θ the FOCs in (A.1) become:
θux
(
β
θ
, 1
)
+ (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, 0)f(ω)dω ≤ λ
ux
(
β
θ
, 1
)
= λ
Combining both equations gives:∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, 0)f(ω)dω ≤ ux
(
β
θ
, 1
)
The right side is unambiguously decreasing in β. Further, given that limx→0 u(x, l) =
+∞ it must hold that there is a critical budget level β¯P satisfying:∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, 0)f(ω)dω ≡ ux
(
β¯P
θ
, 1
)
Proof of Proposition 2a
Solving the maximisation problem in (2.20) yields the FOCs:
(B) : θ
[
(1− pI)ux(BˆN + CˆN , 1) + pIux(BˆN , 1)
]
+ (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
[
pIIvM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN) + (1− pII)vM(ω, BˆN)
]
f(ω)dω
≤ λˆN ; BˆN ≥ 0
(A.2)
(C) :
θ(1− pI)ux(BˆN + CˆN , 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN)f(ω)dω
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII
≤ λˆN ; CˆN ≥ 0
(A.3)
where the pairs of inequalities in (A.2) and (A.3) hold with complementary slackness.
Note that in deriving these FOCs we have used property that u(M, 1) ≡ v[ω¯(M),M ]
in differentiating the integral limits (Leibniz rule).
The left side of (A.2) is the average smvi over the entire population. This captures
how much, on average, welfare will increase with a marginal increase in the universal
benefit. On the right side is the shadow price of public expenditure (λˆN) multiplied
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by 1, which is the marginal expenditure cost of increasing each individual’s universal
transfer (in an economy of size 1).
The left side of (A.3) is the average smvi of categorical recipients, as composed of both
unable and able individuals. Notice that this is an average because the denominator -
i.e. θ(1 − pI) + (1 − θ)pII - is the total number of categorical recipients in the econ-
omy. This captures how much, on average, welfare will increase with an increase in
the categorical transfer size. On the right side is the shadow price of public expendi-
ture multiplied by unity (the per capita marginal cost associated with increasing the
categorical benefit).
With respect to the pairs of inequalities in (A.2) and (A.3), we proceed to test the
following two hypotheses: (i) (BˆN > 0 , CˆN = 0) ; and (ii) (BˆN = 0 , CˆN > 0).
(i) BˆN = β, CˆN = 0 (Pure universal system)
If CˆN = 0 then it must hold from the budget constraint (B+[θ(1−pI)+(1−θ)pII ]C = β)
that BˆN = β. In this case, the FOCs for B and C reduce to:
θux(β, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω = λ
θ(1− pI)ux(β, 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] ≤ λ
Writing the first of these equations as θux(β, 1) = λ− (1− θ)
∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω and
substituting into the second gives:
(1− pI)
[
λ− (1− θ) ∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω
]
+ (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] ≤ λ
⇒ (1− pI)(1− θ)
[
λ− ∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω
]
pII(1− θ)
[
λ− ∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω
] ≤ 1
⇒ 1− pI ≤ pII
Given our discriminatory power assumption (i.e. pI + pII ≤ 1), this condition can only
hold with equality, and thus when pI + pII = 1. It follows that Cˆ
N = 0 only if the test
awarding C has no discriminatory power. Otherwise, CˆN > 0 ∀ pI + pII < 1.
It follows that at any optimum where pI + pII < 1 the average smvi of categorical
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recipients should equate with the shadow price of public expenditure:
θ(1− pI)ux(BˆN + CˆN , 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN)f(ω)dω
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII = λˆ
N (A.4)
from which we can immediately ascertain that, by diminishing marginal utility of
income:
ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) ≥ λˆN >
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN)f(ω)dω (A.5)
where ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) = λˆN only if pII = 0.
Substituting (A.4) into (A.2) then gives:
θpIux(Bˆ
N , 1) + (1− θ)(1− pII)
∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)f(ω)dω
θpI + (1− θ)(1− pII)
≤ θ(1− pI)ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) + (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN)f(ω)dω
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ; Bˆ
N ≥ 0
= λˆN
(A.6)
which in turn implies that, by diminishing marginal utility of income:
ux(Bˆ
N , 1) > λˆN ≥
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)f(ω)dω (A.7)
where
∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)f(ω)dω = λˆN only if pI = 0 and Bˆ
N > 0.
(ii) BˆN = 0, CˆN = β/[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] (Pure targeted system)
From the budget constraint (B+ [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]C = β) it follows that if B = 0
then C = β/[θ(1 − pI) + (1 − θ)pII ]. First off, it must hold that BˆN > 0 whenever
pI > 0 because limx→0 ux(x, l) = +∞. Suppose otherwise, then the left side of (A.2)
or (A.6) blows up to infinity whenever some unable individuals have zero income to
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consume. Next, if pI = 0 but pII ≥ 0 then (A.6) becomes:∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, 0)f(ω)dω
≤
θux
(
β
θ + (1− θ)pII , 1
)
+ (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM
(
ω,
β
θ + (1− θ)pII
)
f(ω)dω
θ + (1− θ)pII
The left side is independent of β, whilst the right side is unambiguously decreasing in
β. Suppose that β → 0, then limβ→0 ux(β/[θ + (1 − θ)pII ], 1) = +∞ such that the
right side approaches +∞ and the condition must hold with strict inequality. There
must therefore be a critical budget level β¯N for which the condition holds with equality.
Using the definition of β¯P from (2.15), we can implicitly define β¯N by:
ux
(
β¯P
θ
, 1
)
≡
θux
(
β¯N
θ + (1− θ)pII , 1
)
+ (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM
(
ω,
β¯N
θ + (1− θ)pII
)
f(ω)dω
θ + (1− θ)pII
It is straightforward to see that this implies ux(β¯
N/[θ+(1−θ)pII ], 1) > ux(β¯P/θ, 1)⇒
β¯N < β¯P · [θ + (1− θ)pII ]/θ. Note that pII = 0⇒ β¯P = β¯N .
Proof of Proposition 2b.
To establish that δN > 0 at the optimum whenever pI > 0 and/or pII > 0, we proceed
in three cases: (i) (pI > 0, pII = 0) ; (ii) (pI = 0, pII > 0) ; and (iii) (pI > 0,
pII > 0).
(i) (pI > 0, pII = 0)
In this case δN = [pIux(B, 1)+(1−pI)ux(B+C, 1)]−
∫∞
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω. From (A.5)
and (A.7) we have ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) = λˆN >
∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)f(ω)dω. Further, by dimin-
ishing marginal utility of income ux(Bˆ
N , 1) > ux(Bˆ
N+CˆN , 1) ∀pI < 1 and so δN > 0 for
pI < 1. If pI = 1 then Bˆ
N = β and CˆN = 0 such that ux(β, 1) >
∫∞
0
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω.
So δN > 0 when pI = 1.
(ii) (pI = 0 , pII > 0)
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In this case δN = ux(B + C, 1) −
∫∞
0
[pIIvM(ω,B + C) + (1− pII)vM(ω,B)] f(ω)dω.
From (A.5) and (A.7):
ux(Bˆ
N + CˆN , 1) > λˆN ≥
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)f(ω)dω >
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N + CˆN)f(ω)dω
So for all pII < 1 : δ
N > 0. Once more, if pII = 1 then welfare provision effectively
takes a pure universal form and δN > 0 because ux(β, 1) >
∫
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω.
(iii) (pI > 0, pII > 0)
In this case δN = [pIux(B, 1) + (1 − pI)ux(B + C, 1)] −
∫∞
0
[pIIvM(ω,B + C) + (1 −
pII)vM(ω,B)]f(ω)dω. From (A.5) and (A.7):
ux(Bˆ
N , 1) > ux(Bˆ
N+CˆN , 1) > λˆN >
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)f(ω)dω >
∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N+CˆN)f(ω)dω
(A.8)
and thus δN > 0 at the optimum. If pI +pII = 1 then a pure universal system is chosen
and δN > 0 because ux(β, 1) >
∫
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω.
In summary then, we have δN > 0 whenever pI > 0 and/or pII > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2c
To establish the effect of classification errors on social welfare, we make use of the
following standard property of concave functions:
ux(B, 1) · C > u(B + C, 1)− u(B, 1) > ux(B + C, 1) · C (A.9)
Figure 2.33 illustrates this. From (2.26) in the main text and the above property in
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Figure 2.33: Property of Concave Utility
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(A.9), it must therefore hold that:
∂V N
∂pI
= θ
{[
u(BˆN , 1)− u(BˆN + CˆN , 1)
]
+ λˆN CˆN
}
< θCˆN
[
λˆN − ux(BˆN + CˆN , 1)
]
≤ 0
∂V N
∂pII
= (1− θ)
{∫ ∞
0
[
v(ω, BˆN + CˆN)− v(ω, BˆN)
]
f(ω)dω − λˆN CˆN
}
< θCˆN
[∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
N)f(ω)dω − λˆN
]
≤ 0
(A.10)
Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2d (Comparative Statics)
To save on notation, let uB = u(B, 1); uC = u(B + C, 1); vB = v(ω,B) and vC = v(ω,B + C). The
notation for the income derivatives also follows this convention.
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Differentiating the system of FOCs in (A.2) and (A.3) (and the budget constraint) w.r.t. pI gives:
(B) : − ∂λˆ
N
∂pI
+
{
θ[(1− pI)uCxx + pIuBxx] + (1− θ)
∫ [
pIIv
C
MM + (1− pII)vBMM
]
f(ω)dω
}
∂BˆN
∂pI
+
{
θ(1− pI)uCxx + (1− θ)
∫
pIIv
C
MMf(ω)dω
}
∂CˆN
∂pI
= θ
[
uCx − uBx
]
(C) : − [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]∂λˆ
N
∂pI
+
{
θ(1− pI)uCxx + (1− θ)pII
∫
vCMMf(ω)dω
}[
∂BˆN
∂pI
+
∂CˆN
∂pI
]
= θ
[
uCx − λˆN
]
(λ) :
∂BˆN
∂pI
+ [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]∂Cˆ
N
∂pI
= θCˆN
In matrix form this system of equations is:
0 −1 −[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]
−1 θ[(1− pI)u
C
xx + pIu
B
xx]+
(1− θ) ∫ [pIIvCMM + (1− pII)vBMM ] f(ω)dω θ(1− pI)u
C
xx+
(1− θ) ∫ pIIvCMMf(ω)dω
−[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] θ(1− pI)u
C
xx+
(1− θ) ∫ pIIvCMMf(ω)dω θ(1− pI)u
C
xx+
(1− θ) ∫ pIIvCMMf(ω)dω

·

∂λˆN
∂pI
∂BˆN
∂pI
∂CˆN
∂pI
 =

−θCˆN
θ
(
uCx − uBx
)
θ
(
uCx − λˆN
)

The determinant of the bordered Hessian is thus:
=−
{
θ(1− pI)uCxx + (1− θ)
∫
pIIv
C
MMf(ω)dω
}
[θpI + (1− θ)(1− pII)]
+
{
θ(1− pI)uCxx + (1− θ)
∫
pIIv
C
MMf(ω)dω
}
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ][1− θ(1− pI)− (1− θ)pII ]
−
{
θpIu
B
xx + (1− θ)
∫
(1− pII)vBMMf(ω)dω
}
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]2
=−
{
θ(1− pI)uCxx + (1− θ)
∫
pIIv
C
MMf(ω)dω
}
[θpI + (1− θ)(1− pII)][1− θ(1− pI)− (1− θ)pII ]
−
{
θpIu
B
xx + (1− θ)
∫
(1− pII)vBMMf(ω)dω
}
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]2
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and thus
=−
{
θ(1− pI)uCxx + (1− θ)
∫
pIIv
C
MMf(ω)dω
}
[θpI + (1− θ)(1− pII)]2
−
{
θpIu
B
xx + (1− θ)
∫
(1− pII)vBMMf(ω)dω
}
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]2 > 0
By Cramer’s rule, the sign of ∂BˆN/∂pI is thus given by (because the determinant of the bordered
Hessian is positive):
det

0 −θCˆN −[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]
−1 θ(uCx − uBx )
θ(1− pI)uCxx+
(1− θ) ∫ pIIvCMMf(ω)dω
−[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] θ(uCx − λˆN )
θ(1− pI)uCxx+
(1− θ) ∫ pIIvCMMf(ω)dω

=θCˆN
{
−
[
θ(1− pI)uCxx + (1− θ)
∫
pIIv
C
MMf(ω)dω
]
[θpI + (1− θ)(1− pII)]
}
− [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]
{
−θ(uCx − λˆN ) + θ(uCx − uBx )[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]
}
> 0
where we have used the fact that uCx > λˆ
N when pI > 0 and pII > 0. It follows that ∂Bˆ
N/∂pI >
0.
Next, the sign of ∂CˆN/∂p1 is given by:
det

0 −1 −θCˆN
−1 θ[(1− pI)u
C
xx + pIu
B
xx]+
(1− θ) ∫ [pIIvCMM + (1− pII)vBMM ] f(ω)dω θ(uCx − uBx )
−[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ] θ(1− pI)u
C
xx+
(1− θ) ∫ pIIvCMMf(ω)dω θ(uCx − λˆN )

=θ
(λˆN − uCx )︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
+ (uCx − uBx )[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0

− θCˆN
{
− 〈θ(1− pI)uCxx + (1− θ)pII ∫ vCMMf(ω)dω〉 [θpI + (1− θ)(1− pII)]
+
〈
θpIu
B
xx + (1− θ)(1− pII)
∫
vBMMf(ω)dω
〉
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]
}
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This can be written as:
=θ
{
(λˆN − uCx ) + (uCx − uBx )[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]
}
− θCˆN

θ2pI(1− pI)
(
uBxx − uCxx
)
+θ(1− θ)pIpII
(
uBxx −
∫
vCMMf(ω)dω
)
+θ(1− θ)(1− pI)(1− pII)
(∫
vBMMf(ω)dω − uCxx
)
+(1− θ)2pII(1− pII)
∫ (
vBMM − vCMM
)
f(ω)dω

A sufficient condition for ∂CˆN/∂pI < 0 will therefore be that the terms within curly braces in
the second line be positive. To make further progress, suppose that vMM = −k ∀ ω ≤ ω¯; but
vMM = 0 ∀ω > ω¯ (where k > 0 is a constant )42. Then the terms within the second pair of braces
become:
k

θ2pI(1− pI)(1− 1)
+θ(1− θ)pIpII
[
F (ω¯C)− 1]
+θ(1− θ)(1− pI)(1− pII)
[
1− F (ω¯B)]
+(1− θ)2pII(1− pII)
[
F (ω¯C)− F (ω¯B)]
 = k

θ(1− θ)pIpII
[
F (ω¯C)− F (ω¯B)]
+θ(1− θ)[1− pI − pII ][1− F (ω¯B)]
+(1− θ)2pII(1− pII)[F (ω¯C)− F (ω¯B)]
 > 0
and thus ∂CˆN/∂pI < 0
Proof of Proposition 3a
Solving the optimisation problem described in (2.37) yields the following FOCs:
(B) : θ
[
(1− pI)ux(BˆF + CˆF , 1) + pIux(BˆF , 1)
]
+ (1− θ)
{∫
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω + pII
∫ ω¯ [
ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1)− vM(ω, BˆF )
]
f(ω)dω
}
≤ λˆF
[
1 + (1− θ)f(ω¯)ω¯BpIICˆF
]
; BˆF ≥ 0 (A.11)
and:
(C) : ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) ≤ λˆF
{
1 +
(1− θ)f(ω¯)ω¯CpIICˆF
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII
}
; CˆF ≥ 0 (A.12)
42Details of preferences satisfying these (stringent) properties are given below.
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where the pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Note that in writing
these FOCs we have made use of the fact that v(ω¯, B) ≡ u(B + C, 1).
The FOCs have the following interpretations. The left side of (A.11) is the marginal
welfare gain associated with a marginal increase in B. Notice that because all indi-
viduals in the population receive B, the marginal gain is the sum of each individual’s
smvi. Next, the right side captures in welfare units (i.e. multiplied by the shadow
price of public expenditure, λ) the marginal cost associated with a marginal increase
in B. Once more, because the government budget is exogenously fixed there are no
tax revenue effects but simply an expenditure effect. The expenditure effect can be de-
composed into two sub-effects: first, a marginal increase in B increases the amount of
money spent on all individuals ; second, a marginal increase in B increases the number
of individuals who would choose to apply for C and not work if awarded it.
The left side of (A.12) is the average marginal welfare gain associated with a marginal
increase in C. On the right side is the marginal cost in welfare units of an increase in
C, divided by the number of categorical recipients. The first term within curly braces
captures the fact that a marginal increase in C results in a higher categorical payment
to an existing recipient. The second term within curly braces captures the fact that
an increase in C induces more individuals to apply for C.
We proceed to test the following two hypotheses: (i) (BˆF > 0, CˆF = 0); and (ii)
(BˆF = 0, CˆF > 0).
(i) BˆF = β , CˆF = 0 (Pure universal system):
Suppose that CˆF = 0 - and thus BˆF = β - such that ω¯(β, 0) = ω¯(β). It follows
∀ ω ≤ ω¯(β, 0) = ω¯(β) : H∗(ω, β) = 0 → u(β, 1) = v(ω, β) → vM(ω, β) = ux(β, 1).
The FOCs (A.11) and (A.12) therefore become:
[θ + (1− θ)F (ω¯)]ux(β, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
ω¯
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω = λˆ
F ,
ux(β, 1) ≤ λˆF .
Combining these equations implies the contradictory statement:
1
1− F (ω¯)
∫ ∞
ω¯
vM(ω, β)f(ω)dω ≥ ux(β, 1)
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The average smvi for those with ω¯ = ω¯ < ω cannot exceed that of the unable and
so the assertion that CˆF = 0 must therefore be false. Instead, it must hold that
CˆF > 0 ∀ pI + pII ≤ 1.
An immediate implication of this result is that the FOC for C in (A.12) must hold
with equality and thus:
ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) = λˆF
{
1 +
(1− θ)f(ω¯)ω¯CpIICˆF
[θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII ]
}
≥ λˆF (A.13)
From this we can directly ascertain that:
ux(Bˆ
F , 1) >
1
F (ω¯)
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω > ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1)
≥ λˆF > 1
1− F (ω¯)
∫ ∞
ω¯
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω
where ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) = λˆF only if pII = 0.
Prior to addressing the second hypothesis, it is useful to substitute (A.13) into (A.11)
to obtain:
θpIux(Bˆ
F , 1) + (1− θ)
{∫ ∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω − pII
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω
}
≤ ux(BˆF + CˆF , 1)χ
{
(1− χ) + (1− θ)f(ω¯)pII(ω¯B − ω¯C)CˆF
χ+ (1− θ)f(ω¯)ω¯CpIICˆF
}
(A.14)
≤ ux(BˆF + CˆF , 1)
where the final inequality arises because ω¯B < ω¯C . Recall that χ = [θ(1 − pI) +
(1 − θ)F (ω¯)pII ] denotes the number of individuals receiving the categorical transfer.
Conversely, (1 − χ) = [θpI + (1 − θ)(1 − F (n¯)pII ] denotes the number of individuals
not receiving the categorical transfer.
We are now in a position to address the second hypothesis.
(ii) BˆF = 0, CˆF = β/[θ + (1− pII)F (ω¯)] (Pure targeted system):
Suppose now that BˆF = 0. If pI > 0 then some unable individuals have no income to
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consume and so the left side of (A.14) blows up because limx→ ux(x, l) = +∞. The
weak inequality cannot hold and so the assertion that BˆF = 0 must be false.
However, if pI = 0 then we can write (A.14) with B = 0 as:∫∞
0
vM(ω, 0)f(ω)dω − pII
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω, 0)f(ω)dω
1− F (ω¯)pII
≤ ux
(
CF , 1
)
χ ·
{
(1− χ) + (1− θ)f(ω¯)pII(ω¯B − ω¯C)CF
χ+ (1− θ)f(ω¯)ω¯CpIICF
}
(A.15)
Proof of Proposition 3b.
To establish that δF > 0 at the optimum whenever pI > 0 and/or pII > 0, we proceed
to check three cases: (i) (pI > 0, pII = 0) ; (ii) (pI = 0, pII > 0) ; and (iii) (pI > 0,
pII > 0).
(i) (pI > 0 , pII = 0)
In this case δF = [pIux(B, 1) + (1− pI)ux(B +C, 1)]−
∫∞
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω. Given no
Type II errors are made the enforcement structure does not matter and the proof that
δF > 0 simply follows that under the No Enforcement case.
(ii) (pI = 0 , pII > 0)
In this case inequality in the average smvi between the unable and able subpopulations
can be written as:
δF =ux(B + C, 1)[1− F (ω¯)pII ]−
{∫ ∞
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω − pII
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω
}
=[1− F (ω¯)pII ]
{
ux(B + C, 1)−
∫∞
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω − pII
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω
1− F (ω¯)pII
}
(A.16)
The first term inside the curly braces is the smvi of categorical benefit recipients,
whilst the second term is the average smvi of able individuals who do not receive the
categorical benefit.
Substituting pI = 0 into the equation defining optimal transfers in (A.14) we can
immediately see that the term within curly braces will be positive and thus δF >
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0.
(iii) (pI > 0 , pII > 0)
In this case we can write δF as:
δF =ux(B + C, 1)[1− F (ω¯)pII − pI ]
−
{∫ ∞
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω − pII
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω − pIux(B, 1)
}
=[1− F (ω¯)pII − pI ]·{
ux(B + C, 1)−
∫∞
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω − pII
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω − pIux(B, 1)
1− F (ω¯)pII − pI
}
From (A.14) we know that the smvi of categorical recipients (i.e. ux(B + C, 1)) will
exceed the average smvi of non-categorical recipients. It follows that if the second term
within curly braces is less than the average smvi of non-categorical recipients (i.e. the
left side of (A.14)) then for sure δF > 0. We check this below:
θpIux(Bˆ
F , 1) + (1− θ)
{∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω − pII
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω
}
θpI + (1− θ)[1− F (ω¯)pII ]
−
{∫∞
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω − pII
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω,B)f(ω)dω − pIux(B, 1)
1− F (ω¯)pII − pI
}
=
pI [1− F (ω¯)pII ]
{
ux(Bˆ
F , 1)−
∫∞
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω − pII
∫ ω¯
0
vM(ω, Bˆ
F )f(ω)dω
1− F (ω¯)pII
}
{θpI + (1− θ)[1− F (ω¯)pII ]} {1− F (ω¯)pII − pI} > 0
(A.17)
because the smvi of unable individuals receiving only the universal benefit will always
exceed the average smvi of able individuals also receiving only the universal benefit. It
must therefore hold that δF > 0 at the optimum.
In summary, whenever pI > 0 and/or pII > 0 it must hold that δ
F > 0. Q.E.D.
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Proof of Proposition 3c.
To establish the sign of ∂V F/∂pI we use (A.9) (i.e. u(B, 1)−u(B+C, 1) < ux(B+C, 1)C
) to obtain:
∂V F
∂pI
= θ〈[u(BˆF , 1)− u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)] + λˆF CˆF 〉 < θCˆF [λˆF − ux(BˆF + CˆF , 1)] < 0
Turning to the affect of Type II errors on maximum welfare, we have:
∂V F
∂pII
= (1− θ)F (ω¯)
{[
u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− 1
F (ω¯)
∫ ω¯
0
v(ω, BˆF )f(ω)dω
]
− λˆF CˆF
}
= (1− θ)F (ω¯)

[
u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− u(BˆF , 1)− λˆF CˆF
]
− 1
F (ω¯)
∫ ω¯
0
[
v(ω, BˆF )− u(BˆF , 1)
]
f(ω)dω

= (1− θ)F (ω¯)

[
u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− u(BˆF , 1)− λˆF CˆF
]
− 1
F (ω¯)
∫ ω¯
ω¯(B)
[
v(ω, BˆF )− u(BˆF , 1)
]
f(ω)dω

To transition from the first line to the second line we add and subtract u(BˆF , 1). In
the second line there are two effects in square braces: the first is the benefit to an
individual - net of exchequer costs - of receiving the categorical benefit conditional on
facing a zero quantity constraint on labour supply; the second measures the cost of
facing a zero quantity constraint on labour conditional on only receiving the universal
benefit. The transition from the second to third line is made through recognising that
vM(ω,B) = ux(B, 1) ∀ ω ≤ ω¯(B).
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But since v(ω,B) < v(ω¯, B) = u(B + C, 1) ∀ ω¯(B) ≤ ω < ω¯ it must hold that:
∂V F
∂pII
> (1− θ)F (ω¯)
{〈
1− F (ω¯)− F (ω¯(Bˆ
F )
F (ω¯)
〉[
u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− u(BˆF , 1)
]
− λˆF CˆF
}
= (1− θ)F (ω¯)
{
F [ω¯(BˆF )]
F (ω¯)
[
u(BˆF + CˆF , 1)− u(BˆF , 1)
]
− λˆF CˆF
}
> (1− θ)F (ω¯)CˆF
{
F [ω¯(BˆF )]
F (ω¯)
ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1)− λˆF
}
= (1− θ)F (ω¯)CˆF
{
F [ω¯(BˆF )]
F (ω¯)
λˆF
〈
1 +
(1− θ)f(ω¯)ω¯CpIICˆF
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII
〉
− λˆF
}
= (1− θ)F (ω¯)CˆF

F [ω¯(BˆF )]
F (ω¯)
λˆF
〈
(1− θ)f(ω¯)ω¯CpIICˆF
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)F (ω¯)pII
〉
−λˆF
[
1− F [ω¯(Bˆ
F )]
F (ω¯)
]

The transition from the first line to the second follows from simple manipulation of
fractions, whilst to transition from the second to third line we use the property that
u(B + C, 1) − u(B, 1) > ux(B + C, 1)C. Next, the transition from the third through
to fifth line uses the definition of ux(Bˆ
F + CˆF , 1) from (A.13). Rewriting the terms in
curly braces in the final line in terms of elasticities then gives:
∂V F
∂pII
> (1− θ)F (ω¯)CˆFE (A.18)
where:
E ≡ F [ω¯(Bˆ
F )]
θ(1−pI)
(1−θ)pII + F (ω¯)
· ω¯f(ω¯)
F (ω¯)
· Cˆ
F ω¯C
ω¯
−
[
1− F [ω¯(Bˆ
F )]
F (ω¯)
]
(A.19)
The sufficient condition is therefore: E > 0 ⇒ ∂V F/∂pII > 0. If (1 − θ)pII ≈ 0 then
the first term on the right side is approximately zero such that E < 0. Yet, given
that ∂V F/∂pII > (1 − θ)F (ω¯)CˆFE this is insufficient to sign ∂V F/∂pII . However, if
θ(1− pI) ≈ 0 then:
E ≈ F (ω¯(B))
F (ω¯)
· ω¯f(ω¯)
F (ω¯)
· Cˆ
F ω¯C
ω¯
−
[
1− F (ω¯(B))
F (ω¯)
]
(A.20)
CHAPTER 2. OPTIMAL BENEFITS WITH IMPERFECT ENFORCEMENT 169
If the product of (i) the elasticity of F with respect to ω - evaluated at ω¯ - and (ii)
the elasticity of ω¯ with respect to C - evaluated at CˆF - are sufficiently high, then we
can have E > 0 and thus ∂V F/∂pII > 0. Since these elasticities depend on as yet
unspecified properties of the distribution and utility functions respectively, we have
enough degrees of freedom to choose parameters so that E > 0.
Appendix B Numerical Simulations
This section (i) derives some key properties of the CES utility function in (2.48) in the
main text; and (ii) presents the numerical code generating the simulation results in the
main text.
The CES Utility Function
Given preferences u(x, l) =
[
αx
E−1
E + (1− α)l E−1E
] E
E−1
(where E 6= 1) and a budget
constraint x = ωH +M , an individual’s optimal choice of H ∈ (0, 1] satisfies 43
H∗ = Arg max
H∈(0,1]
[
α(ωH +M)
E−1
E + (1− α)(1−H)E−1E
] E
E−1
43It is straightforward to show that the elasticity of substitution of the CES utility function is given
by E . Writing the individual budget constraint as x + ωl = ω + M and noting that at any interior
optimum ω = ul/ux, we can define the elasticity of substitution between l and x by (where x
∗ and l∗
denote optimal choices):
E = d(x
∗/l∗)/(x∗/l∗)
d(pl/px)/(pl/px)
=
pl/px
x∗/l∗
· d(x
∗/l∗)
d(pl/px)
=
ω
x∗/l∗
· d(x
∗/l∗)
d(pl/px)
=
ul/ux
x∗/l∗
· d(x
∗/l∗)
d(ul/ux)
From the CES preferences above we have:
ul
ux
=
(1− α)l− 1E
αx−
1
E
=
(1− α)
α
·
(x
l
) 1
E ⇒ x
l
=
(
α
1− α
)E (
ul
ux
)E
Substituting this into the definition of E gives:
E =
E
(
α
1−α
)E (
ul
ux
)E−1
(
α
1−α
)E (
ul
ux
)E−1 = E
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Thus yielding the FOC:
αω
(
1
ωH∗ +M
) 1
E
− (1− α) ·
(
1
1−H∗
) 1
E
≤ 0 ; H∗ ≥ 0
⇒ αω − (1− α)
(
ωH∗ +M
1−H∗
) 1
E
≤ 0 ; H∗ ≥ 0 (B.1)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
Setting H∗ = 0 it is straightforward to verify that the reservation wage ω¯(M) at or
below which an individual chooses not to work is given by:
ω¯(M) =
(
1− α
α
)
M
1
E (B.2)
It is useful to note that:
∂ω¯
∂E = −
(1− α)M 1E log (M)
αE2

>
=
<
 0 if M

>
=
<
 1
Next, for all ω > ω¯(M) it must hold that H∗ > 0 such that the FOC in (B.1) holds
with equality (i.e. αEωE(1 −H∗) − (1 − α)E(ωH∗ + M) = 0). Optimal labour supply
in this case is therefore:
H∗ =
αEωE − (1− α)EM
αEωE + (1− α)Eω =
αEωE
[
1− (1−α
α
)E
Mω−E
]
αEωE + (1− α)Eω =
1− (1−α
α
)E
Mω−E
1 +
(
1−α
α
)E
ω1−E
(B.3)
which is analogous to that in Stern (1976). Notice that if M = 0 then labour supply
will for sure be falling in the net wage rate.44
44Note that if E = 1 preferences are Cobb-Douglas and given by u(x, l) = xαl1−α. The FOC for
optimal labour supply is:
αω − (1− α)
(
ωH∗ +M
1−H∗
)
≤ 0 ; H∗ ≥ 0
Setting H∗ gives rise to the reservation wage ω¯(M) = (1−αα )M (i.e. as in (B.2)). Similarly, for ω > ω¯
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Indirect Utility Function
If ω ≤ ω¯(M) then H∗ = 0 and so indirect utility is simply v(ω,M) = u(M, 1) =[
αM
E−1
E + (1− α)
] E
E−1
; with partial derivatives:
vM = α
[
α + (1− α)M 1−EE
] 1
E−1
> 0
vMM = −
(
1
E
)
α(1− α)M 1−2EE
[
α + (1− α)M 1−EE
] 2−E
E−1
< 0
and
vMMM = −
(
1
E2
)
α(1− α)
{
(1− 2E)M 1−3EE [α + (1− α)M 1−EE ] 2−EE−1
−(2− E)(1− α)M 2−4EE [α + (1− α)M 1−EE ] 3−2EE−1
}
Note that it will certainly hold that vMMM > 0 whenever E ∈ [1/2, 1).
Meanwhile, for ω > ω¯(M) we substitute (B.3) into individual preferences to ob-
tain:
v =
α
[
ω − (1−α
α
)E
Mω1−E
1 +
(
1−α
α
)E
ω1−E
+M
]E−1
E
+ (1− α)
〈
1−
[
1− (1−α
α
)E
Mω−E
1 +
(
1−α
α
)E
ω1−E
]〉E−1
E

E
E−1
=
α
[
ω +M
1 +
(
1−α
α
)E
ω1−E
]E−1
E
+ (1− α)
[(
1−α
α
)E
ω−E(ω +M)
1 +
(
1−α
α
)E
ω1−E
]E−1
E

E
E−1
= (ω +M)
{
αE + (1− α)Eω1−E} 1E−1 (B.4)
where vM = [α
E + (1−α)Eω1−E ] 1E−1 . As vM is not a function of M we necessarily have
vMM = vMMM = 0.
45
we obtain:
H∗ =
αω − (1− α)M
ω
= α− (1− α)M/ω
45Under Cobb Douglas preferences (E = 1) indirect utility when ω ≤ ω¯(M) is simply v = Mα; with
partial derivatives vM = αM
−(1−α) > 0 and vMM = α(α − 1)Mα−2 < 0. Next, for ω > ω¯(M) we
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Derivation of ω¯B and ω¯C
For the CES utility function the condition defining the critical net wage ω¯ is:
[ω¯ +B]
{
αE + (1− α)E ω¯1−E} 1E−1 ≡ [α(B + C)E−1E + (1− α)] EE−1
Differentiating this identity with respect to B gives:
∂ω¯
∂B
[
αE + (1− α)E ω¯1−E] 1E−1 ·{1− (1− α)E ω¯−E(ω¯ +B)
[αE + (1− α)E ω¯1−E ]
}
= α(B + C)−
1
E
[
α(B + C)
E−1
E + (1− α)
] 2−E
E−1 − [αE + (1− α)E ω¯1−E] 1E−1
⇒ ∂ω¯
∂B
[
αE + (1− α)E ω¯1−E] 2−EE−1 {αE − (1− α)E ω¯−EB}
= α
{
(B + C)
1−E
E
[
α(B + C)
E−1
E + (1− α)
]} 1
E−1 − [αE + (1− α)E ω¯1−E] 1E−1
From which it is straightforward to establish that:
∂ω¯
∂B
=
α
[
α + (1− α)(B + C) 1−EE
] 1
E−1 − [αE + (1− α)E ω¯1−E] 1E−1
[αE + (1− α)E ω¯1−E ] 2−EE−1 · [αE − (1− α)E ω¯−EB]
(B.6)
Similarly, we can readily establish that:
∂ω¯
∂C
=
α
{
α + (1− α)(B + C) 1−EE
} 1
E−1
{αE + (1− α)E ω¯1−E} 2−EE−1 [αE − (1− α)E ω¯−EB]
(B.7)
Upper and Lower Bounds of ω¯(B,C)
For the purpose of numerically simulating ω¯ we want to put lower and upper bounds
on the search region. Given that v[ω¯(B+C), B+C] = u(B+C, 1) = v(ω¯, B) and thus
substitute (B.3) into u = (ωH +M)α(1−H)1−α to obtain:
v =
{
ω +M
1 +
(
1−α
α
)}α{( 1−αα ) (1 +M/ω)
1 +
(
1−α
α
) }1−α = ( 1−αα )1−α
1 +
(
1−α
α
) · ω +M
ω1−α
= αα(1− α)1−α
(
ω +M
ω1−α
)
(B.5)
with partial derivative vM = α
α(1− α)1−α/ω1−α.
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Figure 2.34: Upper and Lower Bounds of ω¯
l0
Income
¯¯ω
1
u¯
B + C
B
B + ω¯
B + C + ω¯
l∗(ω¯)l∗(¯¯ω)
Notes: At the critical wage ¯¯ω an individual’s optimal labour/leisure choice is such that they are in-
different between: (i) working whilst receiving no unearned income; and (ii) not working and receiving
B + C in unearned income.
ω¯(B + C) < ω¯, the function ω¯(B + C) serves as a suitable lower bound for ω¯. Under
the CES preferences in (2.48) we already have an explicit expression for ω¯, as given by
(B.2). To establish an expression for an upper bound, let the function ¯¯ω(B,C) satisfy
v(¯¯ω, 0) ≡ u(B +C, 1), where clearly ¯¯ωB > 0 and ¯¯ωC > 0. Given that v(¯¯ω, 0) = v(ω¯, B)
it must hold that ¯¯ω > ω¯ whenever B > 0, whilst ¯¯ω = ω¯ if B = 0. The function ¯¯ω is
therefore an upper bound for ω¯. Figure 2.34 graphically illustrates the upper (¯¯ω) and
lower (ω¯) bounds, respectively.
For the CES preferences in (2.48) we can derive an explicit expression for ¯¯ω. Formally,
¯¯ω satisfies:
¯¯ω
[
αE + (1− α)¯¯ω1−E] 1E−1 = [α(B + C)E−1E + (1− α)] EE−1
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which can be written more conveniently as:
{
¯¯ωE−1
[
αE−1 + (1− α)E ¯¯ω1−E]} 1E−1 = {α(B + C)E−1E + (1− α)} EE−1
⇒ αE ¯¯ωE−1 + (1− α)E =
{
α(B + C)
E−1
E + (1− α)
}E
⇒ ¯¯ωE−1 =
{
αM
E−1
E + (1− α)
α
}E
−
(
1− α
α
)E
and thus, finally:
¯¯ω =
{[
(B + C)
E−1
E +
(
1− α
α
)]E
−
(
1− α
α
)E} 1E−1
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Chapter 3
Revisiting the Optimal Linear
Income Tax with Categorical
Transfers.1
3.1 Introduction
When individuals differ in both their productivity and some categorical dimension such
as disability, a well-established result is that categorical transfers should be set so as
to eliminate inequality in the average social marginal value of income (smvi) between
categorical groups (Diamond and Sheshinski, 1995; Parsons, 1996). The linear income
tax framework has played an important role in the analysis of categorical transfers:
proponents of flat tax schedules cite their administrative simplicity and enhanced work
incentives; whilst analytically a flat tax captures the equity-efficiency tradeoff of income
taxation more tractably than nonlinear taxation (Atkinson, 1995; Paulus and Peichl,
2009; Peichl, 2014).2 The resulting optimal tax formulae are typically reported under
the assumption that inequality in the average net smvi is indeed eliminated at the opti-
mum (Viard, 2001a). This assumption allows the optimal tax expression to be written
as in the uni-dimensional model where individuals differ only in their productivity:
the numerator (equity considerations) is the negative of the covariance between gross
1A shorter version of this chapter is published in Economics Letters: see Slack (2015). This
publication presents some of the key results derived in this chapter.
2Mirrlees (1971, p.208) discusses the desirability of approximately linear tax schedules.
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earnings and the net smvi; whilst the denominator (efficiency considerations) captures
the response of compensated gross earnings to a change in the net wage rate.
However, it is not immediately clear that this between-group inequality will always
be eliminated at the optimum. Indeed, where categorical transfers are financed by tax
revenue there may be cases where it is suboptimal to do so. For example, if a sufficiently
large fraction of the population are dependent on categorical transfers for consumption
then the level of taxation required to equate the average net smvi of dependent and
non-dependent groups may be too harmful to the latter group. This will also depend
on the size of any revenue requirement in place for spending outside welfare.
Moreover, this is likely to hold beyond a simple flat tax framework. For example,
progressive piecewise linear tax systems provide the government with additional tools
to redistribute within categorical groups; but if shifting some of the tax burden away
from lower earners in an able group: (i) pushes the average net smvi of that group
further below that of a dependent group; and/or (ii) lowers tax revenue relative to
the flat tax case, this may limit further the cases where it is optimal to eliminate
between-group inequality in the average net smvi.
This chapter addresses this issue in both linear and piecewise linear income tax frame-
works. It demonstrates that the optimal tax expressions can be written more generally
to allow for cases where the average net smvi of categorical groups are not equated
at the optimum. In these cases welfare provision is purely categorical, such that no
universal benefit is provided. Alternatively, if between-group inequality is eliminated
and there are resources left over a universal benefit is also provided. Extensive numer-
ical simulations provide examples where between-group inequality is not eliminated at
the optimum. Further, they indicate that it is more likely to arise under a progressive
piecewise system for the reasons outlined above.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 3.2 sets up the model
and analyses the flat tax case. Within this section, numerical examples where between-
group inequality persists at the optimum are provided using a variant of the framework
employed by Stern (1976) (i.e. CES preferences, lognormal productivity distribution).
Section 3.3 then extends the analysis to the less restrictive case of piecewise linear
taxation with two tax brackets and increasing marginal tax rates. To simplify the
exposition preferences are taken to be quasilinear in consumption (see also Apps et al.,
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2014). As agent monotonicity3 is readily satisfied under these preferences there will be
a bunching of earners at the earnings threshold that separates the two tax brackets.
Numerical examples where between-group inequality persists under the piecewise op-
tima (and, for comparison, the flat tax optima) are obtained using preferences with a
constant labour elasticity (see Atkinson, 1990; Saez, 2001).4 Individual productivity is
taken to be Pareto distributed, as this is known to give rise to increasing marginal tax
rates (Diamond, 1998). Finally, Section 3.4 concludes the chapter.
3.2 The Model
3.2.1 Background
Individual preferences over consumption, x ≥ 0, and leisure, l ∈ [0, 1], are represented
by the utility function u(x, l). The standard assumptions apply: u is continuous;
differentiable; increasing in both arguments (ux > 0, ul > 0) and concave (uxx < 0 ,
ull < 0 , uxxull − u2xl > 0); with both goods normal (uluxx − uxuxl < 0).
For an individual with net wage ω ≥ 0 and unearned income M ≥ 0 , optimal labour
supply (H∗) and the resulting indirect utility function (v) are defined by:
H∗(ω,M) ≡ arg max
H∈(0,1)
u(ωH +M, 1−H) ,
v(ω,M) ≡ u(ωH∗ +M, 1−H∗) .
Let ω¯(M) = ul(M, 1)/ux(M, 1) be the reservation wage satisfying: H
∗ = 0 ∀ ω ≤ ω¯
and H∗ > 0 ∀ ω > ω¯ ; where ω¯′ > 0. It follows that ∀ ω ≤ ω¯ : v(ω,M) = u(M, 1)
and thus vM(ω,M) = ux(M, 1). Contrastingly, Roy’s identity (vω = vMH
∗) and the
normality of leisure (H∗M < 0) imply that ∀ ω > ω¯ : vωM = vMMH∗ + vMH∗M < 0. So
for ω > ω¯ the marginal indirect utility of unearned income is strictly decreasing in the
3Agent monotonicity requires that indifference curves in gross income - consumption space become
flatter in individual productivity (see, for example, Seade, 1982).
4These isoelastic preferences also allow one to derive analytical results for the conditions under
which between-group inequality will persist under the flat tax optimum. Specifically, for the special
case where taxation is purely redistributive (i.e. no revenue requirement) this chapter demonstrates
that the optimal flat tax will fall below that required to eliminate inequality in the average smvi if
the unable subpopulation is too large.
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net wage rate.
3.2.2 The Tax-Benefit System
Consider a population of size 1, where a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of individuals face a zero
quantity constraint on labour supply and are thus unable to work. Absent any form
of state financial provision these individuals would have zero income to consume. The
remaining (1−θ) individuals are able to work but differ in their underlying productivity
n ≥ 0, where n is distributed with density function f(n) and associated distribution
function F (n).
The government operates a tax-benefit system comprising (i) a constant marginal in-
come tax rate t ∈ (0, 1); (ii) a tax-free universal benefit B ≥ 0 received unconditionally
by all individuals in society; and (iii) a tax-free categorical benefit C ≥ 0 that is
perfectly targeted at unable individuals.
To save on notation, let y = nH and y¯ =
∫∞
0
yf(n)dn. Evaluated at the optimal labour
choices of individuals, we thus define the gross earnings of a productivity n individual
by y∗(n, 1 − t,M) ≡ nH∗[n(1 − t),M ]; whilst the average gross earnings over able
individuals are y¯∗(1− t,M) ≡ ∫∞
0
y∗f(n)dn.
Under a strictly utilitarian criterion, social welfare is:
W (t, B, C; θ) = θu(B + C, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
v[n(1− t), B]f(n)dn (3.1)
The first term is the welfare of unable individuals multiplied by their population share;
whilst the second term is the average welfare of able individuals multiplied by their
population share.
The government’s optimisation problem is thus described by:
max
t,B,C
W (t, B, C; θ)
s.t. B + θC = (1− θ)t · y¯∗(t, B)−R ,
t ∈ (0, 1) , B ≥ 0 , C ≥ 0 .
(3.2)
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where R ≥ 0 is an exogenous revenue requirement.
To discuss the results which follow, let the net smvi of a productivity n individual be
(Viard, 2001a):
s(n, t,M, λ) =
ux(M, 1) : n ≤ n¯(t,M)vM [n(1− t),M ] + λty∗M(n, 1− t,M) : n > n¯(t,M) (3.3)
where n¯ ≡ ω¯/(1 − t) and λ is the shadow price of public expenditure.5 For the
voluntarily unemployed, s is simply the social marginal utility of income. However,
for working individuals s also captures - in welfare units - the fact that an increase
in unearned income induces a worker to reduce their labour supply and, consequently,
lowers tax revenue.
Let tˆ, Bˆ and Cˆ denote the optimal choices resulting from the maximisation problem
in (3.2). We state the following result:
Result 1:
(i) Cˆ > 0 and Bˆ ≥ 0 satisfy :
s¯
(
tˆ, Bˆ, λˆ
)
≤ ux
(
Bˆ + Cˆ, 1
)
= λˆ ; Bˆ ≥ 0 (3.4)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness and λˆ is the
shadow price of public expenditure at the optimum.
(ii) For δ ≡ (λ− s¯) and r = y∗/y¯∗; tˆ is implicitly characterised by:
tˆ
1− tˆ =

δ − Cov(r, s)
λˆ
∫
rEcf(n)dn : δ > 0
−Cov(y∗, s)
λˆ
∫
yEcf(n)dn : δ = 0
(3.5)
where Ec is the compensated elasticity of individual gross earnings with respect to
the net of tax rate.
Proof: See Appendix
5Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p.387) normalise s by λ and define it as the net social marginal
valuation. In terms of deriving the optimal tax expression the two approaches are equivalent.
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Result 1(i) states that, budget allowing, C should be set so as to eliminate inequality in
the average net smvi between the unable and able subpopulations (see Viard, 2001a).
Further, so long as there is inequality in this dimension it is optimal to set B =
0 because social welfare can be increased more through targeting resources at the
unable.
Next, Result 1(ii) provides a general expression for the optimal linear tax rate that
captures the equity (numerator) - efficiency (denominator) tradeoff inherent in income
taxation. This differs from standard linear tax expressions whenever δ > 0, and thus
whenever there is inequality in the average net smvi between the unable and able
subpopulations. In this case, the numerator is composed of two terms. The first is δ
itself, which will be larger the greater is the between-group disparity at the optimum.
The second is the covariance between relative earnings (r) and the net smvi. Notice
that Cov(r, s) · y¯ = Cov(y, s), where the latter term is found in all linear tax formulae
and captures a desire to redistribute from those of high productivity to those of lower
productivity.6 The intuition for these two terms is that the presence of a dependent
subpopulation shifts the equity focus away from disparities in earnings ability within
the able subpopulation, and towards the between-group disparity in the average net
smvi.
The denominator in (3.5) captures the efficiency considerations involved in setting the
optimal tax rate and is unambiguously positive. Ceteris paribus, higher compensated
elasticities of labour supply imply lower tax rates, with emphasis placed on both very
high productivities and productivities at which the population is most dense.
Finally, if δ = 0 then between-group inequality is eliminated at the optimum and the
tax formula reduces to the standard representation in the literature (Atkinson and
Stiglitz, 1980; Atkinson, 1995; Viard, 2001a,b).
6This covariance will be negative if: (i) yn ≥ 0; and (ii) sn < 0. The requirement that the net smvi
falls with productivity is formally given by:
∂s
∂n
= (1− t)vω + λtynM = (1− t)vω + λt {H∗M + n(1− t)H∗ωM}
As stated in the main text, we have vωM < 0 ∀ n > n¯ and similarly H∗M < 0 ∀ n > n¯. However, the
sign of H∗ωM is unclear and requires assumptions on third derivatives.
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3.2.3 Numerical Results: Flat Tax
The purpose of this section is to provide examples where between-group inequality in
the average net smvi persists at the flat tax optimum. In line with the key numerical
studies on linear income taxation - both those with and without categorical transfers
- we take preferences over consumption and leisure to be of the constant elasticity of
substitution form (see Immonen et al., 1998; Stern, 1976; Viard, 2001a,b):
u(x, l) =
[
αx
E−1
E + (1− α)l E−1E
]
; E 6= 1 (3.6)
where E is the elasticity of substitution between leisure and consumption.
The social welfare function is given by:
W =
(
1
1− η
){
θu(B + C, 1)1−η + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
v[n(1− t), B]1−ηf(n)dn
}
(3.7)
Notice that the parameter η determines the degree of concavity of the social welfare
function: setting η > 0 allows for express concern with regard to the distribution of
utilities. We will consider η ∈ {0, 2}. The smvi of an unable or voluntarily unemployed
individual is thus u−η · ux; whilst the net smvi of a worker is v−η · vM + λty∗M .
Whilst the main properties of (3.6) are well established in the literature, it is useful to
note that the optimal earnings function is given by:
y∗ =
n− (1−α
α
)En1−E(1− t)−EM
1 + (1−α
α
)E [n(1− t)]1−E (3.8)
from which it follows that ∂y∗/∂M < 0 whilst ∂2y∗/∂M∂(1− t) > 0.
If M = 0 for workers - which from Result 1 would arise if between-group inequality
in the average (net) smvi is not eliminated through categorical transfers - then (3.8)
illustrates that earnings will be falling in the net-of-tax rate. Conversely, earnings will
be rising in the tax rate, as will be tax revenue.
In the simulations which follow we consider the following parameter values: n ∼
lnN (µ = −1, σ = 0.39); α = 0.614; E ∈ {0.5, 0.6, 0.7, 0.8, 0.9, 0.99}; θ = 0.1 and
R ∈ {0, 0.05, 0.10}. The key studies of categorical transfers within an optimal tax
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Table 3.1: Numerical results: optimal linear income tax and between-group inequality.
η = 0 η = 2
E tR tˆ Bˆ Cˆ δ tδ tˆ Bˆ Cˆ δ tδ
(a) R = 0
0.5 0 0.304 0 0.755 0.014 0.311 0.458 0.087 0.139 0 0.087
0.6 0 0.289 0 0.700 0.022 0.302 0.416 0.076 0.134 0 0.083
0.7 0 0.274 0 0.647 0.029 0.293 0.382 0.067 0.129 0 0.079
0.8 0 0.259 0 0.597 0.035 0.285 0.353 0.060 0.123 0 0.075
0.9 0 0.245 0 0.551 0.040 0.276 0.329 0.054 0.117 0 0.072
0.99 0 0.233 0 0.512 0.044 0.268 0.310 0.049 0.112 0 0.069
(b) R = 0.05
0.5 0.205 0.473 0 0.724 0.055 0.499 0.526 0.060 0.130 0 0.274
0.6 0.209 0.460 0 0.654 0.078 0.501 0.484 0.048 0.128 0 0.275
0.7 0.213 0.446 0 0.583 0.102 0.506 0.449 0.038 0.124 0 0.277
0.8 0.218 0.432 0 0.515 0.126 0.513 0.419 0.030 0.120 0 0.279
0.9 0.223 0.419 0 0.451 0.153 0.524 0.393 0.023 0.115 0 0.281
0.99 0.228 0.408 0 0.397 0.177 0.540 0.373 0.017 0.111 0 0.284
(c) R = 0.10
0.5 0.394 0.629 0 0.703 0.114 0.674 0.601 0.036 0.118 0 0.446
0.6 0.403 0.619 0 0.615 0.165 0.696 0.562 0.025 0.117 0 0.453
0.7 0.414 0.608 0 0.524 0.223 0.736 0.529 0.015 0.114 0 0.462
0.8 0.426 0.597 0 0.435 0.293 * 0.500 0.006 0.111 0 0.472
0.9 0.440 0.588 0 0.352 0.376 * 0.485 0 0.105 0.571 0.485
0.99 0.454 0.583 0 0.283 0.470 * 0.497 0 0.094 2.730 0.499
Notes: tR denotes the tax rate that generates just enough tax revenue to satisfy the revenue require-
ment. tˆ, Bˆ and Cˆ denote the optimal choices. tδ is the critical tax rate that generates just enough
tax revenue - net of any revenue requirement - to eliminate between-group inequality in the average
net smvi through categorical spending. Cases where tδ does not exist are denoted by an ∗: this arises
because the average net smvi may fall with the tax rate at high tax rates. Values ≤ 10−7 are reported
as 0.
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framework take individual productivity to be lognormally distributed, and we follow
convention here (see Immonen et al., 1998; Viard, 2001a,b). We set the mean of log n
equal to -1 and the standard deviation of log n equal to 0.39; as has been the stan-
dard since Mirrlees (1971). The choice of α follows from Stern (1976): at α = 0.614
the average productivity individual works exactly 2/3 of their time endowment when
E = 0.5 and t = M = 0. Turning to the proportion of unable individuals in society,
the choice of θ = 0.1 seems sensible in light of statistics on real-world benefit pro-
grammes (Mcinnes, 2012). Finally, the choices of positive revenue requirement can be
written as a proportion of maximum earnings when t = 0. When E = 0.5 aggregate
earnings in the economy are 0.235. A value of R = 0.05 thus corresponds to roughly
21% of maximum earnings, whilst R = 0.10 corresponds to roughly 43% of maximum
earnings.
The numerical results are presented in Table 3.1.7 The column labelled tR denotes the
tax rate that generates just enough tax revenue to satisfy the revenue requirement,
with benefit expenditure set at zero. This is independent of η. The columns labelled
tˆ, Bˆ and Cˆ denote the optimal choices of the tax rate and benefit levels. The columns
labelled δ denote the level of between-group inequality in the average (net) smvi at the
optimal choices. Given the welfare function in (3.7), δ is formally defined as:
δ = u−ηux(B + C, 1)−
∫ ∞
0
{
v−ηvM [n(1− t), B] + λty∗M
}
dF (n)
Relatedly, the columns labelled tδ denote the critical tax rate that generates just enough
tax revenue - net of any revenue requirement - to eliminate between-group inequality
through categorical spending and thus set δ = 0. Formally, tδ satisfies:
u−ηux
[
(1− θ)tδy¯(1− tδ, 0)−R
θ
, 1
]
=
∫ ∞
0
{
v−ηvM [n(1− tδ), 0] + λtδy∗M
}
dF (n)
The implication is that t < tδ ⇒ δ > 0, but t ≥ tδ ⇒ δ = 0. Figure 3.1 provides the
graphical intuition for the critical flat tax tδ.
7Note that if we set θ = 0 - such that there is no need for categorical transfers - the numerical
results in Table 3.1 collapse down to those in Stern (1976). This exercise provides a useful additional
check on the accuracy of the simulation results.
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Figure 3.1: The Critical Tax Rate tδ
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The most immediate observation from Table 3.1 is that when η = 0 we observe δ > 0
and t < tδ in all cases. Consequently, optimal welfare provision is purely targeted
and the universal benefit is set at zero in all cases. Note that when R = 0.10 there
is no tδ that eliminates between-group inequality. The intuition is as follows: because
high levels of R imply high levels of taxation (see tR) without any form of benefit
expenditure, the term λty∗M from the net smvi of an able individual may become
sufficiently negative that the average net smvi over the able subpopulation falls with
the tax rate (recall from our discussion of the earnings function in (3.8) that y∗M < 0
becomes more negative with the tax rate). If this fall is sufficiently large there will be
no way to eliminate inequality in the average net smvi.
Turning to the case where η = 2, we only observe cases where t < tδ when R = 0.10.
Higher levels of the revenue requirement thus still render it suboptimal to eliminate
inequality in the average net smvi between the unable and able subpopulations. Notice
that - in contrast to the case where η = 0 - the critical tax rate tδ exists in all cases.
The reason for this is that when η = 2 more weight is placed on the marginal indirect
utility of lower productivity workers who are being taxed highly but receive no benefit
income. Consequently, the average net smvi of the able subpopulation tends to rise
with the tax rate.
Turning to the remaining observations from Table 3.1, it is interesting to note that tδ
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is (i) falling in E when R = 0; but (ii) increasing in E when R > 0. The intuition
for this follows from the well-established result (see Stern, 1976) that tR rises with E .
Finally, we observe that the optimal tax rate, tˆ, falls with E in almost all considered
cases, as do the the optimal benefit levels.
3.3 A Progressive Piecewise Linear Income Tax Sys-
tem
Whilst a number of countries adopt a flat income tax, the majority employ progressive8
piecewise linear tax schedules (see Paulus and Peichl, 2009; Peichl, 2014). This section
first motivates the idea that the above discussion is likely to hold in the more general
setting of piecewise taxation, where the set of instruments available to the government
are less restrictive than in the simple flat tax case. We then proceed to demonstrate
this numerically.
3.3.1 A two-bracket progressive piecewise linear tax sched-
ule
Consider a simple progressive piecewise linear tax system with two tax brackets and
an earnings threshold Y . Individuals are taxed at the rate t1 on all earnings y ≤ Y ;
but are taxed at the rate t2 ≥ t1 on any additional earnings (y − Y ) in excess of the
threshold. Formally, an individual’s budget constraint is given by:
x =
(1− t1)y +B : y ≤ Y(t2 − t1)Y + (1− t2)y +B : y > Y (3.9)
The tax-benefit system remains otherwise as in Section 3.2.2.
To progress it is helpful to abstract from income effects9 through assuming preferences
take the form:
8The term progressive is used here to refer to increasing marginal tax rates.
9This ensures that the first order condition for earnings y > Y is unaffected by t1, which simplifies
the analysis (see Apps et al., 2014).
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Figure 3.2: ‘Bunching’ of earnings at the bracket threshold Y
y
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˜˜n
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Note: This figure illustrates that under the preferences in (3.10) indifference curves in (y, x) space
become flatter in n, resulting in the productivity interval n ∈ [n˜, ˜˜n] where individuals choose to earn
exactly Y (see the Appendix for a more detailed discussion). Apps et al. (2014) refer to this progressive
piecewise tax system as the ‘convex case’ because the budget set in (y, x) space is convex. Notice that
in drawing the figure we have abstracted from unearned income (if M > 0 an individual would still
have positive consumption when y = 0).
U(x,H) = u (x− g(H)) (3.10)
where u′ > 0; u′′ < 0; g′ > 0; and g′′ > 0. In addition, we assume that g(0) = g′(0) = 0.
The implication of this latter assumption is simply that there is no reservation wage
at or below which an able individual chooses voluntary unemployment.
As is well documented (see Apps et al., 2014), there will be a ‘bunching’ of earnings at
Y for individuals who would earn more than Y if additional earnings were still taxed
at rate t1; but choose not to because they are in fact taxed at rate t2. Formally, this
bunching occurs for n˜(1− t1, Y ) < n ≤ ˜˜n(1− t2, Y ); where:
n˜(1− t1) ≡ g′ (Y/n˜) , ˜˜n(1− t2) ≡ g′
(
Y/˜˜n
)
(3.11)
It follows directly from (3.11) that both ∂n˜/∂(1− t1) < 0 and ∂ ˜˜n/∂(1− t2) < 0, whilst
both ∂n˜/∂Y > 0 and ∂ ˜˜n/∂Y > 0. Figure 3.2 provides some intuition for the two
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critical productivities n˜ and ˜˜n.
Taking into account the bunching of earnings at the ‘kink’ point in the budget con-
straint, we define the optimal earnings function of a productivity n individual by:
y∗(n, 1− t1, 1− t2, Y )
≡

Arg maxy∈(0,Y ) u [(1− t1) +M − g(y/n)] : ∀ n ∈ (0, n˜)
Y : ∀ n ∈ [n˜, ˜˜n]
Arg maxy∈(Y,∞) u [Y (t2 − t1) + y(1− t2) +M − g(y/n)] : ∀ n ∈ (˜˜n,∞)
(3.12)
From (3.11) and (3.12) one can readily verify that y∗ satisfies:
n(1− t1) = g′(y∗/n) : ∀ n ∈ (0, n˜]
(1− t1) > g′(Y/n)/n > (1− t2) : ∀ n ∈ (n˜, ˜˜n)
n(1− t2) = g′(y∗/n) : ∀ n ∈ [n˜,∞)
(3.13)
where ∀ n ∈ (0, n˜) : ∂y∗/∂n > 0 and ∂y∗/∂(1 − t1) > 0; whilst ∀ n ∈ (˜˜n,∞) :
∂y∗/∂n > 0 and ∂y/∂(1− t2) > 0.
If we let v(n, 1 − t1, 1 − t2, Y,M) denote the resulting indirect utility function we can
establish that:
∂v
∂(1− t1) =
vM · y∗ : ∀ n ∈ (0, n˜]vM · Y : ∀n ∈ (n˜,∞) , ∂v∂(1− t2) =
0 : ∀n ∈ (0, ˜˜n]vM(y∗ − Y ) : ∀n ∈ (˜˜n,∞)
(3.14)
whilst:
∂V
∂Y
=

0 : ∀n ∈ (0, n˜]
vM · [(1− t1)− g′(Y/n)/n] : ∀n ∈ (0, ˜˜n]
vM · (t2 − t1) : ∀n ∈ (˜˜n,∞)
(3.15)
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where vM = u
′. Ceteris paribus, a reduction in the lower net-of-tax rate (i.e. 1 − t1)
benefits all individuals in the economy; whilst a reduction in the upper net-of-tax
rate (i.e. 1 − t2) benefits only those for whom y > Y and thus those with n ∈
(˜˜n,∞). Meanwhile, a ceteris paribus increase in the earnings threshold benefits both
those bunched at the earnings threshold and those who earn above it. In particular,
individuals with n ∈ (n˜, ˜˜n] can optimally increase their earnings; whilst individuals
with n ∈ (˜˜n,∞) have less of their earnings taxed at the higher rate t2.
Optimisation Problem. The government’s optimisation problem is now described
by:
max
t1,t2,Y,B,C
W = θu(B + C) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
v(n, 1− t1, 1− t2, Y, B)f(n)dn
s.t. B + θC
= (1− θ)
{
t1
〈∫ n˜
0
y∗f(n)dn+ Y [1− F (n˜)]
〉
+ t2
∫ ∞
˜˜n
(y∗ − Y )f(n)dn
}
−R ,
t1 ∈ (0, 1) , t2 ∈ (0, 1) , t1 ≤ t2 , Y ≥ 0 , B ≥ 0 , C ≥ 0 . (3.16)
As we are abstracting from income effects, an able individual’s smvi is simply their
marginal indirect utility of income. However, to be consistent with the notation from
Section 3.2.2 we let s = vM be a productivity n individual’s smvi and s¯ =
∫
sf(n)dn
be the average smvi over the able subpopulation.
Letting tˆ1,tˆ2,Yˆ ,Bˆ and Cˆ denote the resulting optima, we can state the following:
Result 2:
(i) Cˆ > 0 and Bˆ ≥ 0 satisfy:
s¯
(
tˆ1, tˆ2, Yˆ , Bˆ
)
≤ u′
(
Bˆ + Cˆ
)
= λˆ ; Bˆ ≥ 0 (3.17)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
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(ii) For Ei = (1− ti)
y∗
∂y∗
∂(1− ti) ; i ∈ {1, 2}, tˆ1, tˆ2 and Yˆ are characterised by:
(t1) :
tˆ1
1− tˆ1
=
δYˆ +
∫ n˜
0
(Y − y) (s− λˆ)f(n)dn
λˆ
∫ n˜
0
yE1f(n)dn
(3.18)
(t2) :
tˆ2
1− tˆ2
=
∫∞
˜˜n
(
y − Yˆ
)
(λˆ− s)f(n)dn
λˆ
∫∞
˜˜n
yE2f(n)dn
(3.19)
(Y ) :
∫ ˜˜n
n˜
(
∂v
∂Y
+ λˆtˆ1
)
f(n)dn =
(
tˆ2 − tˆ1
) ∫ ∞
˜˜n
(
λˆ− s
)
f(n)dn (3.20)
Proof: See Appendix.
Result 2(i) parallels Result 1(i): a universal benefit will only be provided conditional
on categorical transfers eliminating inequality in the average smvi; and there being
resources left over. Result 2(ii) characterises the optimal tax parameters and is anal-
ogous to Apps et al. (2014). The important difference with these authors is that the
presence of a dependent population changes how we write the expression for tˆ1. In
particular, whilst both the expressions for tˆ1 and tˆ2 have equity concerns in the numer-
ator and efficiency concerns in the denominator, it is only the numerator of the former
that contains δ; entering as δY . The intuition is seemingly that an increase in t1 has
no distortionary effect on the gross earnings of those with n ∈ (n˜,∞) and is therefore
an effective tool to help reduce δ. This does, of course, come at the cost of imposing
a higher tax rate on those with n ∈ (0, n˜) and thus those with lower productivities.
Finally, (3.20) illustrates that Y should be set so as to equate (i) the marginal benefit
of allowing individuals with n ∈ (n˜, ˜˜n) to work more at rate t1 (and in welfare units the
associated increase in tax revenue); with (ii) the marginal cost of foregone tax revenue
from those with n ∈ (˜˜n,∞), weighted by the positive term ∫∞˜˜n (λ− s)f(n)dn.
3.3.2 Numerical Results: Piecewise Linear Taxation
To provide examples where δ > 0 at the piecewise taxation optimum, we once more
turn to numerical methods.
In line with the preferences adopted in (3.10), let preferences take the frequently em-
ployed isoelastic form (see Atkinson, 1990; Saez, 2001):
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u(x,H) = log
(
x− αH
1+k
1 + k
)
(3.21)
where in this setting 1/k is the constant elasticity of labour supply with respect to the
net wage rate and α is a constant.10 Low labour elasticities are observed empirically
and we follow convention by setting 1/k = 0.25 and thus k = 4. The literature typically
adopts values of the labour elasticity between 0.1 and 1.
Productivities are Pareto distributed where f(n) = µnµ/nµ+1 ∀ n ≥ n. The Pareto
distribution captures well the upper tail of observed income distributions and its adop-
tion in the more recent optimal tax literature has supported increasing marginal tax
rates on higher earners (see Diamond, 1998). It would therefore seem appropriate for
simulating progressive piecewise tax schedules.11 To capture how the spread of abilities
affects the results, we consider two alternative distributions: (i) n = 1, µ = 4 ; and (ii)
n = 1.067, µ = 5, where n is adjusted so that the average productivity is 1.333 in both
cases. The second distribution has a smaller spread of abilities than the first.
The remaining parameter choices are α = 8 ; θ ∈ {0.10, 0.15} andR ∈ {0, 0.10, 0.15, 0.20}.
Analogous to the numerical analysis in Section 3.2.3, the leisure preference parameter
α is set so that the average worker has a labour supply of roughly 2/3. Again, the val-
ues of the unable subpopulation size θ seem sensible following statistics on real-world
welfare programmes (Mcinnes, 2012). Finally, the choices of revenue requirement fall
well within maximum tax revenue under the two considered distributions. The revenue
maximising tax rate is given by t = k/(1 + k) and is thus 80% when k = 4.12 Setting
10Under the preferences in (3.21) optimal labour supply is given by H∗ = [n(1 − t)/α] 1k . Letting
ω = n(1− t) denote the net wage, the elasticity of labour supply with respect to the net wage rate is
thus:
ω
H∗
· ∂H
∗
∂ω
=
(
ω
k−1
k α
1
k
)
·
((
1
k
)
ω
1−k
k α−
1
k
)
=
1
k
where the term within the first pair of braces is ω/H∗, whilst the term within the second pair of
braces is ∂H∗/∂ω.
11Slemrod et al. (1994) demonstrate that extending the framework of Stern (1976) (a variant of
which we applied in Section 3.2.3) to a two bracket piecewise setting gives rise to t1 > t2 in all cases.
Apps et al. (2014) discuss how the assumption that productivities are lognormally distributed may
bias results in favour of decreasing marginal tax rates.
12Individual earnings are given by y∗ = nH∗ = (1− t) 1kn 1+kk α− 1k . The revenue maximising tax rate
is thus defined as:
tL = Arg max
t
t(1− t) 1kα− 1k
∫ ∞
0
n
1+k
k dF (n) = Arg max
t
t(1− t) 1k
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θ = 0.15 we find that maximum revenue under the first distribution (µ = 4, n = 1)
is 0.393; whilst maximum revenue under the second distribution (µ = 5, n = 1.067) is
0.391.
In the numerical results to be presented below it is useful to compare the piecewise
optima with the flat tax optima. Intuitively, the flat tax is always available under the
piecewise system (i.e. through setting t1 = t2) and so where it is not chosen welfare
must be higher under the piecewise system. We once more let tδ denote the critical
flat tax that generates just enough tax revenue (net of any revenue requirement) to
set δ = 0 through categorical transfers. In this regard, the isoelastic preferences in
(3.21) simplify the flat tax problem sufficiently that we can establish conditions where
between-group inequality will persist at the optimum for the purely redistributive case
with no revenue requirement. We discuss this in the below remark and subsequent
result.
Remark: Under the isoelastic preferences in (3.21) the explicit solution for tδ when
R = 0 is:
tδ =
θ
(1− θ)(1+k
k
)
∫∞
0
n
1+k
k dF (n) · ∫∞
0
n−
1+k
k dF (n) + θ
(3.22)
which is unambiguously increasing in the unable subpopulation size θ.
Result 3: Consider the pure targeting problem when R = 0:
max
t
W = θu(C(t), 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
v[n(1− t), 0]dF (n)
where C(t) =
(
1− θ
θ
)
t
∫ ∞
0
y∗(n, 1− t)dF (n)
(3.23)
Then under the isoelastic preferences in (3.21) the optimal tax rate, denoted by tˆc, is
thus given by:
tˆc = θ
(
k
1 + k
)
(3.24)
which is increasing in both the size of the dependent population and in the inverse
labour elasticity. A simple comparison between (3.22) and (3.24) illustrates that for θ
which yields the first order condition 1− (1/k)tL(1− tL)−1 = 0.
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Figure 3.3: Between-group inequality and θ when R = 0.
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Notes: This figure plots the functions tδ and tˆc (as defined in (3.22) and (3.23)) over θ. As discussed
in Result 3, there is a critical unable subpopulation size above which it is suboptimal to eliminate
inequality in the average smvi between the unable and able subpopulations. In subplot (a) the critical
value of θ is 0.35, whilst in subplot (b) the critical value of θ is 0.25.
large enough it will be suboptimal to eliminate inequality in the average smvi between
the unable and able subpopulations. This is illustrated in Figure 3.3.
Proof: See Appendix
Table 3.2 displays the numerical results and its structure is described in the caption
immediately below the table. The most immediate observation from Table 3.2 is that
there are indeed cases under both the flat tax and piecewise linear tax schedules where
δ > 0 at the optimum. Moreover, there are a number of cases where δ = 0 under the
flat tax schedule, but δ > 0 under the corresponding piecewise schedule. The intuition
here is that the additional tools available to the government under the piecewise system
allow it to lower the tax burden on individuals of lower productivity, which in turn acts
to lower the average smvi over the able subpopulation (as illustrated by the observation
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that s¯ takes a lower value at the piecewise optimum than at the flat tax optimum in
all cases). Even though the unable receive a similar benefit income to the flat tax case
(and thus have a similar smvi) δ is necessarily higher due to the fall in s¯. In these cases
net tax revenue is also lower under the piecewise schedule. Note that where δ > 0 under
both types of system, the unable tend to receive a slightly lower level of categorical
support under the piecewise system than they do under the flat tax system. Finally,
given that the flat tax is always available but not chosen, welfare is higher under the
piecewise system (to save on space this is omitted from the table).
Table 3.2 illustrates that an increase in θ or R increases the number of cases where
δ > 0. Further, for cases where δ > 0 prior to the increase, we observe that an increase
in either parameter increases the size of δ. With respect to the piecewise system, we
note that an increase in R (i) raises the average smvi of the able (because the tax
parameters tˆ1, tˆ2 and Yˆ rise whilst Bˆ either falls or remains at zero); and (ii) raises the
smvi of the unable (because Cˆ falls). Given that δ rises in all cases the latter effect
must dominate the first. A parallel argument holds in the flat tax case. Interestingly,
a mean-preserving reduction in the spread of abilities increases (i) the number of cases
where δ > 0; and (ii) the magnitude of δ for cases where δ > 0 already. This is best
explained in terms of the flat tax system. For any given value of t, both s¯ and tax
revenue fall. Consequently, the critical tax rate tδ at which between-group inequality
is eliminated rises.13 Figure 3.4 summarises the conditions where δ > 0 in (R, θ)
space.
3.4 Concluding Remarks
The analysis of categorical transfers in optimal linear and piecewise-linear income tax
frameworks will depend on whether categorical transfers are financed so as to eliminate
between-group inequality in the average net smvi at the optimum. If one simply as-
sumes this to hold then the resulting optimal tax expressions can be written as in the
uni-dimensional model where individuals differ only in productivity. The purpose of
this chapter has been to demonstrate that this may not always be a good assumption.
For example, the presence of a sufficiently large unable subpopulation dependent on
13Note that tδ would still rise even if we did not adjust n so as to keep mean productivity constant
(for any given t: s¯ may increase but tax revenue falls).
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Figure 3.4: Between-Group Inequality at the Optimum in (R, θ) Space
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(a) n = 1 , µ = 4
Flat Tax System
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(b) n = 1.067 , µ = 5
Piecewise Tax System
Notes: For optimum flat tax and optimum piecewise tax schedules, this figure illustrates the cases
in (R, θ) space where between group inequality in the average smvi is not eliminated. Notice that
when R = 0 the critical values of θ above which between-group inequality will persist in the flat tax
optimum correspond to those established in Figure 3.3.
categorical transfers, coupled with spending commitments outside welfare, may render
it suboptimal to spend on categorical transfers up to this point because doing so would
be too harmful to the non-dependent working subpopulation. Numerical examples
have illustrated cases where this arises.
This chapter has demonstrated that optimal income tax expressions can be written
more generally to allow for cases where it is indeed suboptimal to eliminate between-
group inequality in the average net smvi. In these cases the equity considerations in
the numerator of optimal tax expressions are composed of both between-group and
within-group terms. Further, if one employs preferences with a constant labour elas-
ticity (see Atkinson, 1990; Saez, 2001) it is also possible to derive analytical results
for the conditions under which between-group inequality will persist under the flat tax
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optimum. Specifically, in the special case where taxation is purely redistributive the
optimal flat tax will fall below that required to eliminate inequality in the average
smvi whenever the unable subpopulation exceeds a critical level. How these optimal
tax expressions change when categorical transfers are administered with classification
errors - and thus where it may not be possible to eliminate inequality in the average
net smvi - warrants investigation.
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Appendix A Linear Income Taxation
Proof of Result 1
From the optimisation problem described in (3.2), the first-order conditions (henceforth
FOCs) characterising the optimal benefits Bˆ and Cˆ are:
(B) : θux
(
Bˆ + Cˆ, 1
)
+ (1− θ)s¯
(
tˆ, Bˆ, λˆ
)
≤ λˆ ; Bˆ ≥ 0 (A.1)
(C) : ux
(
Bˆ + Cˆ, 1
)
≤ λˆ ; Cˆ ≥ 0 (A.2)
where the pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
We test the following two hyotheses:
(i) Bˆ > 0 , Cˆ = 0 (Pure Universal System)
Setting Cˆ = 0 in both (A.1) and (A.2) gives:
θux(B, 1) + (1− θ)s¯(t, B, λ) = λ
ux(C, 1) ≤ λ
Taken together, these equations imply that s¯(t, B, λ) ≥ ux(B, 1). This is clearly a
contradiction because the average net social marginal value of income (smvi) of the
able cannot exceed that of the unable when receiving the same benefit income. The
assertion that Cˆ = 0 is therefore false and it must instead hold that Cˆ > 0.
(ii) Bˆ = 0, Cˆ > 0 (Pure Targeted System)
Alternatively, setting Bˆ = 0 in the FOCs in (A.1) and (A.2) gives:
θux(C, 1) + (1− θ)s¯(t, 0, λ) ≤ λ
ux(C, 1) = λ
Combining these equations gives the condition:
s¯(t, 0, λ) ≤ ux(C, 1) (A.3)
This simply states that it will not be optimal to provide a universal benefit if, at
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the optimum, categorical spending does not eliminate between-group inequality in the
average net smvi. Intuitively, it is optimal to expend resources on the most needy in
society, and this is the unable so long as the aforementioned between-group inequality
persists.
The FOC for the interior tax rate optimum is given by:
(t) :
∫ ∞
0
{
−nvω + λˆ
〈
y∗ − tˆ · ∂y
∗
∂(1− t)
〉}
f(n)dn = 0 (A.4)
where ∂y∗/∂(1− t) = n2H∗ω. Note that because y∗ = 0 ∀ n ≤ n¯ we could equivalently
use n¯ as the lower integral limit.
By standard methods (Atkinson and Stiglitz, 1980) we use Roy’s identity (vω =
vM(y
∗/n)) and the Slutsky-Hicks equation 14 ( ∂y
∗
∂(1−t) =
∂yc
∂(1−t) + y
∗
My
∗) to write (A.4)
as: ∫ ∞
0
y∗
(
1− s
λˆ
)
f(n)dn = tˆ
∫ ∞
0
∂yc
∂(1− t)f(n)dn
Letting Ec = (1− t)
y
∂yc
∂(1− t) be the compensated elasticity of earnings with respect to
14The expenditure minimisation problem is:
min
x,y
x− y(1− t) s.t. u(x, 1− y/n)
yielding the FOCs:
(x) : 1− γux = 0
(y) : − (1− t) + γul/n = 0
(γ) : u− u¯ = 0
Let xc(n, 1 − t, u¯) , yc(n, 1 − t, u) and γc(n, 1 − t, γ) denote the optimal ‘compensated’ choices and
further, let the expenditure function be E(n, 1− t, u¯) = xc − yc(1− t). By the envelope theorem:
∂E
∂(1− t) =
∂xc
∂(1− t) (1− γ
cux) +
∂yc
∂(1− t)
[
−(1− t) + γcul
n
]
− yc − ∂γ
c
∂(1− t) (u− u¯) = −y
c
Next, differentiating the identity yc(n, 1− t, u¯) ≡ y∗ (n, 1− t, E(n, 1− t, u¯)) w.r.t. (1− t) gives:
∂yc
∂(1− t) =
∂y∗
∂(1− t) +
∂y∗
∂M
∂E
∂(1− t) =
∂y∗
∂(1− t) − y
∗ ∂y
∗
∂M
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the net of tax rate we obtain:
tˆ
1− tˆ =
∫∞
0
y∗
(
λˆ− s
)
f(n)dn
λˆ
∫∞
0
yEcf(n)dn (A.5)
The numerator will reduce to the negative of the covariance between gross earnings
(y∗) and the net smvi (s) only if λˆ = s¯, and thus if between-group inequality in the
average net smvi is eliminated through categorical spending at the optimum. Indeed,
to see this note that if λˆ = s¯ then
∫
y∗(λˆ− s)f(n)dn = ∫ y∗f(n)dn · s¯− ∫ y∗sf(n)dn =
y¯∗s¯− ∫ y∗sf(n)dn = −Cov(y∗, s).
Letting δ = (λ − s¯) denote between-group inequality in the average net smvi and
r = y∗/y¯∗ relative income; the numerator of (A.5) can be written as:∫ ∞
0
y∗(λˆ− s)f(n)dn =
∫ ∞
0
y∗
[
(λˆ− s¯) + s¯
(
1− s
s¯
)]
f(n)dn
= δy¯∗ + s¯
∫ ∞
0
y∗
(
1− s
s¯
)
f(n)dn
= δy¯∗ + s¯
{∫ ∞
0
y∗f(n)dn
∫ ∞
0
(s
s¯
)
f(n)dn−
∫ ∞
0
y∗
(s
s¯
)
f(n)dn
}
= δy¯∗ +
{∫ ∞
0
y∗f(n)dn
∫ ∞
0
sf(n)dn−
∫ ∞
0
y∗sf(n)dn
}
= δy¯ − Cov(y∗, s) (A.6)
Substituting (A.6) into the optimal tax expression in (A.5) and then dividing both
the numerator and denominator by y¯ gives the optimal tax expression in the main
text.
Appendix B Piecewise Linear Income Taxation
Properties of Preferences
Suppose preferences are of the form U(x, y/n) = u[x − g(y/n)] ; where u′ > 0 ,
u′′ < 0 ; g′ > 0 and g′′ > 0. This is simply a concave transformation of quasi-linear
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preferences.15 Let the function x(y) satisfy the indifference condition U(x(y), y/n) = u¯.
Differentiating this expression with respect to y yields x′(y) = g′(y/n)/n > 0 and
x′′(y) = g′′(y/n)/n2 > 0, such that indifference curves in (y, x) space are convex-
increasing in y. From this it immediately follows that:
dx′(y)
dn
=
−
(y
n
)
g′′
(y
n
)
− g′
(y
n
)
n2
< 0 (B.1)
such the slope of indifference curves in (y, x)-space is decreasing in n. This is illustrated
in Figure (3.2) in the main text.
Given the piecewise tax system described in (3.9) in the main text, it follows from
(B.1) that there will be (i) a critical productivity n˜(1 − t1, Y ) at which an individual
facing the marginal tax rate t1 has an optimal unconstrained gross earnings of Y ; and
(ii) a critical productivity ˜˜n(1− t2, Y ) at which an individual facing the marginal tax
rate t2 has optimal unconstrained earnings of Y . Formally:
n˜(1− t1) = g′
(
Y
n˜
)
; ˜˜n(1− t2) = g′
(
Y
˜˜n
)
Differentiating w.r.t. the net of tax rates gives:
∂n˜
∂(1− t1) =
−(n˜)2
(1− t1)n˜+ g′′(Y/n˜) · (Y/n˜) < 0
∂ ˜˜n
∂(1− t2) =
−(˜˜n)2
(1− t2)˜˜n+ g′′(Y/˜˜n) · (Y/˜˜n)
< 0
(B.2)
Alternatively, differentiating w.r.t. the earnings threshold Y gives:
∂n˜
∂Y
=
g′′(Y/n˜)
(1− t1)n˜+ g′′(Y/n˜) · (Y/n˜) > 0
∂ ˜˜n
∂Y
=
g′′(Y/˜˜n)
(1− t2)˜˜n+ g′′(Y/˜˜n) · (Y/˜˜n)
> 0
(B.3)
15Alternatively, we could write U(x, l) = u[x− g(1− l)]. It is straightforward to verify that:
Ul = u
′ · αg′ > 0 , Ull = u′′ · [αg′(1− l)]2 − u′αg′(1− l) < 0
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Properties of indirect utility. Substituting the optimal earnings function y∗ (as
defined in (3.12) in the main text) into preferences gives the indirect utility function
v(n, 1− t1, 1− t2, Y,M). Differentiating v w.r.t. the net of tax rates and the earnings
threshold thus gives:
∂v
∂(1− t1) =

u′ ·
〈
y∗ + ∂y
∗
∂(1−t1) [(1− t1)− g′(y∗/n)/n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
〉
= u′y∗ : n ∈ (0, n˜]
u′ · Y : n ∈ (n˜,∞)
whilst
∂v
∂(1− t2) =

0 : n ∈ (0, ˜˜n]
u′ ·
〈
(y∗ − Y ) + ∂y∗
∂(1−t2) [(1− t2)− g′/n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
〉
= u′(y∗ − Y ) : n ∈ (˜˜n,∞)
and finally:
∂v
∂Y
=

0 : n ∈ (0, n˜)
u′ · [(1− t1)− g′(Y/n)/n] > 0 : n ∈ (n˜, ˜˜n)
u′
〈
(t2 − t1) + ∂y∂Y [(1− t2)− g′/n]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
〉
= u′(t2 − t1) : n ∈ (˜˜n,∞)
Given that vM = u
′ it follows that ∂v/∂(1− t1) = vM min(y∗, Y ) ∀n; whilst ∂v/∂(1−
t2) = vM(y
∗ − Y ) ∀ n ∈ (˜˜n,∞).
Proof of Result 2
Optimal benefits (Bˆ, Cˆ). The FOCs characterising the optimal benefit levels are:
(B) : θu′
(
Bˆ + Cˆ
)
+ (1− θ)s¯
(
tˆ1, tˆ2, Yˆ , Bˆ
)
≤ λˆ ; Bˆ ≥ 0 (B.4)
(C) : u′
(
Bˆ + Cˆ
)
≤ λˆ ; Cˆ ≥ 0 (B.5)
CHAPTER 3. INCOME TAXATION AND CATEGORICAL TRANSFERS 214
where the pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Suppose that Cˆ = 0
but Bˆ > 0: then (B.4) and (B.5) together imply that u′(B) = s¯(t1, t2, Y, B) which is a
contradiction given that the smvi is falling in n. It must therefore hold that Cˆ > 0 at
the optimum.
Optimal lower tax rate (tˆ1). The FOC characterising the optimal lower tax rate
(t1) is
16:
(t1) :
∫ ∞
0
− ∂v
∂(1− t1)f(n)dn+ λˆ
〈∫ n˜
0
[
y∗ − tˆ1 ∂y
∗
∂(1− t1)
]
f(n)dn+ Yˆ [1− F (n˜)]
〉
= 0
where the only individuals who adjust their labour supply in response to an increase t1
are those with n ∈ (0, n˜]. Taking this into account and using the fact that ∂v/∂(1−t1) =
vM min(y, Y ) ∀ n we can write this as:∫ n˜
0
y
(
1− vM
λ
)
f(n)dn+
∫ ∞
n˜
Yˆ
(
1− vM
λˆ
)
f(n)dn = tˆ1
∫ n˜ ∂y∗
∂(1− t1)f(n)dn
Letting Ei = (1− ti)
y∗
∂y∗
∂(1− ti) i ∈ {1, 2} we obtain:
tˆ1
1− tˆ1
=
∫ n˜
y∗
(
λˆ− vM
)
f(n)dn+
∫∞
n˜
Y
(
λˆ− vM
)
f(n)dn
λˆ
∫ n˜
y∗E1f(n)dn
(B.6)
=
∫ n˜
(y∗ − Y )
(
λˆ− vM
)
f(n)dn+
∫
Y
(
λˆ− vM
)
f(n)dn
λˆ
∫ n˜
y∗E1f(n)dn
=
Y (λ− s¯) + ∫ n˜(y∗ − Y ) (λ− s)f(n)dn)
λˆ
∫ n˜
y∗E1f(n)dn
=
δY +
∫ n˜
(Y − y∗)
(
s− λˆ
)
f(n)dn
λˆ
∫ n˜
y∗E1f(n)dn
(B.7)
where to progress from (B.6) to (B.7) we simply added and subtracted
∫ n˜
Y (λˆ −
vM)f(n)dn and then subsequently used the definitions s = vM and s¯ =
∫
sf(n)dn.
16In the unidimensional model where individuals differ only in their underlying productivity, Apps
et al (2013) add and subtract
∫ n˜
Y (λ−s) and use the property that λ = s¯ at the optimum. Of course,
in our setting with categorical transfers this may not be the case.
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Optimal upper tax rate (tˆ2). Next, the FOC charactering the upper bracket tax
rate (t2) is:
(t2) :
∫ ∞
˜˜n
− ∂v
∂(1− t2) + λˆ
〈(
y∗ − Yˆ
)
− tˆ2 ∂y
∗
∂(1− t2)
〉
f(n)dn = 0 (B.8)
where of course ∂y∗/∂(1 − t2) = 0 ∀n ∈ (0, ˜˜n). Using the fact that ∂v/∂(1 − t2) =
vM(y − Y ) this becomes;∫ ∞
˜˜n
(
y∗ − Yˆ
)(
1− vM
λˆ
)
f(n)dn = tˆ2
∫ ∞
˜˜n
∂y
∂(1− t2)f(n)dn (B.9)
From which we obtain:
tˆ2
1− tˆ2
=
∫∞
˜˜n
(
y − Yˆ
)(
λˆ− vM
)
f(n)dn
λˆ
∫∞
˜˜n
yE2f(n)dn
(B.10)
Optimal earnings threshold (Yˆ ). Finally, the FOC with respect to the earnings
threshold (Y ) is:
(Y ) :
∫ ∞
n˜
∂v
∂Y
f(n)dn+ λˆ
〈
tˆ1[1− F (n˜)] + tˆ2[1− F (˜˜n)]
〉
(B.11)
Using the fact that ∂v/∂Y = −(t2 − t1)vM ∀n ∈ [˜˜n,∞) this becomes:
∫ ˜˜n
n˜
∂v
∂Y
f(n)dn+ (tˆ2 − tˆ1)
∫ ∞
˜˜n
vMf(n)dn = λˆ
{
(tˆ2 − tˆ1) + tˆ1F (n˜)− tˆ2F (˜˜n)
}
⇒
∫ ˜˜n
n˜
∂v
∂Y
f(n)dn+ (tˆ2 − tˆ1)
∫ ∞
˜˜n
(vM − λˆ)f(n)dn = λˆtˆ1
[
F (n˜)− F (˜˜n)]
and thus:
∫ ˜˜n
n˜
(
∂v
∂Y
+ λˆtˆ1
)
f(n)dn = (tˆ2 − tˆ1)
∫ ∞
˜˜n
(λˆ− vM)f(n)dn (B.12)
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Appendix C Numerical Simulations with Isoelastic
Preferences
Properties of preferences with constant labour elasticity
Under the isoelastic preferences u(x,H) = log[x − αH1+k/(1 + k)] specified in (3.21)
in the main text, the optimal labour supply function is defined as:
H∗ = arg max
H∈[0,1]
log
(
nH(1− t) +M − αH
1+k
1 + k
)
This yields the explicit labour supply and optimal earnings functions:
H∗[n(1− t)] =
[
n(1− t)
α
] 1
k
y∗(n, 1− t) = nH∗ = α− 1k (1− t) 1kn 1+kk (C.1)
from which we can immediately see that
∂y∗
∂n
> 0 and
∂y∗
∂(1− t) > 0. We can also
directly establish from (C.1) that the indirect utility function is given by:
v(n, 1− t,M) = log
[
(1− t)y∗ +M − α(y
∗/n)1+k
1 + k
]
= log
[
n
1+k
k (1− t) 1kα− 1k
(
k
1 + k
)
+M
] (C.2)
Agent Monotonicity. Let the function x(y) satisfy the indifference condition u (x(y), y/n) =
u¯ and thus:
x(y) = eu¯ + α
(
(y/n)1+k
1 + k
)
⇒ x′(y) = α
(y
n
)k
/n
⇒ dx
′(y)
dn
= −α
(y
n
)k
(k + 1) /n < 0 (C.3)
So indifference curves in (y, x) space are (i) convex-increasing in y but (ii) flatter in n
(i.e. agent monotonicity).
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Piecewise Tax System. Consider a piecewise system with two tax rates t1 ≤ t2 and
earnings threshold Y generating an individual budget constraint:
x =
y(1− t1) +M : y ≤ YY (t2 − t1) + y(1− t2) +M : y > Y
Consider an individual facing the portion of the budget constraint for which y ≤
Y . From (C.1) and (C.3) it is straightforward to establish that there will be critical
productivity n˜ at which an individual will choose to earn exactly Y . Formally:
n˜ =
[
Y k
(
α
1− t1
)] 1
1+k
(C.4)
Next, consider an individual facing the upper part of the budget constraint with
marginal tax rate t2. Once more, from (C.1) and (C.3) we can establish that there
is a critical productivity ˜˜n at which an individual will choose to earn exactly Y . For-
mally:
˜˜n =
[
Y k
(
α
1− t2
)] 1
1+k
(C.5)
where for t1 < t2 : n˜ < ˜˜n.
Note that:
∂n˜
∂t1
> 0 ;
∂n˜
∂Y
> 0 ;
∂ ˜˜n
∂t2
> 0 ;
∂ ˜˜n
∂Y
> 0
Proof of Result 3
Optimal Tax Rate under pure targeting scheme (when R = 0). Under the isoe-
lastic preferences in (3.21) the optimisation problem in (3.23) can be written as:
max
t∈(0,1)
θ log
[(
1− θ
θ
)
t(1− t) 1kα− 1k
∫ ∞
0
n
1+k
k dF (n)
]
+ (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
log
[
(1− t) 1+kk α− 1k
(
k
1 + k
)
n
1+k
k
]
dF (n)
(C.6)
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This yields the FOC for the optimal tax rate (tˆc):
θ
[
(1− tˆc) 1k − ( 1k )tˆc(1− tˆc)
1−k
k
]
tˆc(1− tˆc) 1k
= (1− θ) (
1+k
k
)
(1− tˆc)
⇒ θ
[
1−
(
1
k
)
tˆc(1− tˆc)−1
]
= (1− θ)
(
1 + k
k
)
tˆc(1− tˆc)−1
⇒ θ
[
(1− tˆc)−
(
1
k
)
tc
]
= (1− θ)
(
1 + k
k
)
tˆc
and thus tˆc = θ(k/(1 + k)).
The critical tax rate tδ (when R = 0). When R = 0 the elimination of between-
group inequality in the average smvi requires:[(
1− θ
θ
)
tδ(1− tδ) 1kα− 1k
∫ ∞
0
n
1+k
k dF (n)
]−1
=
[
(1− tδ) 1+kk α− 1k
(
k
1 + k
)]−1
·
∫ ∞
0
n−
1+k
k dF (n)
and thus:
θ
(
k
1 + k
)
= tδ
[
(1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
n−
1+k
k dF (n)
∫ ∞
0
n
1+k
k dF (n) + θ
(
k
1 + k
)]
Simple manipulation then yields:
tδ = θ
[
(1− θ)
(
1 + k
k
)∫ ∞
0
n
1+k
k dF (n)
∫ ∞
0
n−
1+k
k dF (n) + θ
]−1
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c
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p
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=
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r
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p
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p
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c
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p
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c
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p
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i
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h
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e
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e
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d
e
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a
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,
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h
e
c
k
,
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,
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,
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,
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,
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,
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e
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n
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e
c
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R
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.
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.
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[
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]
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c
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p
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c
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c
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,
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,
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e
t
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1
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r
e
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e
t
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(
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]
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(
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y
p
d
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m
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n
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l
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(
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]
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[
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]
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[
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]
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p
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c
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]
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p
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[
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]
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[
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]
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2
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b
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p
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e
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’
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p
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b
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h
e
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’
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p
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’
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[
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]
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=
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=
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e
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r
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r
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r
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e
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c
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n
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p
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n
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p
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c
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p
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b
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b
e
t
w
e
e
n
z
e
r
o
a
n
d
o
n
e
;
(
i
i
)
t
h
e
u
p
p
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b
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h
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p
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b
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b
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e
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n
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p
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b
e
(
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i
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c
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p
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c
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Chapter 4
The Optimal Linear Income Tax
with Imperfectly Administered
Categorical Transfers
4.1 Introduction
When the linear income tax framework is augmented with categorical heterogeneity
that the planner can perfectly observe, there is a well-defined ordering of priorities be-
tween tax financed categorical transfers and a universal benefit (demogrant): net tax
revenue should be spent solely on categorical transfers up to the point that inequality in
the average social marginal value (smvi) across categorical groups is eliminated.1 Con-
ditional on it being optimal to raise enough tax revenue to achieve this, and there being
tax revenue left over, a universal benefit (demogrant) will be provided to all individuals
in society. The resulting optimal tax expression captures the equity-efficiency tradeoff
inherent in income taxation; with equity terms in the numerator and those of efficiency
in the denominator. In general, the equity considerations will be a function of both (i)
any between-group disparity in the average smvi; and (ii) the ‘within-group’ negative
of the covariance between individual earnings and their smvi. The efficiency consider-
ations, meanwhile, capture the aggregate (compensated) responsiveness of individual
1The result that categorical transfers should be set to eliminate inequality in the average smvi
between categorical groups is well-established (see Diamond and Sheshinski, 1995; Viard, 2001a)
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gross earnings to the tax rate.
In reality, however, the complexities of determining an individual’s categorical status
(e.g. disability or involuntary unemployment) mean that categorical benefits are likely
to be administered with both Type I (false rejection) and Type II (false award) clas-
sification errors.2 The extent to which these errors are made will affect the ordering
of priorities between categorical and universal benefits and, in turn, have implications
for the optimal tax rate. This chapter is concerned with the additional equity and
efficiency considerations that classification errors introduce into the optimal tax ex-
pression. For example, if an increase in the tax rate induces an additional ineligible
individual to apply for - and ultimately be awarded - a categorical benefit, this may
give rise to both (i) losses in tax revenue from this individual and (ii) additional welfare
expenditure costs.
This chapter considers an economy where a fraction of the population is unable to
work, whilst the remaining fraction is composed of individuals who are able to work
but differ continuously in their productivity. The government operates a three-part
tax-benefit system comprising (i) a constant marginal tax rate on all earned income;
(ii) a tax-free universal benefit received unconditionally by all individuals in society;
and (iii) a tax-free categorical benefit that is ex-ante conditional on an applicant being
unable to work and ex-post conditional on a recipient not working. The test awarding
the categorical benefit makes Type I and Type II classification errors. However, it
is assumed that the ex-post ‘no-work’ condition is fully enforced such that no able
individual who is awarded the benefit by Type II error will subsequently work. This
therefore restricts the able individuals who apply for the categorical benefit to those
of lower productivities.3 Moreover, the critical productivity at or below which an able
individual chooses to apply for the categorical benefit will be an increasing function of
the tax rate.
An increase in the tax rate will therefore generate both direct and indirect behavioural
responses that affect the government budget constraint. The direct effect is simply
that found in all conventional analyses: an increase in the tax rate induces individuals
2A growing empirical literature analyses the scope for Type II errors in the U.S. Social Security
Disability Insurance programme (see Autor and Duggan, 2003, 2006; Benitez-Silva et al., 2004; Chen
and van der Klaauw, 2008; Von Wachter et al., 2011).
3Applications for the categorical benefit are taken to be costless in terms of money, stigma and
time.
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to adjust their labour supply in the intensive margin. The indirect effect, meanwhile,
captures the fact that an increase in the tax rate will induce additional able individuals
to apply for the categorical benefit and, if awarded it, stop working and generating tax
revenue. This will also affect the expenditure side of the budget constraint because
more individuals receive the categorical benefit.
The key contributions of this chapter are (i) to provide an expression for the optimal
linear tax rate that captures the additional equity and efficiency considerations of
income taxation that arise with classification errors; and (ii) to numerically simulate
how the optimal tax rate (and benefit levels) changes with the propensity to make
classification errors of either type.
With regard to the optimal tax expression, an important consideration in both the
numerator (equity terms) and denominator (efficiency terms) becomes the elasticity of
the distribution function with respect to individual productivity, evaluated at the crit-
ical productivity at or below which able individuals choose to apply for the categorical
benefit. Type II errors generate conflicting effects in both the equity and efficiency
dimensions. In the equity dimension, Type II errors (i) mean that some able individ-
uals of low productivity - who the government would not wish to tax highly - receive
the categorical benefit and do not work, which acts to raise the tax rate; but also
(ii) redistribute within the able subpopulation through ‘leaking’ categorical transfers
to lower productivity individuals, which acts to lower the tax rate because there may
be less need to redistribute via the universal benefit. In the efficiency dimension (i)
Type II errors mean that some individuals of lower productivity do not work and thus
their response to taxation can be disregarded, therefore acting to increase the tax rate;
but (ii) the number of applications for the categorical benefit is, ceteris paribus, an
increasing function of the tax rate, and because the government must pay each new
recipient the categorical benefit in addition to losing tax revenue from this individual,
this acts to lower the tax rate.
Individual utility is throughout taken to be a concave transformation of quasilinear
preferences (linear in consumption and convex-decreasing in labour). The implications
of this assumption are that (i) there are are no income effects associated with a working
individual’s smvi; and (ii) the size of the universal benefit does not influence an able
individual’s decision to apply for the categorical benefit. This allows us to establish a
precise relationship between the average smvi of an able applicant for the categorical
CHAPTER 4. INCOME TAXATION, TRANSFERS AND ERRORS. 229
benefit and the shadow price of public expenditure, which in turn greatly assists in
interpreting the equity considerations in the optimal tax expression.
To gain comparative statics insights into how the optimal tax rate changes with the
propensity to make classification errors, we turn to numerical methods. Preferences
take a frequently employed isoelastic form (see Atkinson, 1990; Saez, 2001) that is
consistent with those adopted in the theoretical section of the chapter. Individual
productivity is lognormally distributed. This has been the distribution of choice for the
key studies of categorical transfers within the optimal income tax framework (Immonen
et al., 1998; Viard, 2001a). For varying values of the constant labour supply elasticity
the results all suggest that an increase in the propensity to make either error type
(i) increases the optimal tax rate; (ii) increases the optimal universal benefit; but (iii)
decreases the optimal categorical benefit. Welfare provision thus becomes increasingly
universal as the the discriminatory power of the test awarding the categorical benefit
decreases. As in the theory, however, the categorical benefit always remains positive
such that some form of targeting is always desirable.
Whilst a number of papers have analysed perfectly administered categorical transfers in
a variant of the standard linear income tax framework where individuals differ over both
a productivity continuum and some categorical attribute4, there has been little work
on imperfectly administered transfers in this setting. Indeed, the literature typically
restricts individual heterogeneity in the productivity dimension to two types (Jacquet,
2014; Stern, 1982). In this regard, the closest precursor to this chapter dates back to
Stern (1982), who compares social welfare under (i) imperfect lump-sum taxation5 and
a proportional income tax; with (ii) optimal non-linear income taxation. It is the first
case that is related to this chapter: individual earnings are taxed linearly at source and
the government can classify, albeit with error, individuals into ‘skilled’ and ‘unskilled’
groups. With no classification errors it may be optimal to impose a lump-sum tax on
skilled individuals to finance transfers to the unskilled, with the income tax set at zero.
However, a positive propensity to incorrectly classify the unskilled as skilled exposes
4See, for example, Viard (2001a,b).
5Whilst there is a clear distinction between categorical transfers and lump-sum transfers in the
general case where the categorical attribute (e.g. disability) is imperfectly correlated with ability,
it is also important to stress that the two converge in the extreme case where there is a perfect
correlation. This would arise, for example, in a simple two-type setting where disability status is
perfectly correlated with low ability. For a further discussion on the similarity between categorical
transfers and lump-sum transfers see Viard (2001a,b).
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the former to the risk of receiving a smaller and even negative transfer, which is welfare
reducing. Consequently, the linear income tax - which is independent of ‘categorical’
status and thus the same for both types - may rise to ensure transfers to the skilled
are sufficiently large. As in the current chapter, the numerical simulations in Stern
illustrate that the optimal linear income tax rate increases with the propensities to
misclassify either type of individual.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. Section 4.2 presents the model
and the main theoretical analysis. Section 4.3 then presents the numerical analysis.
Finally, Section 4.4 concludes the chapter.
4.2 The Model
4.2.1 Individuals
Let individual preferences over consumption (x ≥ 0) and labour (H ≥ 0) be represented
by the utility function:
U(x,H) = u (x− g(H)) (4.1)
where u′ > 0 ; u′′ < 0 and limx→0 u′ = +∞; whilst g′ > 0 ; g′′ > 0 and limH→0 g =
limH→0 g′ = 0. This last assumption simply ensures that there will always be an interior
optimum for H.6
An individual with net wage ω ≥ 0 and unearned income M ≥ 0 has an optimal labour
supply function H∗(ω) that satisfies ω ≡ g′(H∗). Notice that this is independent
of unearned income. By the assumptions placed on g, it follows directly that H∗ is
increasing in ω.7
We denote an individual’s indirect utility function by v(ω,M) ≡ u[ωH∗+M − g(H∗)].
It follows follows from the envelope theorem that vω = u
′H∗ and vM = u′, which in
turn implies vω = vMH
∗ (i.e. Roy’s identity). In addition, vωM = u′′H∗ < 0 such that
the marginal indirect utility of income is decreasing in the net wage.
6The implication is therefore that there will be no reservation wage.
7Differentiating both sides of ω = g′(H∗) w.r.t. ω gives dH∗(ω)/dω = [g′′(H∗)]−1 > 0.
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With this by way of background we proceed to define the population and tax-benefit
system in place.
4.2.2 The Population and Tax-Benefit System
Consider an economy of size 1 where a fraction θ ∈ (0, 1) of the population face a
zero quantity constraint on labour supply and are thus unable to work. The remaining
(1−θ) individuals are able to work but differ in their underlying productivity, n ; where
n ∈ (0,∞) is continuously distributed with density function f(n) and distribution
function F (n).
The government operates a three-part tax-benefit system comprising (i) a constant
marginal tax rate t ∈ (0, 1) on all earned income; (ii) a tax-free universal benefit
B ≥ 0 that is received unconditionally by all individuals in society; and (iii) a tax-free
categorical benefit C ≥ 0 that is ex-ante conditioned on applicants being unable to work
and ex-post conditioned on recipients not working. Applications for the categorical
benefit are taken to be costless in terms of money, time and stigma. The test awarding
the benefit makes Type I (false rejection) and Type II (false award) classification
errors with probabilities pI and pII , respectively. We assume that pI + pII ≤ 1, which
guarantees that the test is never more likely to award the categorical benefit to an able
applicant than an unable applicant.
Enforcement and the critical application productivity. In what follows, we
assume that the ex-post no-work condition is fully enforced such that no able individual
who is incorrectly awarded C by Type II error ever chooses to work. The implication
is that only those of sufficiently low productivity will choose to apply for C. With this
in mind, let the critical productivity n¯(1− t, C) satisfy u(B+C) ≡ v[n¯ · (1− t), B] and
thus:
C = n¯(1− t)H∗ (n¯(1− t))− g [H∗ (n¯(1− t))] (4.2)
It follows that all able individuals with n ∈ [0, n¯] will choose to apply for C; whilst
those with n ∈ (n¯,∞) will not apply because the opportunity cost of not working is
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Figure 4.1: The Critical Productivity n¯(1− t, C)
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Notes. This figure illustrates how the critical productivity n¯ changes with both the tax rate (left
subplot) and the categorical benefit size (right subplot).
too high8. Differentiating (4.2) with respect to (1− t) and C, respectively, yields:
∂n¯
∂(1− t) = −
n¯
1− t < 0 ;
∂2n¯
∂(1− t)2 =
2n¯
(1− t) > 0 . (4.3)
and
∂n¯
∂C
=
1
(1− t)H∗ > 0 ;
∂2n¯
∂C2
= − 1
(1− t)g′′(H∗) · (H∗)3 < 0 (4.4)
A marginal increase in either t or C thus increases the critical productivity at or below
which an able individual chooses to apply for C and, if awarded it, stop working (see
Figure 4.1).
Aggregate gross earnings and the tax tate. Let aggregate gross earnings over
the able subpopulation be given by the composite function:
Z (1− t, n¯; θ, pII) = (1− θ)
{∫ ∞
0
y(n, 1− t)dF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
y(n, 1− t)dF (n)
}
(4.5)
8We assume that at the point of indifference an able individual will choose to apply for C.
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where y(n, 1 − t) denotes individual optimal gross earnings. The direct and indirect
effects of an increase in the net-of-tax rate are given by, respectively:
∂Z
∂(1− t) = (1− θ)
(∫ ∞
0
∂y
∂(1− t)dF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
∂y
∂(1− t)dF (n)
)
> 0 , (4.6)
∂Z
∂n¯
· ∂n¯
∂(1− t) = (1− θ)F (n¯)pIIEf (n¯)y|n=n¯(1− t)
−1 > 0 . (4.7)
where Ef (n) ≡ nf(n)/F (n) is the elasticity of the distribution function with respect
to individual productivity.
The direct effect of an increase in the net-of-tax rate is simply that found in all con-
ventional analyses: it captures the aggregate intensive margin response of working
individuals to the increased work incentives, holding constant the critical productivity
n¯. Meanwhile, the indirect effect of an increase in the net-of-tax rate is captured by
the fact that n¯ falls with the net-of-tax rate, and thus so too do the number of ap-
plicants for the categorical benefit. This increases the number of working individuals
in the economy. Notice that the size of the indirect effect depends on the elastic-
ity of the distribution function with respect to individual productivity, evaluated at
the critical productivity n¯. Both direct and indirect effects act to increase aggregate
earnings.
Government Budget Constraint. The government budget constraint is given
by:
B + χ (t, C; θ, pI , pII) · C ≤ t · Z (1− t, n¯; θ, pII)−R (4.8)
where χ ≡ θ(1 − pI) + (1− θ)F (n¯)pII denotes the number of categorical recipients in
the economy, whilst R ≥ 0 is an exogenous revenue requirement for spending outside
of welfare. One can readily establish that:
∂χ
∂t
= (1− θ)F (n¯)pIIEf (n¯)(1− t)−1 > 0 (4.9)
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Intuitively, a ceteris paribus increase in the tax rate reduces the gain to working and,
consequently, incentivises additional able individuals to apply for the categorical ben-
efit. The size of this effect is increasing in the elasticity of the distribution function
with respect to individual productivity, evaluated at the critical productivity n¯.
Let CF (t, B; θ, pI , pII , R) be the value of the categorical benefit that exhausts the bud-
get constraint for any pair (t, B) and exogenous parameters (θ, pI , pII , R). Formally,
CF is defined by:
t · Z [1− t, n¯(1− t, CF ); θ, pII ]− χ(t, CF ; θ, pI , pII) · CF ≡ (B +R) (4.10)
Written in this way, we can see that the left side is unambiguously decreasing in
C (because ∂Z/∂C < 0, ∂χ/∂C > 0), whilst the right side is independent of C.
Differentiating (4.10) with respect to t gives:
∂CF
∂t
=
Z − t
(
∂Z
∂(1− t) +
∂Z
∂n¯
∂n¯
∂(1− t)
)
− ∂χ
∂t
CF
∂χ
∂C
CF + χ− t∂Z
∂n¯
∂n¯
∂C
=
Z − t ∂Z
∂(1− t) − (1− θ)F (n¯)pIIEf (n¯)(ty|n=n¯ + CF )/(1− t)
χ+ (1− θ)pIIf(n¯) ∂n¯
∂C
(CF + ty|n=n¯)
(4.11)
The numerator in (4.11) captures the effect of an increase in the tax rate on the benefit
budget, holding constant the categorical benefit size. The first term, Z, captures the
effect of an increase in the tax rate on tax revenue in the absence of any behavioural
responses. Were this the only term it would unambiguously be the case that ∂CF/∂t >
0. There are of course behavioural responses and these are captured by the remaining
terms. The second term is the negative of the direct effect in (4.6). It thus corresponds
to the reduction in aggregate earnings caused by individuals reducing their labour time
in the intensive margin. The third term captures the fact that n¯ increases with the
tax rate, and thus so too do the number of categorical applicants (and recipients) from
the able subpopulation. As discussed in both (4.7) and (4.9), this results in both (i)
CHAPTER 4. INCOME TAXATION, TRANSFERS AND ERRORS. 235
a loss in tax revenue as individuals who previously worked now do not; and (ii) the
expenditure cost of paying the categorical benefit to the new recipients. Overall, the
sign of the numerator - and in turn the sign of ∂CF/∂t - will depend on whether or
not any rise in tax revenue generated by the increase in t is offset by the additional
benefit expenditure costs it induces.
The denominator in (4.11) captures the effect of an increase in the categorical benefit
on the benefit budget. It is unambiguously positive. An increase in the categorical
benefit requires paying all existing categorical recipients a higher benefit level. This
in turn incentivises additional individuals to apply, which generates both (i) a loss in
tax revenue as individuals who previously worked now do not; and (ii) the expenditure
cost of paying new recipients the categorical benefit. The extent to which CF changes
with the tax rate (for a given B) will be decreasing in both the number of existing
recipients; and the size of tax revenue effects and expenditure effects associated with
new applicants.
Notice that differentiating (4.10) with respect to B yields:
∂CF
∂B
= −
[
χ+ (1− θ)pIIf(n¯) ∂n¯
∂C
(ty|n=n¯ + CF )
]−1
< 0 (4.12)
This is simply the negative of the denominator in (4.11). Unsurprisingly, an increase
in B necessarily lowers CF because there are less resources to spend on categorical
transfers.
In all that follows we assume that ∂CF/∂B < −1, which requires:
(1− χ) > (1− θ)pIIf(n¯) ∂n¯
∂C
(ty|n=n¯ + CF )
The implication is that the total benefit income of categorical recipients will fall with
an increase in the universal benefit.
Laffer Rate. The revenue maximising (or ‘Laffer’) tax rate is defined as:
tL(B; θ, pI , pII , R) = Arg max
t∈(0,1)
t · Z [1− t, n¯ (1− t, CF ) ; θ, pII ] (4.13)
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Notice that whilst individual earnings are not directly affected by the level of B, the
categorical benefit size CF is. Because a ceteris paribus increase in B lowers CF it
will increase the number of able individuals who work (through lowering the number
that apply for the categorical benefit). The revenue maximising tax rate will therefore
depend on B.
The resulting first-order-condition (henceforth FOC) characterising tL yields:
tL = Z
[
∂Z
∂(1− t) −
∂Z
∂n¯
(
∂n¯
∂C
· ∂CF
∂t
− ∂n¯
∂(1− t)
)]−1
(4.14)
Dividing both sides (1−t) allows us to write the expression in terms of elasticities.
tL
1− tL =
{[
(1− t)
Z
· ∂Z
∂(1− t)
]
+
[(
n¯
Z
· ∂Z
∂n¯
)
·
(
(1− t)
n¯
· dn¯(1− t, CF )
d(1− t)
)]}−1
(4.15)
The first term within curly braces is the partial elasticity of aggregate earnings with
respect to the net-of-tax rate. It captures the aggregate responsiveness of earnings in
the intensive margin to an increase in the net-of-tax rate. In all that subsequently
follows we will denote this by EZ ≡ (1 − t)Z−1∂Z/∂(1 − t).9 The second term within
curly braces, meanwhile, is the product of two elasticities. The first of these is the
elasticity of aggregate earnings with respect to the critical productivity n¯. The second,
meanwhile, is the elasticity of this critical productivity with respect to the net-of-tax
rate. Intuitively, larger values of the aforementioned elasticities imply a lower revenue
maximising tax rate.
4.2.3 The Optimisation Problem
Let the social welfare function be strictly utilitarian and given by:
9Notice that if pII = 0 the first-order-condition characterising the Laffer Rate would simply be
Z − tL∂Z/∂(1− t) = 0, thus giving rise to the familiar expression (Saez, 2001):
tL
1− tL =
1
EZ
.
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W (t, B, C; θ, pI , pII) = θ [(1− pI)u(B + C) + pIu(B)]
+ (1− θ)

∫∞
0
v[n(1− t), B]f(n)dn
+pII
∫ n¯
0
〈u(B + C)− v[n(1− t), B]〉f(n)dn

(4.16)
The first line is the average welfare of an unable individual - accounting for the fact
that with probability pI they are incorrectly denied the categorical benefit - weighted
by their population share. The second line, meanwhile, is the average welfare of unable
individuals multiplied by their population share. The first term within curly braces is
the average welfare of able individuals in the case that all receive the universal benefit,
whilst the second term captures the welfare gain to able individuals who are awarded
the categorical benefit with probability pII .
Given the government’s budget constraint described in (4.8), the optimisation problem
is therefore:
max
{t,B,C}
W (t, B, C; θ, pI , pII)
s.t. B + χ(t, C; θ, pI , pII) · C = t · Z [t, n¯(1− t, C); θ, pII ]−R ,
t ∈ (0, 1) , B ≥ 0 , C ≥ 0
(4.17)
In what follows we let tˆ, Bˆ and Cˆ denote the optimal choices resulting from (4.17). In
addition, λˆ will denote the shadow price of public expenditure at the optimum. To save
on notation, we will henceforth denote the aggregate smvi of non-categorical recipients
by:
σ(t, B, C) = θpIu
′(B) + (1− θ)
[∫ ∞
0
vMdF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
vMdF (n)
]
(4.18)
The solution to the optimisation problem in (4.17) is characterised in the below re-
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sult.10
Result 1:
(i) Cˆ > 0 ∀ pI + pII ≤ 1 and Bˆ ≥ 0 are characterised by:
σ
(
tˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ
)
≤ u′
(
Bˆ + Cˆ
)
χ · −
[
1 +
∂CF (tˆ, Bˆ; ·)
∂B
]
︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
; Bˆ ≥ 0 (4.19)
where the pair of inequalities hold with complementary slackness.
(ii) λˆ < u′(Bˆ + Cˆ) = vM [n¯(1− tˆ), Bˆ] and so:
vM [n(1− tˆ), Bˆ] > λˆ ∀ n ∈ (0, n¯] (4.20)
(iii) tˆ ∈ (0, 1) is implicitly defined by:
tˆ
1− tˆ =
[∫∞
0
y
(
λˆ− vM
)
dF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
y
(
λˆ− vM
)
dF (n)
]
− F (n¯)pII λˆEf (n¯)Cˆ
λˆ
[
Z¯EZ + F (n¯)pIIEf
(
y|n=n¯ + Cˆ
)]
(4.21)
where Z¯ = Z/(1− θ) denotes average gross earnings over the able subpopulation.
Proof: See Appendix
Corollary 1: If pI > 0 then Bˆ > 0 by the property limx→0 u′ = +∞ and, consequently,
(4.19) holds with equality.
Result 1 is composed of three related parts, culminating with the optimal tax expression
in part (iii). We proceed to discuss each in turn.
Result 1(i) states that a categorical benefit should be provided at all levels of discrim-
inatory power11, whilst the optimality condition in (4.19) characterises the conditions
under which it is optimal to provide a universal benefit. The left side of (4.19) is the
aggregate smvi of individuals who do not receive the categorical benefit, as composed
of both unable and able individuals. This captures the aggregate welfare gain to these
10In line with the discussion of the Full Enforcement regime in Chapter 2, we cannot in general
guarantee a unique solution to this optimisation problem. However, in the numerical analysis which
follows welfare is always concave and, consequently, no problems of multiple optima arise.
11Therefore including the case of no discriminatory power where pI + pII = 1.
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individuals from an increase in the universal benefit. The right side, meanwhile is the
aggregate smvi of categorical recipients multiplied by the negative of the total change
in their benefit income associated with an increase in the universal benefit. Given our
assumption that ∂CF/∂B < −1, an increase in the universal benefit acts to reduce
the total benefit income of categorical recipients. The right side therefore captures
the aggregate welfare gain to categorical recipients associated with a reduction in the
universal benefit. The complementary slackness condition implies that it will only be
optimal to provide a positive universal benefit if the left side of (4.19) exceeds the right
side, when evaluated at B = 0. As stated in Corollary 1, this is guaranteed to hold
whenever the propensity to make Type I errors is positive because unable individuals
would otherwise have zero income to consume.
A direct implication of (4.19) is that:
u′
(
Bˆ + Cˆ
)
> σ
(
tˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ
)
/(1− χ) (4.22)
I.e. at the optimum the smvi of categorical recipients will exceed the average smvi of
non-categorical recipients. This arises because:
χ ·−
[
1 +
∂CF (tˆ, Bˆ; ·)
∂B
]
= (1−χ) ·
[
1− (1− θ)pIIf(n¯) ∂n¯∂C (ty|n=n¯ + CF ) /(1− χ)
1 + (1− θ)pIIf(n¯) ∂n¯∂C (ty|n=n¯ + CF ) /χ
]
< 1
Result 1(ii) states that at the optimum the smvi of an able applicant for the categorical
benefit exceeds the shadow price of public expenditure. The reason for including this
as part of the main result is that it assists us in interpreting the optimal tax expression
in Result 1(iii), which we turn to discuss now.
Result 1(iii) provides an implicit expression for the optimal tax rate, as given by (4.21).
As is standard, the implicit expression characterising the optimal tax rate has equity
considerations in the numerator and efficiency considerations in the denominator. We
start by discussing the numerator. The two terms inside square braces are aggregates
of y(λˆ − vM): i.e. the difference between the shadow price of public expenditure and
an individual’s smvi, weighted by gross earnings. The first term is the aggregate (or in
this case average) of y(λˆ − vM) over the entire able subpopulation; whilst the second
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term - which enters negatively - is the aggregate of y(λˆ − vM) over able applicants.
From (4.20) we know that this aggregate must itself be must be negative because the
smvi of each able applicant exceeds the shadow price of public expenditure at the
optimum. This second term therefore acts to increase the tax rate because those who
the government would not wish to tax highly are - due to Type II error - receiving the
categorical transfer and not working. However, a further equity implication of Type
II errors on the tax rate is that ‘leaked’ categorical transfers do play a redistributive
role within the able subpopulation, which may lessen the need to employ higher tax
rates to redistribute through the more expensive universal transfer. This is captured
by the third term outside square brackets, which acts to lower the tax rate. Notice that
the size of this third term is an increasing function of the elasticity of the distribution
function with respect to individual productivity, evaluated at n¯ (i.e. Ef ).
We now turn to discuss the efficiency considerations in the denominator of (4.21). The
first term within square brackets (i.e. Z¯EZ) is the partial elasticity of aggregate gross
earnings with respect to the net-of-tax rate, weighted by average gross earnings over the
able subpopulation. Recall that this elasticity captures the responsiveness of individual
earnings in the intensive margin to the net-of-tax rate, holding constant the number
of applicants for the categorical benefit. This consideration is present in all standard
optimal tax expressions.12 Ceteris paribus, higher values of this elasticity act to lower
the optimal tax rate. Notice also that a ceteris paribus increase in pII will act to reduce
this term because fewer lower productivity individuals work and respond to the tax rate.
The second and final term within square brackets (i.e. F (n¯)pIIEf (y|n=n¯ +C)) captures
the fact that a marginal increase in the tax rate increases n¯ and thus the number
of applicants for the categorical benefit. This in turn generates the dual efficiency
considerations of (i) foregone tax revenue from individuals who previously worked but
12Note that there a number of equivalent notational conventions in the literature to capture efficiency
considerations. Specifically, the first term in the denominator of (4.21) will often appear in terms of
individual elasticities. To see that this is equivalent to the formulation here, which draws from Piketty
and Saez (2012), note that:
Z¯EZ = Z
(1− θ)
(
1− t
Z
· ∂Z
∂(1− t)
)
= (1− t)
[∫ ∞
0
∂y
∂(1− t)dF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
∂y
∂(1− t)dF (n)
]
=
∫ ∞
0
yEydF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
yEydF (n)
where Ey ≡ (1 − t)y−1∂y∂(1 − t) is the elasticity of individual gross earnings with respect to the
net-of-tax rate.
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now receive the categorical benefit by Type II error; and (ii) the expenditure effect of
paying each new recipient the categorical benefit. Notice that the size of this effect is
increasing in the gross earnings of the marginal n¯ individual; the categorical benefit size;
and the elasticity of the distribution function with respect to individual productivity,
evaluated at n¯. Higher values of any of these these considerations act to lower the
optimal tax rate.
4.2.4 Between-group inequality in the average smvi
By way of background, in the case where categorical transfers are perfectly targeted
at the unable it will only be optimal to provide a universal benefit if inequality in
the average smvi between the unable and able subpopulations is eliminated through
categorical spending and there are resources left over. However, as illustrated in Result
1(i) and Corollary 1, the conditions under which it is optimal to provide a universal
benefit change with classification errors. In particular, Type I errors guarantee the
provision of a universal benefit. The purpose of this section is to also demonstrate that
whenever classification errors are made inequality in the average smvi will remain at
the optimum.
Formally, let inequality in the average smvi between the unable and able subpopulations
be given by:
δ = [(1− pI)u′(B + C) + pIu′(B)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
average smvi (unable)
−
−
{∫ ∞
0
vMdF (n) + pII
∫ n¯
0
[u′(B + C)− vM ] dF (n)
}
︸ ︷︷ ︸
average smvi (able)
(4.23)
Result 2: Whenever pI > 0 and/or pII > 0 we have δ > 0 at the optimum.
Proof: We proceed to check that δ > 0 at the optimum in three cases.
(i) (pI > 0, pII = 0)
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Given that pI > 0 the expression in (4.19) must hold with equality such that:
13
θpIu
′(Bˆ) + (1− θ) ∫∞
0
vMdF (n)
θpI + (1− θ) = u
′(Bˆ + Cˆ)
which directly implies u′(B) > u′(Bˆ+Cˆ) >
∫∞
0
vMdF (n), in turn implying δ > 0.
(ii) (pI = 0, pII > 0)
In this case δ = u′(B +C)[1− F (n¯)pII ]− [
∫∞
0
vMdF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
vMdF (n)] and conse-
quently δ > 0 at the optimum if:
u′(Bˆ + Cˆ) >
∫∞
0
vMdF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
vMdF (n)
1− F (n¯)pII
which is guaranteed to hold by expression (4.19).
(iii) (pI > 0, pII > 0)
In this case δ > 0 at the optimum if:
u′(Bˆ + Cˆ) >
∫∞
0
vMdF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
vMdF (n)− pIu′(B)
1− F (n¯)pII − pI
From (4.19) it follows that a sufficient condition for δ > 0 is:
∫∞
0
vMdF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
vMdF (n)− pIu′(B)
1− F (n¯)pII − pI
<
θpIu
′(B) + (1− θ)[∫∞
0
vMdF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
dF (n)]
θpI + (1− θ)[1− F (n¯)pII ]
which requires:
u′(Bˆ) >
∫∞
0
vMdF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
vMdF (n)
1− F (n¯)pII
When receiving the same benefit income (i.e. B), the smvi of an unable individual will
always be at least as great as that of an able individual and so this condition must
13Note that when pII = 0 we have −(1 + ∂CF /∂B) = (1− χ)/χ and (1− χ) = θpI + (1− θ).
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hold. Q.E.D.
4.3 Numerical Simulations
Recall that (4.21) is an implicit expression for the optimal tax rate: gross earnings,
indirect utility and, importantly, the critical productivity n¯ are all functions of the
(net-of) tax rate. We therefore turn to numerical methods to gain insights into how
the propensities to make Type I and Type II errors affect the optimal tax rate.
To do so, let individual preferences over consumption and labour be given by the
frequently employed isoelastic form:
u(x,H) = log
(
x− αH
1+k
1 + k
)
(4.24)
where 1/k is a constant elasticity of labour supply with respect to the net wage rate
(see also Atkinson, 1990, 1995; Saez, 2001). In line with the more general preferences in
(4.1), the resulting optimal labour supply function H∗ = [n(1− t)/α]1/k is independent
of unearned income and gives rise to the indirect utility function:
v[n(1− t),M ] = log
{
[n(1− t)] 1+kk α− 1k
(
k
1 + k
)
+M
}
From this it can be readily established that the critical productivity n¯ at or below
which able individuals apply for the categorical benefit is:
n¯ ≡
{(
1 + k
k
)
α
1
kC
} k
1+k
/(1− t) (4.25)
This is clearly increasing in both t and C.
In the simulations which follow we assume: n ∼ lnN (µ = −1, σ = 0.39); α = 1;
k ∈ {1, 2, 3}; θ = 0.1. The assumption that productivities are lognormally distributed
with mean of log n set at -1 and standard deviation of log n set at 0.39 is frequently
adopted in the literature (see Immonen et al., 1998; Mirrlees, 1971; Stern, 1976; Viard,
2001a,b). Further, the key analyses of categorical transfers within the optimal income
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tax framework typically employ the lognormal distribution.14 The choice of α = 1
gives rise to H∗ = 0.63 for the average productivity (n = 0.3969) individual when
k = 2. Finally, the choices of k correspond to labour elasticities of 1,1/2 and 1/3
respectively: these are broadly consistent with those adopted by other authors (see, for
example Atkinson, 1995; Saez, 2001). For simplicity, it is assumed that the government
has no revenue generating commitments and thus R = 0. Taxation is thus purely
redistributive.
The simulation procedure is as follows: for a given value of pI ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}
we systematically increase pII in intervals of 0.025 from 0 to 1; at each stage calculating
the optimal tax rate and benefit levels. Table 4.1 reports the resulting optima over
the stated values of k and pI , for the cases where pII ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}. We
discuss the results below.
A ceteris paribus increase in pI tends to increase the optimal tax rate; increase the
universal benefit; but lower the categorical benefit. Whilst the increase in the tax rate
will act to increase n¯, the fall in the categorical benefit acts in the opposite direction and
is sufficiently large that n¯ falls with pI in all cases. Next, the effect of an increase in pII
on the optimal choices is more pronounced but the directions of movement remain the
same. Indeed, a ceteris paribus increase in pII tends to increase the optimal tax rate;
increase the universal benefit; but lower the categorical benefit. In particular, notice
that an increase in pII from 0 to 0.1 (for any pI) results in all cases in a reduction of over
50% in the categorical benefit, which in turn reduces the proportion of able individuals
who would choose to apply for the categorical benefit (were pII > 0) from around
50% to less than 20%. For all the examples given in Table 4.1 the value function of
social welfare (i.e. welfare at the optimum choices given exogenous error propensities)
is falling in the propensity to make either error type.
Finally, notice that Cˆ is increasing in k in all cases: this arises because an increase in k
corresponds to a reduction in the elasticity of labour supply, which in turn generates a
reduction in the number of able individuals who would choose to apply for C. Formally,
we have:
14Detailed numerical results under the alternative assumption that productivity is exponentially
distributed are available from the author upon request.
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∂n¯
∂k
=
[
α
1
k (1 + k)C
k(1− t) 1+kk
] k
1+k
{
[k2 − (1 + k)k − (1 + k) log a]
(1 + k)2k
+
1
(1 + k)2
log
[
α
1
k (1 + k)C
k
]}
When evaluated at α = 1 the term log(α) drops out such that it will unambiguously
hold that ∂n¯/∂k < 0 so long as C(1 + k)/k < 1; which is certainly the case from Table
4.1.
As discussed, a key observation from Table 4.1 is that an increase in pII above zero
induces a large proportional fall in the optimal categorical benefit and, in turn, in
the number of able individuals who choose to apply for the categorical benefit. It is
therefore important to note that in all considered cases the optimum benefit functions
are smooth and continuous. Figure 4.2 provides useful examples for the case where
k = 2. The figure graphically illustrates how tˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ and F (n¯) change with the
propensity to make classification errors. On the horizontal axis in each subplot pII is
varied from 0 to 0.6 in discrete increments of 0.025, whilst the different curves within
each figure are generated for a different value of pI .
Finally, Figure 4.3 provides a useful check that the simulated optimal tax rates are in
fact global optima and that the welfare function is ‘well-behaved’ with classification
errors. The figure illustrates how welfare changes with the tax rate, for different values
of pI and pII . In each of the six subplots the tax rate is varied on the horizontal
axis and welfare is given on the vertical axis. The different subplots are generated
for successively higher values of pI , whilst the different curves within each subplot are
generated for a different value of pII . For any given tax rate the optimal benefit levels
were chosen and then substituted into the welfare function. As can be seen, in each
case there is a unique optimal choice of t.
4.4 Concluding Remarks
As outlined in the introduction to this chapter, many of the key results from the
analysis of categorical transfers in a linear income tax framework are derived under the
strong assumption that the government can perfectly identify the categorical group to
which an individual belongs. In this case there is a well-defined ordering of priorities
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Figure 4.2: Graphical Illustration of Optima for k = 2
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(c) Optimum Universal Benefit
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Notes: Subplots (a), (c) and (d) illustrate how the optimal choices (tˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ) change with the propen-
sity to make classification errors; whilst subplot (b) illustrates how these changes in the choice vari-
ables affect the number of individuals from the able subpopulation who choose to apply for the
categorical benefit. The different curves within each figure are generated for a different value of
pI ∈ {0, 0.1, 0.2, 0.3, 0.4, 0.5}.
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Figure 4.3: Welfare and the Tax Rate (k = 2)
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Notes: This figure serves as a useful check that the simulated optimal tax rates correspond to global
optima. Within each subplot the diamond marker (i.e. ) denotes welfare at the optimal tax rate, tˆ.
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between categorical (targeted) and universal benefits. Welfare provision should be
purely categorical up to the point that inequality in the average smvi across categorical
groups is eliminated. If it is optimal to generate enough tax revenue to achieve this,
and there are resources left over, an unconditional universal benefit will be provided
to all individuals in society.
In reality, however, an individual’s true categorical status (e.g. disability, involuntary
unemployment) may be difficult to identify and this will inevitably lead to misclassi-
fications; in turn generating both Type I (false rejection) and Type II (false award)
errors. These errors are likely to change the ordering of priorities between targeted and
universal welfare provision, and in turn have implications for the equity and efficiency
considerations that characterise the optimal tax rate. The implications for the optimal
tax rate have been the subject matter of this chapter.
This chapter considered a framework where a fraction of the population is unable to
work, whilst the remaining fraction are able to work but differ continuously in their
productivity. The government operates a tax-benefit system comprising (i) a linear in-
come tax on all earned income; (ii) a tax-free universal benefit received unconditionally
by all individuals in society; and (iii) a tax-free categorical benefit that is targeted at
the unable, albeit imperfectly. The categorical benefit is administered with both Type
I and Type II classification errors. Any able individual who applies for the categorical
benefit and is incorrectly awarded it is not allowed to work. This condition is fully
enforced, such that the only able individuals who choose to apply for the categorical
benefit are those of lower productivities, and thus those for whom the opportunity
cost of not working is insufficiently high. An important implication is that the critical
productivity at or below which individuals choose to apply for the categorical benefit
will be, ceteris paribus, an increasing function of the tax rate.
The key contribution of this chapter has been to derive an expression for the optimal
linear tax rate when the categorical benefit is administered with two-sided classification
errors. In setting the tax rate, the government must now factor in the additional equity
and efficiency considerations that arise through classification errors. In particular,
Type II errors generate conflicting effects in both the equity and efficiency dimensions.
In the equity dimension, Type II errors (i) mean that some able individuals of low
productivity - who the government would not wish to tax highly - are not working,
and this acts to raise the tax rate; but also (ii) play a redistributive role through
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‘leaking’ the categorical benefit to lower productivity individuals, which may in turn
reduce the need to redistribute through the universal benefit and thus act to lower
the tax rate. In the efficiency dimension (i) individuals who would have worked and
adjusted their earnings in response to the tax rate now do not work due to Type II
errors, which acts to raise the tax rate; but (ii) the number of individuals who choose
to apply for the categorical benefit is, ceteris paribus, increasing in the tax rate, which
acts to lower the tax rate so as to avoid the dual efficiency concerns of reducing the
tax base whilst also paying more individuals the categorical benefit.
Numerical simulations suggest that an increase in the propensity to make either error
type (i) increases the optimal tax rate; (ii) increases the optimal universal benefit; but
(iii) lowers the optimal categorical benefit. For any given propensity to make Type
I errors, an increase from zero in the propensity to make Type II errors generates a
large proportional fall in the categorical benefit size, thus reducing the proportion of
the able subpopulation that would choose to apply for it.
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Appendix A Derivations and Proofs
Derivatives of the function n¯.
Differentiating both sides of (4.2) in the main text with respect to (1 − t) and C,
respectively, yields:
(1− t) :
[
∂n¯
∂(1− t) · (1− t) + n¯
]H∗ + dH∗dω [n¯(1− t)− g′(H∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
 = 0
(C) :
∂n¯
∂C
· (1− t)
H∗ + dH∗dω [n¯(1− t)− g′(H∗)]︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
− 1 = 0
from which it directly follows that ∂n¯/∂(1 − t) = −n¯/(1 − t) < 0, whilst ∂n¯/∂C =
1/[(1− t)H∗] > 0. Taking second derivatives then yields:
∂2n¯
∂(1− t)2 = −
[
(1− t) ∂n¯
∂(1−t) − n¯
(1− t)2
]
=
2n¯
(1− t)2 > 0
∂2n¯
∂C2
= − 1
(1− t)(H∗)3 ·
dH∗
dω
= − 1
(1− t)(H∗)3g′′(H∗) < 0
Proof of Result 1(i).
From the optimisation problem in (4.17) the first-order-conditions (henceforth FOCs)
characterising the optimal benefits Bˆ and Cˆ are:
(B) : χu′
(
Bˆ + Cˆ
)
+ σ(tˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ) ≤ λˆ ; Bˆ ≥ 0 (A.1)
(C) : χu′
(
Bˆ + Cˆ
)
≤ λˆ
(
χ+
∂χ
∂C
Cˆ − tˆ · ∂Z
∂n¯
∂n¯
∂C
)
; Cˆ ≥ 0
⇒ u′
(
Bˆ + Cˆ
)
≤ λˆ
1 +
(1− θ)f(n¯)pII ∂n¯
∂C
[
Cˆ + tˆy|n=n¯
]
χ
 ; Cˆ ≥ 0 (A.2)
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where the pairs of inequalities hold with complementary slackness. Notice that in
writing (A.2) we have substituted in both ∂χ
∂C
C = (1 − θ)pIIf(n¯) ∂n¯∂CC and ∂Z∂n¯ ∂n¯∂C =
−(1− θ)pIIf(n¯) ∂n¯∂C y|n=n¯.
We briefly discuss both of these FOCs in turn. Given that incentives to apply for the
categorical benefit are unaffected by the level of universal benefit, the FOC character-
ising Bˆ is simple. The left side of (A.1) is the average smvi over the entire population
and thus corresponds to the marginal benefit of increasing B. The right side of (A.1)
is the marginal cost - in welfare units - of increasing B: this cost simply enters as
unity (i.e. the shadow price multiplied by 1) because every individual is paid a higher
universal benefit. As illustrated by the complementary slackness condition, whether or
not it will be optimal to provide a universal benefit will depend on whether or not the
average smvi over the population equates with or exceeds the shadow price of public
expenditure (λ) when B = 0.
The shadow price is in turn pinned down by the FOC characterising Cˆ. The left side
of (A.2) is the average smvi of a categorial recipient.15 The right side captures - in
welfare units - the average marginal cost associated with increasing the categorical
benefit. This marginal cost is composed of two effects. First, a marginal increase in
the categorical benefit means that the government pays each existing recipient a higher
benefit and so this effect simply enters as unity. Second, a marginal increase in the
categorical benefit induces an additional able individual to apply for the categorical
benefit, where they did not prior to the increase. This second effect generates both
an expenditure cost and a loss in tax revenue, because: (i) the government pays an
additional individual the categorical benefit where it did not before (this effect enters
as Cˆ); and (ii) the new recipient stops working as a result of the fully enforced no-work
requirement (this effect enters as tˆy|n=n¯). As this is an average marginal cost, these
second effects enter as a fraction of the number of existing recipients (i.e. χ).
With respect to the FOCs for B and C in (A.1) and (A.2) we test two hypotheses: (i)
Bˆ > 0, Cˆ = 0; and (ii) Bˆ = 0, Cˆ > 0.
(i) (Bˆ > 0, Cˆ = 0)
15All recipients of the categorical benefit of course have the same marginal welfare because they do
not work.
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If we set C = 0 then n¯ = 0 and so:
χ = θ(1− pI) ; σ = θpIu′(B, 1) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vMdF (n)
The FOCs in (A.1) and (A.2) thus become:
θu′(B) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM [n(1− t), B]dF (n) = λ ,
u′(B) ≤ λ .
Taken together, however, this implies that:
θu′(B) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vMdF (n) ≥ u′(B)⇒
∫ ∞
0
vM [n(1− t), B]dF (n) ≥ u′(B)
This must be a contradicton because for any interior tax rate able individuals are
better-off than unable individuals and thus their average smvi must be lower than that
of unable individuals. The assertion that Cˆ = 0 is therefore false and, instead, at all
levels of discriminatory power we have Cˆ > 0.
Given that Cˆ > 0 the FOC in (A.2) must hold with equality such that:
λˆ = u′(Bˆ + Cˆ) ·
{
χ
χ+ (1− θ)f(n¯)pII ∂n¯∂C [Cˆ + tˆy|n=n¯]
}
(A.3)
Substituting (A.3) into (A.1) then gives:
σ(tˆ, Bˆ, Cˆ) ≤ u′(B + C) · χ
{
1
χ+ (1− θ)f(n¯)pII ∂n¯∂C [Cˆ + tˆy|n=n¯]
− 1
}
; Bˆ ≥ 0
= u′(B + C) · χ
{
(1− χ)− (1− θ)f(n¯)pII ∂n¯∂C [Cˆ + tˆy|n=n¯]
χ+ (1− θ)f(n¯)pII ∂n¯∂C [Cˆ + tˆy|n=n¯]
}
; Bˆ ≥ 0
(A.4)
Finally, it is straightforward to establish that the term within curly braces corresponds
to −(1 + ∂CF
∂B
), where CF is as defined in (4.10) in the main text.
(ii) (Bˆ = 0 , Cˆ > 0)
Given that limx→0 u′(x) = +∞ it is straightforward to see from (4.19) in the main
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text that Bˆ > 0 whenever pI > 0. Otherwise, it will only be optimal to provide a
universal benefit if (i) the aggregate smvi of non-recipients exceeds (ii) the aggregate
smvi of categorical recipients multiplied by the (negative of) the change in their total
benefit income associated with an increase in the universal benefit, when evaluated at
B = 0.
Proof of Result 1(ii)
It is straightforward to establish from (A.3) that u′(Bˆ + Cˆ) > λˆ at the optimum. This
arises because the term within curly braces is less than unity. Now, from the definition
of n¯ in (4.2) an able individual with n ∈ [0, n¯) has u[n(1−t)H∗+B−g(H∗)] < u(B+C)
and so:
vM [n(1− t), B] = u′[n(1− t)H∗ +B − g(H∗)] > u′(B + C) ; ∀ n ∈ [0, n¯) (A.5)
Putting u′(Bˆ + Cˆ) > λˆ and (A.5) together thus gives:
vM [n(1− tˆ), Bˆ] > u′
(
Bˆ + Cˆ
)
> λˆ ; ∀ n ∈ [0, n¯) ,
vM [n¯(1− tˆ), Bˆ] = u′
(
Bˆ + Cˆ
)
> λˆ ; if n = n¯
(A.6)
This assists us in interpreting the optimal tax expression derived below.
Proof of Result 1(iii) (Optimal Tax Expression)
From the optimisation problem in (4.17), the FOC characterising an interior solution
for the optimal tax rate is given by:
(t) : (1− θ)
{∫ ∞
0
−nvωdF (n) + pII
∫ n¯
0
nvωdF (n)
}
= λˆ
{
∂χ
∂t
Cˆ − Z + tˆ
[
∂Z
∂(1− t) +
∂Z
∂n¯
· ∂n¯
∂(1− t)
]}
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Note that in writing this FOC we have used the identity u(B + C) ≡ v[n¯(1 − t), B]
when differentiating the integral limits in the welfare function. Substituting in both
Roy’s identity (i.e. vω = vM(y/n) and the definition of aggregate earnings Z then
gives:
λˆ(1− θ)
{∫ ∞
0
y
(
1− vM
λˆ
)
dF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
y
(
1− vM
λˆ
)
dF (n)
}
=λˆ
{
∂χ
∂t
Cˆ + tˆ
[
∂Z
∂(1− t) +
∂Z
∂n¯
· ∂n¯
∂(1− t)
]}
To progress we recall that ∂χ
∂t
Cˆ = −(1 − θ)pIIf(n¯) ∂n¯∂(1−t)Cˆ whilst ∂Z∂n¯ ∂n¯∂(1−t) = −(1 −
θ)pIIf(n¯)
∂n¯
∂(1−t)y|n=n¯. Substituting in these terms and using the property that ∂n¯∂(1−t) ·
(1− t) = −n¯⇒ ∂n¯
∂(1−t) = t · ∂n¯∂(1−t) − n¯, gives:
1
λˆ
(1− θ)
{∫ ∞
0
y(λˆ− vM)dF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
y(λˆ− vM)dF (n)− λˆpII n¯f(n¯)Cˆ
}
= tˆ
{
∂Z
∂(1− t) − (1− θ)pIIf(n¯)
∂n¯
∂(1− t)
[
y|n=n¯ + Cˆ
]}
(A.7)
Substituting in the definition ∂n¯
∂(1−t) = −n¯/(1 − t) and dividing both sides by (1 − t)
yields:
tˆ
1− tˆ =
∫∞
0
y
(
λˆ− vM
)
dF (n)− pII
∫ n¯
0
y
(
λˆ− vM
)
dF (n)− λˆF (n¯)pII
(
n¯
F (n¯)
f(n¯)
)
Cˆ
λˆ
{
Z¯ ·
(
(1− t)
Z
∂Z¯
∂(1− t)
)
+ pIIF (n¯) ·
(
n¯
F (n¯)
f(n¯)
)[
y|n=n¯ + Cˆ
]}
(A.8)
where Z¯ = Z/(1− θ) is simply the average gross earnings over the able subpopulation.
Substituting in EZ¯ ≡ (1−t)Z¯ ∂Z¯∂(1−t) and Ef ≡ nf(n)/F (n) then gives the expression in the
main text.
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Appendix C Optimal Tax Under No Enforcement
In the main text we assume that the ex-post no-work condition is fully enforced. It is
also of interest, however, to derive the optimal tax rate for the polar case where the ex-
post condition is not enforced. In this case all able individuals choose to apply for the
categorical benefit. Further, under the preferences specified in (4.1) labour supply is
independent of unearned income such that an individual’s labour supply is independent
of whether or not they receive the categorical benefit. Consequently, aggregate earnings
in the economy are a function of solely the tax rate and given by:
Z(1− t; θ) = (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
y(1− t)dF (n) (C.1)
The optimisation problem becomes much simpler and is given by:
max
t,B,C
W = θ[(1− pI)u(B + C) + pIu(B)]
+ (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
〈pIIv[n(1− t), B + C] + (1− pII)v[n(1− t), B]〉 dF (n)
s.t. B + [θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ]C = t · Z(1− t; θ)−R ,
t ∈ (0, 1) , B ≥ 0 , C ≥ 0 .
(C.2)
The resulting FOCs for B and C are:
(B) : θ[(1− pI)u′(Bˆ + Cˆ) + pIu′(Bˆ)]
+ (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
〈
pIIvM [n(1− tˆ), Bˆ + Cˆ] + (1− pII)vM [n(1− tˆ), Bˆ]
〉
dF (n)
≤ λˆ ; Bˆ ≥ 0
(C.3)
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(C) :
θ(1− pI)u′(Bˆ + Cˆ) + (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM [n(1− tˆ), Bˆ + Cˆ]dF (n)
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ≤ λˆ ; Cˆ ≥ 0
(C.4)
As usual, we test two hypotheses: (i) (Bˆ > 0, Cˆ = 0); and (ii) (Bˆ = 0, Cˆ > 0)
(i) (Bˆ > 0, Cˆ = 0)
Setting Cˆ = 0 the two FOCs become:
(B) : θu′(B) + (1− θ)
∫ ∞
0
vM [n(1− t), B]dF (n) = λ (C.5)
(C) :
θ(1− pI)u′(B) + (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM [n(1− t), B]dF (n)
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ≤ λ (C.6)
Substituting (C.6) into (C.5) gives:
u′(B)[1− pI − pII ] ≤ s¯[1− pI − pII ] (C.7)
which can clearly only hold when pI + pII ≥ 1. So Cˆ > 0 ∀ pI + pII < 1; whilst
Cˆ = 0 ∀ pI + pII = 1.
Given that Cˆ > 0 whenever the test administering C has positive discriminatory power
we an combine (C.3) and (C.4) to obtain:
θpIu
′(Bˆ) + (1− θ)(1− pII)
∫∞
0
vM [n(1− t), Bˆ]dF (n)
θpI + (1− θ)(1− pII)
≤λˆ = θ(1− pI)u
′(Bˆ + Cˆ) + (1− θ)pII
∫∞
0
vM [n(1− tˆ), Bˆ + Cˆ]dF (n)
θ(1− pI) + (1− θ)pII ; Bˆ ≥ 0
(C.8)
(i) (Bˆ = 0, Cˆ > 0)
From (C.8) we can see that B > 0 only if the average smvi of non-categorical recipients
exceeds the average smvi of categorical recipients when B = 0. If pI = 0 then this
certainly holds because limx→0 u′ = +∞.
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From (C.8) it must hold that for pI > 0 and pII > 0:
u′(Bˆ + Cˆ) > λˆ >
∫ ∞
0
vM [n(1− tˆ), Bˆ]dF (n) (C.9)
This will assist us in interpreting the optimal tax expression which follows.
The FOC for the optimal tax rate is:
(t) :
∫ ∞
0
〈
pII · −nvω[n(1− tˆ), Bˆ + Cˆ] + (1− pII) · −nvω[n(1− tˆ), Bˆ + Cˆ]
〉
dF (n)
− λˆ
∫ ∞
0
〈
y − tˆ ∂y
∂(1− t)
〉
dF (n) = 0
and thus:
tˆ
1− tˆ =
∫∞
0
y
〈
λˆ−
{
pIIvM [n(1− tˆ), Bˆ + Cˆ] + (1− pII)vM [n(1− tˆ), Bˆ]
}〉
f(n)dn
λˆZ¯EZ
(C.10)
Notice that by (C.9) the numerator is unambiguously positive.
Part II
Individual Decisions and Risk
Taking
266
Chapter 5
Enforcing Ex-Post Conditionality:
Categorical Benefit Size and
Risk
5.1 Introduction
Type II (false award) classification errors in the administration of welfare benefits give
rise to a range of enforcement issues because they provide incentives for abuse of the
welfare system.1 This abuse can take a number of forms, some more detectable than
others. First, individuals may choose to apply for a benefit and, if incorrectly awarded
it, comply with any subsequent ex-post conditions. This behaviour is very difficult to
detect (Yaniv, 1986). In this regard, a growing empirical literature analyses the work
capability of recipients on the U.S. Social Security Disability Insurance programme,
where the two most prevalent recipient categories are those with the difficult to detect
and monitor conditions of musculoskeletal disease (back pain) or mental illness (Autor
and Duggan, 2003; Von Wachter et al., 2011) 2. Second, ineligible benefit recipients may
1Two principal studies provide estimates of the propensity of the U.S. Social Security Adminis-
tration to make Type II errors in awarding disability insurance (see Benitez-Silva et al., 2004; Nagi,
1969). Both generate quantitatively similar estimates of around 20% (22% and 19%, respectively).
2Modern welfare programmes typically do not focus exclusively on strict medical criteria, but also
on the subjective assessment of ability to function in the workplace. For example, the US Social
Security Administration places significant emphasis on an applicant’s reported discomfort (Autor and
Duggan, 2006)
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choose to violate ex-post conditions, taking into account the risk of being detected and
sanctioned in some way. This may take the form of working when receiving a disability
benefit or unemployment benefit. Whilst it may seem natural to assume that all
working recipients work ‘cash-in-hand’ in the informal economy, Fuller et al. (2015)
provide evidence that a substantial degree of fraud occurs through official/registered
employment. This may arise due to inadequacies in the integration of I.T. systems
across tax authorities, benefit authorities and local government.3
This chapter analyses the decision of individuals who are able to work - but differ
continuously in their wage - to apply for a categorical benefit, C, that is ex-ante condi-
tional on an applicant being unable to work; and ex-post conditional on a recipient not
working. Benefit recipients may be also be required to spend a fraction of the working
day at the benefit office. It is assumed that there are no checks or penalties in place
for an able individual who is incorrectly awarded C but does not work when receiving
it. There are two reasons for making this assumption. First, as discussed above, such
behaviour is likely to be highly difficult to detect as an able recipient exactly mimics
an unable recipient. Second, in reality some individuals may be unsure as to their own
eligibility and, consequently, their being awarded the benefit by administrative error
does not constitute fraud. However, the act of working when receiving C is detectable
and provides the ‘smoking gun’ necessary for the benefit authority to identify, ex-post,
a benefit recipient as able to work and, importantly, actively violating the rules. This
constitutes detectable fraud in this chapter.4 An individual who is detected working
is made to repay the benefit in its entirety, in addition to paying a fine proportional
to the benefit size. This falls in line with the type of sanction benefit authorities may
‘offer’ in reality.5
3Many governments now cite the need to improve the degree of information sharing across relevant
authorities. In the U.K., for example, this takes the form of the ‘Single Fraud Investigation Service’.
4Yaniv (1986) refers to this as ‘outright fraud’; whilst Fuller et al. (2015) refer to it simply as
‘concealed earnings’.
5In reality, sanctions can take a number of non-mutually exclusive forms, including exclusion from
the welfare programme for a given period; a fine of a fixed absolute amount; a fine proportional to the
monetary amount incorrectly received; the repayment of benefits; or even prosecution. Note that each
type of sanction imposes a financial loss on the individual: either directly through a fine or indirectly
through the loss of future benefit payments. For example, in the U.K. the Department of Work and
Pensions may, in addition to recovering overpayments (i) disqualify a recipient for periods including
13 weeks, 26 weeks or 3 years, depending on the number of previous offences committed; (ii) offer a
fine proportional to 50 percent of the overpayment (up to a maximum of £2000); or (iii) prosecute.
The administrative fine is offered as an alternative to prosecution. Fines and repayments may be
either deducted from benefit payments (if still receiving the benefit) or, if disqualified, paid directly
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In the main framework labour supply is modelled in the extensive margin, such that
individuals either work a fixed amount or they do not work at all. Such an assumption
seems reasonable given that many studies emphasise the importance of the extensive
margin relative to the intensive margin for labour supply responses to tax/benefit
programmes, in particular for those with lower incomes (Eissa and Liebman, 1996;
Saez, 2001; Jacquet, 2006, 2014). As will be detailed below, this assumption greatly
simplifies the analysis of individual decisions to engage in the risky activity of working
when receiving the categorical benefit.
Within this framework, we ask the following related questions.
(i) For cases where the standard enforcement parameters (detection probability,
penalty rate) do not alone deter applications from individuals who would choose
to work when receiving the categorical benefit, how does the benefit level affect
deterrence? In particular, are there enforcement parameter-benefit level combi-
nations such that full deterrence can be achieved?
(ii) How does the decision of an able individual to apply for the categorical benefit
and, if awarded it, their subsequent work decision, differ with the wage rate?
(iii) How do the answers to the above two questions differ depending on whether
preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion (CARA) or decreasing absolute
risk aversion (DARA)?
To analyse these questions, we capture the risk attached to working when receiving the
categorical benefit by the risk premium associated with the variance in benefit income,
as approximated by standard methods (Arrow, 1970; Pratt, 1964). The assumption
that a working individual’s labour supply is fixed in the intensive margin allows us to
use these methods.
In answering these questions, this chapter relates to two strands of literature. First,
drawing on the economics of crime (Becker, 1968), a small number of papers model
the decision of individuals to claim unemployment insurance when actually employed
(Yaniv, 1986; Fuller et al., 2015). The closest precursor to this chapter is Yaniv (1986),
who employs a static model in which individuals with preferences over income that
exhibit decreasing absolute risk aversion must choose the number of days of their time
endowment to fraudulently claim. Recipients must spend a fraction of the working day
by the individual (see Department for Work and Pensions, 2010, 2011, 2015).
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at the benefit office, in addition to waiting a fixed period before benefits are received.
The author considers two alternative fine structures from the tax evasion literature (see
Allingham and Sandmo, 1972; Yitzhaki, 1974). When the fine is proportional to the
number of claiming days - and thus independent of the benefit size - a ceteris paribus
increase in the benefit level increases the claiming duration via positive substitution
and income effects. Contrastingly, when the fine is proportional to total benefit income,
an increase in the benefit level increases the expected fine, thus generating an overall
ambiguous effect on incentives. Notably, Yaniv does not allow for the possibility that
the benefit itself may induce voluntary unemployment. In reality, the size of a benefit
is likely to not only influence which ineligible individuals choose to apply, but also
whether or not they choose to fully comply with ex-post conditions when receiving
it.
A related second strand of literature focuses on the design of welfare benefits when the
benefit authority has no formal technology to determine eligibility, but instead chooses
consumption bundles/transfer levels that satisfy incentive compatibility constraints and
induce self-revelation (Besley and Coate, 1992; Blackorby and Donaldson, 1988; Cuff,
2000; Diamond and Mirrlees, 1978; Kreiner and Tranaes, 2005; Nichols and Zeckhauser,
1982). In particular, the works of Besley and Coate (1992), Cuff (2000), and Kreiner
and Tranaes (2005) use unproductive workfare - which is analogous to the ex-post
condition of spending time at the benefit office - as a tool to deter non-needy individuals
from applying for a given benefit. An important distinction that separates the current
chapter from this literature is that, given an exogenous eligibility test and a continuum
of potential ineligible applicants, there will always be some individuals who apply for
a benefit and, if incorrectly awarded it, choose the riskless activity of not working.
Even if individuals were required to spend the full working day at the benefit office,
those with a sufficiently low wage may still choose to apply. Focus in our setting is
therefore placed on investigating conditions under which individuals can be deterred
from breaking ex-post conditionality.
The analysis in this chapter proceeds via backwards induction. Conditional on receiving
C, we first determine which individuals would choose voluntary unemployment and
which individuals would choose to work; taking into account the risk of being detected
and fined. Then given this behaviour, we determine which individuals would choose to
apply for C. In the main analysis the only condition placed on benefit recipients is that
they do not work. An individual who would choose to work conditional on receiving C
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will only apply for C if the expected benefit income exceeds the risk premium associated
with the variance in benefit income. In a subsequent section we then adopt a simpler
framework to analyse the case where benefit recipients are also required to spend a
fraction of the ‘working day’ at the benefit office. The time requirement is taken to be
fully enforced. In this framework individuals have preferences only over consumption
(see Yaniv, 1986). An individual who would choose to work when receiving C will
only choose to apply for it if the expected benefit income net of earnings foregone
through time spent at the benefit office exceeds the risk premium. With this by way
of background, the key results are as follows:
1. Constant Absolute Risk Aversion: Under the class of utility functions sat-
isfying −uxx/ux = η, where 0 < η < 1 is a constant and x is consumption, the
risk premium associated with the variance in benefit income is independent of
an individual’s wage and convex-increasing in C. So whilst an increase in C
(i) linearly increases a working benefit recipient’s expected income; it also (ii)
exposes them to increasingly greater risk through raising the risk premium. For
any enforcement parameters (detection probability, penalty rate) which do not
fully deter applications from those who would choose to work when receiving
C, there is a critical level of C set above which full deterrence can in fact be
attained. Further, the lower the level of enforcement provided by the standard
enforcement parameters, the higher this critical level is. If C is set below this
critical level, all able individuals above a threshold productivity level will apply
for C and continue to work if awarded it.
2. Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion: Under the class of utility functions sat-
isfying −uxx/ux = η/x 6, the risk premium associated with the variance in benefit
income is a decreasing function of an individual’s wage and convex-increasing in
C. A necessary though not sufficient condition to deter individuals who would
work when receiving C from applying is that the enforcement parameters be set
sufficiently high - where the required level is independent of C and productiv-
ity. Conditional on this being achieved, full deterrence can only be attained if C
exceeds its critical value at each productivity level.
3. Extension with fully enforced time requirement: When the only ex-post
condition imposed on recipients is that they do not work, an unsatisfactory im-
6i.e. Constant Relative Risk Aversion preferences.
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plication of both the CARA and DARA analyses is that higher earners will apply
for C if the enforcement of the no-work condition is too lenient. In reality, higher
earners are unlikely to apply for benefits even if they face a positive probability of
being awarded them. One of many explanatory factors for this is that receiving
benefits can be a time consuming activity. Within a framework where individuals
have CARA preferences, we impose the requirement that recipients of C must
spend a fraction of the working day at the benefit office. This (i) preserves the
result that a benefit set sufficiently high can fully enforce the no-work require-
ment; but now also (ii) generates a critical wage above which no able individual
will apply for C because the opportunity cost of foregone earnings is too high.
The remainder of this chapter is structured as follows. In Section 5.2 we set up the
model. Section 5.3 then presents the main analysis under both CARA and DARA
preferences. Section 5.4 then extends the analysis to a framework where there is a fully
enforced condition that benefit recipients spend a fraction of the day at the benefit
office. Concluding remarks are provided in Section 5.5.
5.2 The Model
5.2.1 Individuals
Individual preferences over consumption, x ≥ 0, and leisure, l ∈ [0, 1], are represented
by the utility function u(x, l). The standard assumptions apply: u is continuous,
differentiable, increasing in both arguments (ux > 0 , ul > 0) and strictly concave
(uxx < 0 , ull < 0 , uxxull−u2xl > 0). Any additional properties will be later determined
by assumptions placed on risk aversion.
Let there be a subpopulation of individuals who are able to work, but differ continuously
in their net wage, ω ≥ ω0; where ω0 > 0 is the lowest wage in the economy. Individual
labour supply is modelled in the extensive margin7, such that an individual either
works the fixed amount H ∈ (0, 1) of their time endowment, or enjoys full leisure.
The assumption is made that, in absence of any form of unearned income, all able
7Once more, extensive margin labour responses to tax/benefit programmes are shown to be im-
portant relative to intensive margin responses, particularly for those commanding lower wages (Eissa
and Liebman, 1996; Saez, 2001; Jacquet, 2006, 2014).
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individuals will work and have consumption x = ωH.
However, these individuals may choose to apply for a categorical benefit, C ≥ 0, that
is targeted at an unable subpopulation of individuals who cannot work, but which is
administered with Type II (false award) classification errors. The categorical benefit
is ex-ante conditional on an applicant being unable to work; and ex-post conditional
on a recipient not working.8
For simplicity, it is assumed that applications for C are costless in terms of money,
stigma and time. Under this frequently employed assumption (see Jacquet, 2006, 2014)
the utility of a rejected applicant coincides with their utility from having not applied
in the first place. Application decisions are therefore independent of the positive Type
II error propensity, instead depending solely on whether the (expected) utility from
receiving C exceeds that from not. This renders the analysis more tractable.
5.2.2 Enforcement Issues
Type II errors in the awards process violate ex-ante conditionality, and in turn generate
enforcement issues with respect to ex-post conditionality because individuals who are
able to work are receiving the categorical benefit. Whether or not they will in fact
choose to work will depend on the enforcement mechanisms in place.
It is assumed that there are no checks or penalties in place for an able recipient of
C who does not work and who thus complies with ex-post conditionality. There are
two reasons for making this assumption. First, in reality it is not immediately clear
that such behaviour is ‘fraudulent’ because an applicant may be uncertain of their own
eligibility. Second, and of more importance for this chapter, such behaviour is likely
to be highly difficult to detect because the truly ineligible recipient exactly mimics the
behaviour of a truly eligible recipient (Yaniv, 1986).
However, the act of working whilst receiving C is detectable and provides the ‘smoking
gun’ necessary for the benefit authority to identify, ex-post, a benefit recipient as able to
work and, importantly, actively violating the rules. This constitutes detectable fraud
in this chapter. Any recipient of C who does work risks being detected with probability
ρ ; 0 ≤ ρ ≤ 1. If detected the ineligible recipient is made to repay C in its entirety
8In a subsequent section we will explore a framework where recipients are also required to spend
a fraction of the working day at the benefit office.
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and, in addition, is imposed with a fine of size φC, where 0 ≤ φ ≤ 1. Putting this all
together, the expected categorical benefit when working is given by:
C˜(C, ρ, φ) = C[1− ρ(1 + φ)] ≥ 0 (5.1)
We note immediately the partial derivatives: C˜C ≥ 0, C˜ρ ≤ 0 and C˜φ ≤ 0. For any
enforcement pairs (ρ, φ) satisfying ρ(1 +φ) > 1 it is straightforward to see that no able
individual will apply for C with the intention of working because C˜ < 0. Accordingly,
we henceforth restrict attention to lenient enforcement pairs satisfying ρ(1 + φ) ≤ 1
(and thus C˜ ≥ 0) and wish to identify the conditions under which individuals will
apply for C and, if awarded it, violate ex-post conditionality by working.
5.3 Analysis
Given the assumptions laid out, the purpose of the main analysis is to determine
how the enforcement parameters and benefit size determine which able individuals
will choose to apply for the categorical benefit and, importantly, whether or not they
will choose to work when receiving it. By backwards induction we first establish how
an able individual would behave (work/do not work) conditional on receiving C. To
determine application decisions, we then compare their utility when receiving C with
that when not receiving C.
To proceed, however, we need a convenient way to write the expected utility of a
working recipient of C. We denote the risk associated with working - as captured by
deviations around C˜ - by the random variable:
α =
α0 : Prob(ρ)α1 : Prob(1− ρ) (5.2)
where:
α0 = −(1− ρ)(1 + φ)C , α1 = ρ(1 + φ)C (5.3)
and thus E(α) = 0.
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The detected state therefore corresponds to C˜ + α0 = −φC, whilst the undetected
state corresponds to C˜ + α1 = C. To save on notation, let A ≡ ωH + C˜ denote the
expected income of an individual who works when receiving C. Because labour supply
is exogenously fixed in the intensive margin, we can employ the standard methods of
Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964) to show that the risk premium, χ(A, σ) , associated
with the variance in benefit income, σ, satisfies:
u(A− χ, 1−H) ≡ ρu(A+ α0, 1−H) + (1− ρ)u(A+ α1, 1−H) (5.4)
where:9
χ(A, σ) =
1
2
r(A) · σ(ρ, φ, C);
σ(ρ, φ, C) = E(α2) = ρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)2C2,
r(A) = −uxx(A, 1−H)
ux(A, 1−H)
(5.5)
So, in general, the risk premium is the coefficient of absolute risk aversion10 , r, mul-
tiplied by half the variance in categorical income11 , σ (see Pratt, 1964, p.125). Once
more, because labour supply is constant in the intensive margin, the curvature of the
utility function over income is given by the standard formula for r (Chetty, 2006). Note
that σ is convex-increasing in both C and φ, but may be increasing or decreasing in ρ.
Formally:
9Our use of the mean-zero random variable α follows directly from Pratt (1964, p.124, see equations
(1) and (2)).
10Given that labour supply is constant, we could define a(x) ≡ u(x, 1−H), so that r = −a′′/a′ .
11Note that the variance in α is equivalent to the variance in benefit income. Formally:
E[α− E(α)]2 = ρα02 + (1− ρ)α12 = ρ[(C˜ + α0)− C˜]2 + (1− ρ)[(C˜ + α1)− C˜]2
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σC > 0, σCC > 0, σφ > 0, σφφ > 0 ,
σρ

>
=
<
 0⇔ ρ

<
=
>
 12 .
(5.6)
We can also see from (5.5) that individual productivity - the sole source of heterogeneity
across able individuals - only enters χ via r. The decision of an able recipient of C to
work will therefore depend on how r changes with ω, via changes in A. To proceed, we
analyse both the cases where risk aversion is (i) independent of ω and thus constant
across individuals; and (ii) a decreasing function of ω.
5.3.1 Constant Absolute Risk Aversion (CARA)
In this section we eliminate the dependence of r on A (and thus ω) through assuming
r = η, where 0 < η < 1 is a constant. By standard methods, the class of utility
functions satisfying this assumption is given by the solution to the second-order lin-
ear differential equation uxx + ηux = 0. Formally, let preferences take the CARA
form12:
u(x, l) = 1− ψ(l)e−ηx (5.7)
where r = −uxx/ux = η, ψ(l) > 0 ; ψ′ < 0; ψ′′ > 0 and ψψ′′ > (ψ′)2. The last
assumption guarantees that u is strictly concave (see Appendix).13 An implication of
these preferences is that uluxx−uxuxl = 0, such that the marginal utility of consumption
is independent of leisure along an indifference curve. Further, no individual with ω ≤
ω¯ ≡ −(1/η)Log[ψ(1)/ψ(1 − H)]/H > 0 will work. For simplicity we assume ω0 = ω¯,
such that all able individuals who do not receive C choose to work.14
12This functional form is also employed by Berloffa and Simmons (2003). For an application of
CARA preferences in an analysis of benefit fraud, see Fuller et al. (2015).
13Suppose, for example, that ψ(l) = 1/l. In this case ψ′(l) = −1/l2 whilst ψ′′(l) = 2/l3. We
therefore have ψψ′′ = 2/l4 > (ψ′)2 = 1/l4 and the assumption is readily satisfied.
14The main results remain unchanged if we allow ω < ω¯: in this case voluntarily unemployed
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The risk premium in (5.5) now becomes:
χ(σ) =
1
2
ησ (5.8)
So χ is now a constant multiplied by half the variance in categorical income. It is
independent of the individual wage rate and thus takes the same value for all individ-
uals. Under this assumption then, the enforcement parameters and benefit level will
affect the risk premium solely through their effect on the variance in benefit income.
Indeed, from (5.5) we can see that χ is convex-increasing in both φ and C, but may
be increasing or decreasing in ρ.
Work Decision Conditional on Receiving C
An able recipient of C will only choose to work if u(A−χ, 1−H) > u(C, 1). Given that
A is unambiguously increasing in ω, let the critical net wage ω(ρ, φ, C) satisfy:
u
[
ω(ρ, φ, C) · H + (C˜ − χ), 1−H
]
≡ u(C, 1) (5.9)
We assume that at the point of indifference an individual will choose not to work.
An able recipient of C will therefore not work if ω ≤ ω; but will work if ω > ω.
Differentiating (5.9) with respect to C, ρ and φ, respectively, we obtain:
ωC =
1
H
{[
ux(C, 1)
ux(ωH + C˜ − χ, 1−H)
− C˜C
]
+ χ′σC
}
> 0
ωφ =
1
H(χ
′σφ − C˜φ) > 0
ωρ =
1
H(χ
′σρ − C˜ρ)
{
≥
<
}
0
(5.10)
individuals with ω ∈ [ω0, ω¯] will all apply for C and, if awarded it, remain voluntarily unemployed
(if they do not work when receiving no benefit income, they will certainly not work when receiving
benefit income).
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where ωρ > 0 ∀ ρ ≤ 1/2 , whilst ∀ ρ > 1/2:
ωρ

<
=
>
 0⇔ C

>
=
<
 C¯(ρ, φ) ≡ 2η(2ρ− 1)(1 + φ) (5.11)
From (5.10) it can be readily verified (see Appendix) that an increase in C unambigu-
ously increases ω. There are two effects at work. First15, an increase in C increases
both the certain consumption of a non-working recipient and the expected consump-
tion of a working recipient. However, because C˜C < 1 the increase in consumption for
a non-worker exceeds that for a worker, thus driving ω to rise. Second, an increase in
C increases χ and thus the risk that a working individual faces. To compensate for
this, ω must further rise.
Turning to the enforcement parameters, an increase in φ unambiguously increases ω
because χ′σφ > 0 and C˜φ < 0 (i.e. it increases the risk premium and lowers the
expected benefit), whilst the affect of an increase in ρ depends on whether ρ ≤ 1/2
or ρ > 1/2. In the former case, ω unambiguously increases for the same reasons as
for φ. In the latter case, however, we have χ′σρ < 0, such that ω only increases if the
reduction in χ is offset by the reduction in C˜, thereby causing (χ− C˜) to rise. Given
that χ′σCC > 0, this will only hold if C is sufficiently small.
Decision to Apply for C
With knowledge of individual behaviour conditional on receiving C, we now determine
who will apply for C and under what conditions. Because applications are taken to be
costless, an individual’s utility from having an application for C rejected is identical
to that from having not applied. Accordingly, application decisions are independent of
the propensity of the benefit authority to make Type II errors (which is assumed to
be positive). An individual commanding wage ω will therefore make an application if
the utility from receiving C exceeds that from working, given that all able individuals
work when not receiving C.16
15Note that under the CARA preferences in (5.7) the implication of uluxx − uxuxl = 0 is that
ux(C, 1)/ux(ωH+C˜−χ, 1−H) = 1. We could thus alternatively write ωC = (1/H)
{
[1− C˜C ] + χ′σC
}
.
16Following the assumption that ω0 = ω¯ ≡ ( 1η )Log
[
ψ(1)
ψ(1−H )
]
/H.
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As established, there are two important subgroups to consider: (i) those with ω < ω
who would not work conditional on receiving C; and (ii) those with ω > ω who would
work conditional on receiving C.
(i) ω < ω
First off, an individual with ω < ω will apply for C only if u(C, 1) ≥ u(ωH, 1 − H),
and thus if ω ≤ ω¯(C), where ω¯ is implicitly defined by:
u[ω¯(C) · H, 1−H] ≡ u(C, 1) (5.12)
It follows immediately from (5.12) that ω¯ > C/H > C and:
ω¯C =
1
H
ux(C, 1)
ux(ω¯H, 1−H) > 1 (5.13)
Unsurprisingly then, an increase in C increases the critical wage at or below which an
able individual chooses to apply for C and not work if awarded it.
(ii) ω < ω
Turning to those with ω < ω, an application for C will be made only if u[ωH + (C˜ −
χ), 1 −H] > u(ωH, 1 −H), which holds if χ < C˜. Given that χ is independent of ω,
it follows that all individuals with ω < ω will apply for C if χ < C˜.
Combining the definitions of ω and ω¯ in (5.9) and (5.12), respectively, we have:
u[ωH + (C˜ − χ), 1−H] ≡ u[ω¯H, 1−H] ≡ u(C, 1) (5.14)
Recall that ω is a function of the enforcement parameters and the benefit level, whilst
ω¯ is a function of only the benefit level. Accordingly, the combination of enforcement
parameters and the benefit size will determine the position of ω relative to ω¯ on the
net wage continuum. It follows immediately from (5.14) that the relationship between
ω and ω¯ is:
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ω − ω¯

>
=
<
 0⇔ (χ− C˜)

>
=
<
 0 (5.15)
If χ > C˜ then ω > ω¯ and so (i) all those with ω ∈ [ω0, ω¯] apply for C and do not work
if awarded it; whilst (ii) no individual with ω ∈ (ω¯,∞) applies. Notice that in this
case there are individuals who belong in the wage interval ω ∈ (ω¯, ω] who would not
work if awarded the benefit, but choose not to apply for it. If χ = C˜ then ω = ω¯ and
applications are otherwise as described above. However, if χ < C˜ then ω < ω¯ such that
(i) all those with ω ∈ [ω0, ω] apply for C and do not work if awarded it; whilst (ii) all
those with ω ∈ (ω,∞) apply for C and do work if awarded it. Figure 5.1 graphically
depicts the relationship between these two critical wages.
The parameters under which ex-post conditionality is fully enforced
Following (5.15), a natural question to investigate is the conditions under which χ ≥ C˜
(respectively χ < C˜). Intuitively, this will depend on the relationship between the
enforcement parameters and the benefit level in determining the relative sizes of χ
and C˜. Indeed, equating χ and C˜, it is straightforward to establish the following
result.
Result 1: For any lenient enforcement pair (ρ, φ);
(χ− C˜)

>
=
<
 0⇔ C

>
=
<
 ∗C(ρ, φ) (5.16)
where:
∗
C(ρ, φ) ≡ 2[1− ρ(1 + φ)]
ηρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)2 (5.17)
An immediate corollary from (5.16) is:
Corollary 1: For enforcement parameters which either (i) fully deter , or (ii) provide
zero deterrence, against applications from those with ω < ω, the size of C has no impact
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Figure 5.1: The relationship between ω and ω¯.
(a) Utility and the critical wages (C˜ > χ)
ωω0
u
u(C, 1)
u(A− χ, 1−H)
u(ωH, 1−H)
ω ω¯
(b) Utility and the critical wages (C˜ < χ)
ωω0
u
u(C, 1)
u(ωH, 1−H)
u(A− χ, 1−H)
ω¯ ω
Notes. This figure provides graphical intuition for the critical net wages ω and ω¯. Subplot (a) depicts
the case where C˜ > χ, whilst subplot (b) depicts the case where C˜ < χ. Both subplots plot individual
utility over the net wage continuum. The horizontal line in each subplot gives the utility level of
an individual who receives the categorical benefit and does not work. If C˜ > χ then the (expected)
utility of a working categorical recipient must, at all wage levels, exceed the utility of a worker who
does not receive the categorical benefit. It must therefore hold that ω < ω¯. Contrastingly, if C˜ < χ
then the (expected) utility of a working categorical recipient must be less than that of a worker who
does not receive the categorical benefit. In this case it must therefore hold that ω > ω¯. The filled
region between ω¯ and ω illustrates that some individuals who would choose not to work conditional
on receiving C do not in fact apply for C.
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on application decisions. Formally:
lim
ρ(1+φ)→1
∗
C = 0 ,
lim
ρ(1+φ)→0
∗
C = +∞.
Much more interesting however, are the intermediate cases, 0 < ρ(1 + φ) < 1, where
the enforcement parameters in isolation provide neither full or zero deterrence against
applying for C and subsequently working. In these cases, the size of C matters in
deterring such applications. In particular, (5.16) and (5.17) show that C must be set
sufficiently high to achieve deterrence. The intuition for this initially surprising result
rests on the fact that:
d2
dC2
(χ− C˜) = d
2
dC2
χ = χ′σCC > 0 (5.18)
So whilst C˜ is linearly increasing in C, χ is convex-increasing in C and this drives the
main result. Intuitively, increases in C expose working benefit recipients to greater
and greater risk such that, for C set above the critical level
∗
C , χ more than offsets
C˜. Figure 5.2 illustrates why this result arises. Exactly how high C would need to be
set to achieve deterrence depends on the leniency of the enforcement parameters. In
particular:
∗
Cρ < 0,
∗
Cφ < 0,
∗
Cρφ > 0 ∀ 0 < ρ(1 + φ) < 1 (5.19)
So
∗
C is increasing in the leniency of enforcement. The less effective the enforcement
parameters are at deterring able benefit recipients from working, the higher the benefit
level would need to be set. Note that
∗
Cρ < 0 implies that d(χ− C˜)/dρ > 0 whenever
C <
∗
C. Indeed, from (5.11) and (5.17) it is straightforward to show that:
C¯(ρ, φ) ≤
∗
C(ρ, φ) (5.20)
The detection probability is therefore effective at raising ω - and thereby reducing the
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Figure 5.2: The Critical Categorical Benefit,
∗
C(ρ, φ)
C0
χ, C˜
C˜
χ
∗
C
Full Deterrence
C
Notes. The point C ≡
∗
C/2 simply satisfies d(χ− C˜)/dC = 0.
number of individuals who would choose to apply for C and subsequently work - for
all cases where χ ≤ C˜.
5.3.2 Decreasing Absolute Risk Aversion (DARA)
Under the assumption of CARA, changes in the enforcement parameters and the benefit
level only affect the risk premium via changes in the variance in benefit income. Let
us now relax this assumption and instead suppose that risk aversion is decreasing over
income and, in turn, the individual wage. We first re-write the general expression for
the risk premium in (5.5) as:
χ(A, σ) =
1
2
r(A)σ(ρ, φ, C) ; r′(A) < 0 (5.21)
Given that χ is now a function of ω, where ω is continuously distributed, there must now
be a continuum of risk premia. Note that dχ/dω = χA ·∂A/∂ω = (1/2)r′(A)σ∂A/∂ω <
0. Differentiating χ with respect to C, there are now two conflicting effects:
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dχ(A, σ)
dC
=
r(A)σ
2C
{
C
σ
σC +
C
r(A)
(
r′(A) · C˜C
)}{≥
<
}
0 (5.22)
The first term in braces is the elasticity of σ with respect C. This term is positive
because σC > 0 and it captures the standard effect from the CARA analysis. The
second term, meanwhile, is the elasticity of r with respect to C. This term must be
negative because C˜C > 0, thus capturing the fact that an increase in expected income
lowers the coefficient of risk aversion. So whether or not an increase in C will increase
χ(A, σ) will depend on the aggregate of these two opposing effects.
We can also write the affect of the enforcement parameters on χ in terms of elastici-
ties:
dχ(A, σ)
dφ
=
r(A)σ
2φ
{
φ
σ
σφ +
φ
r(A)
(r′(A) · C˜φ)
}
> 0 ,
dχ(A, σ)
dρ
=
r(A)σ
2ρ
{
ρ
σ
σρ +
ρ
r(A)
(r′(A) · C˜ρ)
}{≥
<
}
0 .
(5.23)
Given that σφ > 0 and r
′(A)C˜φ > 0, an increase in φ unambiguously increases χ at
each productivity level. In words, an increase in the penalty rate serves to (i) increase
the variance in benefit income, which in isolation increases the risk premium; and
(ii) increase the coefficient of absolute risk aversion through lowering expected benefit
income, which in isolation also serves to increase the risk premium. Once more, the
effect of an increase in ρ on χ depends on whether ρ ≤ 1/2 or ρ > 1/2. If ρ < (=)1/2
then σρ > (=)0 and, because r
′(A)C˜ρ > 0, χ unambiguously increases for the same
two reasons as discussed for φ. However, if ρ > 1/2 then σρ < 0 such that the variance
in benefit income and coefficient of absolute risk aversion move in opposite directions,
thereby generating an overall ambiguous effect. So unlike in the CARA case, it may
not always hold that χ is decreasing in ρ for all ρ > 1/2, where this arises because high
values of ρ decrease expected assets which, in turn, increase risk aversion.
To trace through in more detail some of the implications of DARA on individual
decisions to apply for C, a more explicit expression for the risk premium than that in
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(5.22) is required. We now assume that:
r =
η
A
; 0 < η ≤ 1 (5.24)
By standard differential equation methods once more, we thus assume that preferences
take the form:
u(x, l) =
x1−ηψ(l)
1− η ; η 6= 1 , ψ
′ > 0 , ψ′′ < 0 (5.25)
Substituting (5.24) into (5.21) gives:
χ(A, σ) =
1
2
( η
A
)
σ (5.26)
Differentiating (5.26) respect to C, it can be readily established that the risk premium
is once more convex-increasing in C. Formally:
dχ
dC
=
1
2
η
{
AσC − σC˜C
A2
}
=
1
2
η
{
(A− C˜)σC + σC˜C
A2
}
> 0 ,
d2χ
dC2
=
1
2
η
(A− C˜)2
A3
σCC > 0 .
(5.27)
Turning to the affect of the enforcement parameters on the risk premium, we have
dχ/dφ > 0 as established in (5.23), whilst:
dχ
dρ
> 0 ∀ρ ≤ 1
2
,
dχ
dρ

>
=
<
 0⇔ C

>
=
<
 (2ρ− 1)ωH(1− ρ)2 + ρ2φ ∀ρ > 12 (5.28)
So for all ρ > 1/2, C must be set sufficiently high at each wage level in order for an
increase in ρ to raise χ. When C is large an increase in ρ generates a reduction in A
- and thus an increase in r - that is sufficiently large so as to offset the reduction in
σ.
CHAPTER 5. ENFORCEMENT: WELFARE BENEFIT SIZE AND RISK 286
Work Decision Conditional on Receiving C
A recipient of C will only choose to work if u(A−χ, 1−H) > u(C, 1).17 Differentiating
the left side with respect to ω gives ux ·H(1−χA) > 0, which implies that we can once
more define a critical net wage ωD(ρ, φ, C) above which an individual will work when
receiving C. Formally, ωD satisfies:
u
[
A(ωD)− χ(A(ωD), σ), 1−H] ≡ u(C, 1) (5.29)
An individual with ω ∈ [ω0, ωD] will thus not work when receiving C; whilst someone
with ω ∈ (ωD,∞) will work when receiving C.
Differentiating (5.29) with respect to C,ρ and φ, respectively, gives:
ωDC =
1
H(1− χA)
{[
ux(C, 1)
ux(ωDH + C˜ − χ, 1−H)
− C˜C
]
+ [χAC˜C + χσσC ]
}
> 0
ωDφ =
1
H
{
χσσφ
1− χA − C˜φ
}
> 0
ωDρ =
1
H
{
χσσρ
1− χA − C˜ρ
}
>
=
<
 0
(5.30)
An increase in C unambiguously increases ωD. Analogous to (5.10), there are two
effects at work. First, an increase in C increases both the certain consumption of a non-
working categorical recipient and the expected consumption of a working categorical
17Note that under the preferences specified in (5.25) we have uluxx−uxuxl < 0, such that leisure is
a normal good. An immediate implication of this is that there will be a critical wage ω¯(C) satisfying
u(C, 1) ≡ u(ω¯H + C, 1 − H) at or below which no individual will choose to work. Explicitly, this
critical wage is given by:
ω¯(C) =
C
H
{
1
(1−H) 11−η
− 1
}
; ω¯′(C) > 0 .
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recipient. However, because C˜C < 1 the increase in consumption for the non-worker
exceeds the increase in expected consumption for the worker, thus causing ωD to rise.18
Second, we know from (5.27) that the total effect of an increase in C on χ is positive,
which further acts to increase ωD. Next, an increase in φ unambiguously increases ωD
because a working recipient’s expected benefit income falls; whilst the risk premium
increases. Finally, if (i) ρ ≤ 1/2 an increase in ρ will unambiguously increase ωD; but
if (ii) ρ > 1/2 an increase in ρ will only increase ωD if χσσρ > C˜ρ(1− χA).
Decision to Apply for C
We now turn to address application decisions. Analogous to the the CARA analysis,
all those with ω ≤ ωD (ω ≤ ω in the CARA analysis) will apply for C if ω ≤ ω¯, where
ω¯ is as defined in (5.12). Further, an individual with ωD < ω will once more only apply
for C if χ(A, σ) ≤ C˜. A key difference between the CARA and DARA cases is that
this condition is now a function of the net wage rate. It is straightforward to show
that:
(χ− C˜)

>
=
<
 0⇔ Γ(ρ, φ)

>
=
<
 ωHC ; Γ ∈ [−1,+∞) (5.31)
where the function Γ is explicitly given by (see Appendix for the derivation);
Γ(ρ, φ) ≡
1
4
ησCC − C˜2C
C˜C
=
−(1 + φ)2(η
2
+ 1)ρ2 + (1 + φ)[η
2
(1 + φ) + 2]ρ− 1
[1− ρ(1 + φ)] ∀ ρ(1 + φ) ≤ 1
(5.32)
18Under the preferences in (5.25) the marginal utility of consumption is increasing in leisure, such
that ux(C, 1)/ux(ωH+ C˜ − χ, 1−H) > 1.
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and satisfies:
lim
ρ(1+φ)→0
Γ(ρ, φ) = −1 ,
lim
ρ(1+φ)→1
Γ(ρ, φ) = +∞ ,
Γρ > 0 , Γφ > 0 ∀ ρ(1 + φ) ≤ 1 .
(5.33)
Notice that Γ is a function of only the enforcement parameters (and the constant η).
Furthermore, it is increasing in both of these parameters for all lenient enforcement
cases. An immediate implication of (5.31) is therefore that, for any enforcement param-
eters that render Γ < 0, there will be no level of the categorical benefit that can deter
an individual with ωD < ω from applying for C and subsequently working if awarded
it. That is, if enforcement is sufficiently lenient so as to render Γ < 0, there will be no
way to achieve deterrence because the right side of (5.31) is always positive.
Given that Γ is a quadratic equation in ρ (equivalently, a quadratic equation in φ),
let the function ρˇ(φ) satisfy Γ[ρˇ(φ), φ] ≡ 0. From the properties of Γ in (5.33) it must
hold that ρˇ(φ) is the first, or lower, root of Γ for a given φ. The second root occurs
for enforcement parameters satisfying ρ(1 + φ) > 1 and is thus not considered. Figure
5.3 graphically depicts the function Γ and provides some numerical examples of ρˇ for
various values of φ and η.
Drawing this all together, the following result must hold:
Result 2:
(i)
ρ ≤ ρˇ(φ)⇒ χ < C˜ ∀ ω (5.34)
(ii)
ρ > ρˇ(φ)⇒ (χ− C˜)

>
=
<
 0 if C

>
=
<
 ∗CD(ω, ρ, φ) ≡ ωHΓ (5.35)
where limΓ→0
∗
CD = +∞ and limΓ→+∞
∗
CD = 0
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Figure 5.3: Properties of the Function Γ(ρ, φ)
(a) Graphical Depiction of Γ
ρ0
Γ
−1
ρˇ(φ)
Γ(ρ, φ)
1
1+φ
ρˇ(φ′)
Γ(ρ, φ′)
1
1+φ′
Notes: φ′ > φ and the points (1 + φ)−1 and (1 + φ′)−1 are the lenient enforcement upper bounds
(b) Critical Detection Probability, ρˇ
φ ρˇ (η=0.25) ρˇ(η=0.5) ρˇ(η=0.75)
0 0.889 0.800 0.727
0.1 0.758 0.675 0.610
0.2 0.667 0.587 0.528
0.3 0.596 0.519 0.464
0.4 0.538 0.465 0.413
0.5 0.490 0.420 0.371
0.6 0.450 0.382 0.336
0.7 0.414 0.350 0.306
0.8 0.384 0.322 0.280
0.9 0.357 0.298 0.258
1 0.333 0.276 0.239
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It follows directly from this result that:
Corollary 2: A necessary - though not sufficient - condition to deter an individual
with ω < ω from applying for C is that ρ > ρˇ(φ), and thus that the level of enforcement
be set sufficiently high.
The key message from this analysis is Result 2(i) and the proceeding Corollary 2. The
intuition for this can be seen from the denominator in the definition of χ in (5.26):
Higher levels of the enforcement parameters limit the impact of the size of C on A and
thus limit the extent to which an increase in C reduces the coefficient of absolute risk
aversion. Contrastingly, in the CARA case A is absent from the coefficient of absolute
risk aversion and consequently this necessary condition does not arise.
5.3.3 Discussion
An unrealistic implication of the results obtained in both Section 5.3.1 (CARA analysis)
and Section 5.3.2 (DARA analysis) is that, for enforcement-benefit level combinations
that expose working recipients to insufficient risk, all higher earners will apply for the
categorical benefit and, if awarded it, work. Yet, in reality higher earners are unlikely
to want to apply for a categorical benefit even if they face some positive probability of
being awarded it. This is likely to arise because neither (i) applying for the benefit, or
(ii) receiving the benefit, are actually costless as so far assumed. Whilst applications
are a one-time cost and abstracting from them renders the analysis more tractable,
actually receiving C is likely to involve non-negligable time costs because recipients
are typically required to spend a fraction of their day at the benefit office or engaging
in certain activities. We turn to discuss this in the following section.
5.4 Time Opportunity Costs
The purpose of this section is to take seriously the real-word facet of welfare pro-
grammes that there are time costs associated with receiving categorical benefits. These
time costs can take a multitude of forms depending on the nature of the benefit, such
as regular meetings with a benefit officer; medical reassessments; work-capability tests;
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work-preparation activities or providing evidence of job search.19 Under the realis-
tic assumption that such requirements are imposed during the working day, they also
present opportunity costs to fraudulent recipients who work since their net earnings are
lowered through taking time off work to fulfil these conditions (Yaniv, 1986)20.
To analyse the implications of time opportunity costs we adopt a simpler framework
where preferences are defined over consumption only21 and given by u(x); where u′ > 0
and u′′ < 0 (see also Yaniv, 1986). We further assume that −u′′/u′ = η such that,
analogous to Section 5.3.1, preferences exhibit constant absolute risk aversion.
In this setting, an individual who does not receive the categorical benefit has consump-
tion x = ω. Meanwhile, an individual who receives the categorical benefit and works
has expected consumption x = ω(1 − k) + C˜; where k ∈ (0, 1) denotes the fraction
of the day that a benefit recipient must spend attending meetings/reassessments with
a benefit officer. This time requirement is taken to be fully enforced such that any
recipient who does not conform with it automatically loses the benefit.
The analysis proceeds as in the previous sections: we first establish which individuals
would choose to work/not work conditional on receiving C; and then, given this be-
haviour, determine which individuals will choose to apply for C. Given our assumption
of CARA preferences, the risk premium in (5.8) applies.
19Whilst some benefits - such as incapacity payments - do not require frequent reassessment, many
others do. For example, in the U.K. individuals who have some form of (non-terminal) illness or
disability and receive Employment and Support Allowance (ESA) are required to attend frequent
meetings with a ‘benefits adviser’ if they are placed in a ‘work-related activity group’. An aim of such
programmes is to eventually transfer recipients - via work capability assessments - into job search
programmes and ultimately employment. Indeed, individuals receiving Jobseekers Allowance must
‘sign on’ every two weeks and provide evidence of job search. The transition between these benefit
programmes is characterised by a shift from ‘work preparation conditionality’ (i.e. ESA) to ‘full
conditionality’ (i.e. Jobseekers allowance) (see Department for Work and Pensions, 2010).
20Benefit offices such as JobCentre Plus in the U.K. will typically be open 9am-5pm (i.e. the typical
working day.)
21In the context of the framework employed in Section 5.3.1, where preferences were defined over
both over consumption and leisure, there would be a certain inconsistency in maintaining the assump-
tion of fixed working hours but then allowing individuals to take the fraction k of their working day
off from work (to attend the benefit office). In this case some individuals would have incentives to
take time off and simply enjoy more leisure, thus getting closer to their optimal labour supply. Whilst
the framework adopted in the current section is more restrictive, it avoids these conceptual issues.
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5.4.1 Work decision when receiving C.
When receiving C an individual may choose to either comply with the no-work condi-
tion and have utility u(C), or instead work and have (expected) utility u[ω(1 − k) +
C˜ − χ]. Let ωk(ρ, φ, C) denote the critical wage at which an individual is indifferent
between these two choices. Formally:
ωk =
(C − C˜) + χ
1− k (5.36)
We once more assume that at the point of indifference an individual will choose not to
work. All those with ω ∈ [ω0, ωk] will therefore not work when receiving C; whilst all
those with ω ∈ (ωk,∞) will work when receiving C. The properties of ωk with respect
to ρ, φ and C parallel that for ω in (5.9):
ωkC > 0 ; ω
k
CC > 0 ; ω
k
φ > 0 ω
k
φφ > 0 ; ω
k
ρ
{
≥
<
}
0 ; ωkρρ < 0
It is also straightforward to see that ωk is increasing in k.
5.4.2 Application decisions
Turning to application decisions, there are thus two groups to consider: (i) those with
ω ≤ ωk who do not work when receiving C; and (ii) those with ω > ωk who do work
when receiving C. The decision to apply for the former group is straightforward; they
will apply if ω ≤ ω¯k ≡ C. Contrastingly, an individual with ω > ωk will only apply for
C if C˜ − ωk > χ, and thus if ω ≤ ¯¯ωk, where ¯¯ωk satisfies:
¯¯ωk(ρ, φ, C, k) ≡ C˜ − χ
k
(5.37)
The intuition is as follows.22 An individual who would choose to work when receiving C
22The assumption of CARA preferences greatly simplifies the analysis of the condition C˜−ωk > χ.
Indeed, because χ is independent of ω we can solve for a unique ¯¯ω above which an individual who
would work when receiving C will not apply. If χ were to take the DARA form in (5.26) there may
be multiple solutions to C˜ − ωk > χ.
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Figure 5.4: The Upper Bound ¯¯ωk∗.
C
0
χ
− ¯¯ωk∗k
C˜ − ¯¯ωk∗k
C
C˜
∗
C
Notes. This figure graphically illustrates the upper bound ¯¯ωk∗. This is simply ¯¯ωk = (C˜ − χ)/k
evaluated at the value of C which maximises (C˜ − χ), i.e. C.
will only apply if the expected benefit (C˜) net of foregone earnings (ωk) exceeds the risk
premium associated with the variance in benefit income. However, for an individual
with ω > ¯¯ωk the opportunity cost of foregone earnings is too high, thus rendering
an application suboptimal. Straight away then, we can see that the imposition of a
time requirement generates more realistic application decisions because higher wage
individuals will not apply.
An upper bound on ¯¯ωk. From (5.37), we can take the analysis a step further by
recognising that ¯¯ωk must, ceteris paribus, take its maximum value at the value of C
which maximises C˜−χ. For any given enforcement parameter pair (ρ, φ), the expected
benefit net of the risk premium is maximised at C(ρ, φ), where:
C(ρ, φ) ≡
∗
C(ρ, φ)
2
=
1− ρ(1 + φ)
ηρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)2 (5.38)
Given that C is as stationary point it will hold that χ′σC(ρ, φ, C) = C˜C(ρ, φ, C). From
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Figure 5.5: The critical categorical benefit
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− ¯¯ωkk
−ωkk
Notes. This figure illustrates that the critical benefit size
∗
Ck occurs at the point where ωk = ω¯k = ¯¯ωk.
The negative portion of the figure captures this in terms of the earnings that these marginal individuals
would forego were they to work when receiving the categorical benefit. The value of C at which these
foregone earnings intersect will intuitively depend on the size of k. Indeed, one can readily establish
that ∂ωkCk/∂k > 0, ∂ω¯Ck/∂k > 0, but ∂
¯¯ωkCk/∂C = 0. An increase in k thus lowers the value of the
categorical benefit at which the intersection occurs.
this it follows that we can define a critical net wage which is independent of C, above
which no able individual will choose to apply for C and work.
Result 3a. ∀ C <
∗
C(ρ, φ), ¯¯ωk is bounded above by a critical productivity ¯¯ωk∗ that
depends only on the standard enforcement parameters (and k). Formally:
¯¯ωk∗(ρ, φ, k) ≡ ¯¯ωk (ρ, φ, C(ρ, φ), k) (5.39)
where ¯¯ωk(ρ, φ, C, k) < ¯¯ωk∗(ρ, φ, k) ∀ C 6= C
This upper bound is graphically illustrated in Figure 5.4.
Whether or not an individual who would work when receiving C will apply for it will
clearly depend on where ωk lies relative to ¯¯ωk on the net wage continuum. Intuitively,
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if ¯¯ωk < ωk then no such individual will apply. With this in mind, we state the following
result.
Result 3b.
ωk

>
=
<
 ω¯k

>
=
<
 ¯¯ωk if C

>
=
<
 ∗Ck ≡ 2[1− ρ(1 + φ)− k]ηρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)2 (5.40)
An immediate implication of (5.40) is that
∗
Ck <
∗
C ∀ k > 0, such that the imposition of
time costs lowers the critical categorical benefit above which no individual who would
work when receiving C will choose to apply. Notice further that if k ≥ 1 − ρ(1 + φ)
then enforcement is independent of the categorical benefit and no individual who would
work when receiving C will ever apply. Figure 5.5 provides the graphical intuition for
this result. In addition, Figure 5.6 depicts how application choices differ over the net
wage continuum for the three cases depicted in (5.40).
5.5 Concluding Remarks
This chapter has analysed the decisions of workers - who differ continuously in their
wage - to apply for a categorical benefit that is targeted at individuals who are unable
to work, but administered with Type II (false award) classification errors. The cate-
gorical benefit is ex-ante conditional on an applicant being unable to work; and ex-post
conditional on a recipient not working. Recipients may also be required to spend a
fraction of the working day at the benefit office. Any recipient who works risks being
detected. Upon detection a fraudulent recipient is required to repay the benefit in its
entirety, in addition to paying a fine that is proportional to the benefit size.
Under both CARA and DARA (CRRA) preferences, the risk premium associated with
the variance in benefit income is convex-increasing in the benefit size. This yields the
interesting (and initially surprising) result that individuals who would work conditional
on receiving the categorical benefit can be deterred from applying for it through setting
the benefit level sufficiently high. In the case of CARA preferences the risk premium
is independent of the individual wage rate and so one risk premium characterises the
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Figure 5.6: The relationship between ωk , ω¯k and ¯¯ωk
(a) C =
∗
Ck
ωω0
u(C)
u(ω)
ω¯k = ωk = ¯¯ωk
u(Ak)
(b) C >
∗
Ck
ωω0
u(C)
u(ω)
ω¯k
u(Ak)
ωk
(c) C <
∗
Ck
ωω0
u(C)
u(ω)
ω¯k
u(Ak)
ωk ¯¯ωk
Notes. This figure graphically depicts the three cases stated in (5.40). Note that Ak = ω(1−k)+C˜−χ.
Subplots (a) and (b) illustrate that if ωk ≥ ¯¯ωk (i) all those with ω ∈ [ω0, ω¯k] will apply for C and,
if awarded it, not work; whilst (ii) all those with ω ∈ (ω¯k,∞) will not apply for C. Contrastingly,
subplot (c) illustrates that if ωk < ¯¯ωk (i) all those with ω ∈ [ω0, ωk] will apply for C and, if awarded
it, not work; (ii) all those with ω ∈ (ωk, ¯¯ωk] will apply for C and, if awarded, continue to work; whilst
(iii) those with ω ∈ (¯¯ωk,∞) do not apply for C.
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attitudes of all individuals to risk. For all cases where the standard enforcement param-
eters (detection probability, penalty rate) alone do not provide full deterrence, there
is a critical categorical benefit level above which no able individual will apply for the
categorical benefit and work when receiving it. This critical benefit level is increasing
the leniency of the standard enforcement parameters. Contrastingly, for DARA pref-
erences which exhibit constant relative risk aversion, the risk premium is decreasing
in the individual wage. A necessary but not sufficient condition to deter individuals
from applying for the categorical benefit and subsequently working is that the standard
enforcement parameters be set sufficiently high. Conditional on this being achieved, a
categorical benefit set sufficiently high can be used to provide deterrence.
When the only ex-post condition imposed on recipients is that they do not work, an
unsatisfactory implication of the above results is that higher earners will all apply for
the benefit if enforcement is too lenient. In reality, however, higher earning individuals
are unlikely to apply for categorical benefits even if they face a positive probability of
being awarded them. One explanatory factor for why is that receiving benefits is in
many cases a time consuming activity. A simple extension imposing a fully enforced
time requirement on recipients (i) preserves the result that a benefit set sufficiently
high can achieve deterrence; but now also (ii) generates a critical wage above which no
able individual will apply because the opportunity cost of foregone earnings is simply
too high.
Imposing a fine proportional to the benefit incorrectly obtained parallels how real-world
systems operate. It is, however, precisely because the fine is an increasing function of
the benefit size that we obtain the result that a benefit set sufficiently high can fully
deter individuals from violating ex-post conditionality.
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Appendix A Derivations and Proofs
Derivation of the risk premium χ(A, σ)
By the standard method established in Pratt (1964), we take first- and second- order
Taylor approximations around (A, 1−H) on the left- and right- sides of equation (5.4)
in the main text, respectively, to obtain:
u[A− χ, 1−H] ≈ u[A, 1−H]− χ · ux[A, 1−H] , (A.1)
E(u) ≈ ρ
{
u(A, 1−H) + α0ux(A, 1−H) + 1
2
uxxα
2
0(A, 1−H)
}
+ (1− ρ)
{
u(A, 1−H) + α1ux(A, 1−H) + 1
2
α21uxx(A, 1−H)
}
= u[A, 1−H] + ux[A, 1−H] · E(α)︸ ︷︷ ︸
=0
+
1
2
uxx[A(ω), 1−H] · E(α2) .
(A.2)
where, defining σ(ρ, φ, C) ≡ E[(α− E(α))2] = E(α2):
σ = ρ(α0)
2 + (1− ρ)(α1)2 = [ρ(1− ρ)2 + ρ2(1− ρ)](1 + φ)2C2
= ρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)2C2 (A.3)
Through substituting (A.3) into (A.2) and subsequently combining (A.1) and (A.2), it
is straightforward to arrive at the risk premium as defined in (5.5).
CARA Preferences
Preferences satisfying uxx + ηux = 0
The solution to uxx + ηux = 0 simply follows standard second-order linear differential
equation methods (see Simon and Blume, 1994, pp.647-648). Given that labour is
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exogenously fixed in the intensive margin, let u˜(x) ≡ u(x, l). The differential equa-
tion defining absolute risk aversion is therefore u˜′′(x) + ηu˜′(x) = 0. Substituting in
u˜ = ezx (and thus u˜′ = zezx and u˜′′ = z2ezx) yields ezx[z2 + ηz] = 0 and thus the
characteristic equation z(z + η) = 0, which has roots z = 0 and z = −η. The solution
is therefore:
u˜(x) = ae0 − beηx = a− be−ηx
It is straightforward to show that a utility function in consumption and leisure (fixed)
which satisfies these properties - and the initial assumptions placed on preferences -
is:
u(x, l) = 1− ψ(l)e−ηx ; ψ(l) > 0 , ψ′ < 0 , ψ′′ > 0 , ψψ′′ > (ψ′)2
We can readily establish that:
ux = ηψ(l)e
−ηx > 0 ; uxx = −η2ψ(l)e−ηx < 0 ; −uxx/ux = η > 0
ul = −ψ′(l)e−ηx > 0 ; ull = −ψ′′(l)e−ηx < 0 ; uxl = ηψ′(l)e−ηx
Strict concavity requires uxxull − u2xl > 0. We have:
uxxull − u2xl = η2ψ(l)ψ′′(l)e−2ηx − η2[ψ′(l)]2e−2ηx
= η2e−2ηx
{
ψ(l)ψ′′(l)− [ψ′(l)]2} > 0
by the assumptions placed on u.23
23Normality of leisure requires uluxx − uxuxl < 0. With these preferences, note however that
uluxx − uxuxl = 0. We can readily show that any reservation wage in the economy is independent of
unearned income. Suppose all individuals in society receive an unconditional universal benefit (B):
then the reservation wage (ω¯) satisfies:
1− ψ(1)e−ηB = 1− ψ(1−H)e−(ω¯H+B) ⇒ ψ(1)e−ηB = ψ(1−H)e−η(ω¯H)e−ηB
⇒ ψ(1)
ψ(1−H = e
−ηω¯H
⇒ ω¯ = −
(
1
η
)
Log
[
ψ(1)
ψ(1−H)
]
/H > 0
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The derivatives of the critical net wage ω
Totally differentiating the definition of ω in (5.9) in the main text with respect to C,
ρ and φ gives:
ux(ωH + C˜ − χ, 1−H) · (ωCH + C˜C − χ′σC) = ux(C, 1)
ux(ωH + C˜ − χ, 1−H) · (ωφH + C˜φ − χ′σφ) = 0
ux(ωH + C˜ − χ, 1−H) · (ωρH + C˜ρ − χ′σρ) = 0
(A.4)
Solving for ωC , ωφ and ωρ respectively, gives the derivatives in (5.10).
It is straightforward to establish from (5.10) that ωC > 0. From the properties of the
CARA preferences in (5.7) we can write ωC as:
ωC =
(
1
H
)[
(1− C˜C) + χ′σC
]
Noting that C˜C = 1 − ρ(1 + φ) is maximised at ρ = 0 ; whilst χ′σC is minimised at
ρ = 0, it must be the case that ωC is minimised at ρ = 0, where ωC |ρ=0 = 0. Since we
only consider ρ > 0 it follows that ωC > 0.
With respect to the enforcement parameters, it is unambiguously the case that ωφ > 0
and ωρ ≥ 0 ∀ ρ ≤ 1/2. However, because χ′σρ < 0 ∀ ρ > 1/2, we can see that the sign
of ωρ when ρ > 1/2 will depend on:
ωρ

>
=
<
 0 if ddρ(χ− C˜)

>
=
<
 0⇔ 12η (1− 2ρ)︸ ︷︷ ︸
<0
(1 + φ)2C2 + (1 + φ)C

>
=
<
 0
⇔ C

<
=
>
 C¯ ≡ 2η(2ρ− 1)(1 + φ) ∀ ρ > 12
(A.5)
Derivation of the Critical Benefit Level
∗
C and its Properties
The relationship between χ and C˜ is simply given by:
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χ

>
=
<
 C˜ ⇔ 12ηρ(1−ρ)(1+φ)2C2

>
=
<
 [1−ρ(1+φ)]C ⇔ C

>
=
<
 ∗C ≡ 2[1− ρ(1 + φ)]ηρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)2
(A.6)
Differentiating C∗ with respect to ρ and φ, respectively, gives:
∗
Cρ = −
{
2
η(1 + φ)2
}{
ρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ) + [1− ρ(1 + φ)](1− ρ)
ρ2(1− ρ)2
}
= −
{
2
η(1 + φ)2
}
·
{
ρ2(1 + φ) + (1− 2ρ)
ρ2(1− ρ)2
}
= −
{
2
η(1 + φ)2
}
·
{
ρ2φ+ (1− ρ)2
ρ2(1− ρ)2
}
< 0
∗
Cφ =
{
2
ηρ(1− ρ)
}
·
{−ρ(1 + φ)2 − 2[1− ρ(1 + φ)](1 + φ)
(1 + φ)4
}
=
{
2
ηρ(1− ρ)
}
·
{
ρ(1 + φ)2 − 2(1 + φ)
(1 + φ)4
}
=
{
2
ηρ(1− ρ)
}
·
{
ρ(1 + φ)− 2
(1 + φ)3
}
< 0
∗
Cρφ =
{
2
η(ρ(1− ρ))
}
· {ρ(1 + φ)3 + 3(2− ρ(1 + φ))(1 + φ)2(1 + φ)6} > 0
(A.7)
Proof that
∗
C ≤ C¯
Suppose, contrary to (5.20), that
∗
C > C¯. This implies:{
2[1− ρ(1 + φ)]
ηρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)2
}
>
{
2
η(2ρ− 1)(1 + φ)
}
⇔ [1− ρ(1 + φ)](2ρ− 1) > ρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)
⇔ (2ρ− 1) > ρ2(1 + φ)
⇔ −(1− ρ)2 > ρ2φ
(A.8)
This is a contradiction and thus
∗
C < C¯. Q.E.D.
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Derivation of Explicit Risk Premium under CARA preferences
The purpose of this section is to illustrate why the Taylor approximation of the risk-
premium greatly increases the tractability of the analysis. Under the stated CARA
preferences the condition defining the risk premium, χ, is:
1− ψ(1−H)e−η(A−χ) = ρ[1− ψ(1−H)e−η(A+α0)] + (1− ρ)[1− ψ(1−H)e−η(A+α1)]
which reduces to the condition:
e−η(A−χ) = ρe−η(A+α0) + (1− ρ)e−η(A+α1)
⇒ e−ηAeηx = ρe−ηAe−ηα0 + (1− ρ)e−ηAe−ηα1
⇒ eηχ = ρe−ηα0 + (1− ρ)e−ηα1
Taking Logs (to the base e) thus gives:
ηχ = Log
ρe−ηα0 + (1− ρ)e−ηα1︸ ︷︷ ︸
>1

and finally:
χ(ρ, φ, C) =
(
1
η
)
Log
{
ρe−ηα0 + (1− ρ)e−ηα1} (A.9)
Figure 5.7 illustrates that this is convex-increasing in C.
DARA preferences
Preferences satisfying uxxx+ ηux = 0
Drawing from Simon and Blume (1994), once more let u˜(x) = u(x, l) where l is a
constant. Letting q(x) = u˜′(x) the second-order differential equation u˜′′(x)x+ηu′(x) =
0 becomes (dq/dx)x+ηq = 0 and thus dq/q = −η(dx/x). Integrating both sides yields
ln q = −η(lnx+ c) where c is an integration constant. Taking the exponential of both
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Figure 5.7: Explicit CARA Risk Premium
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(b) φ = 0.5, η = 0.5
Notes: The values of η chosen here are 0.25 (panel a) and 0.5 (panel b). Higher values are permitted
in the literature (see Berloffa and Simmons, 2003).
sides yields q = e−η(lnx+c) = elnx
−ηe−ηc = x−ηb; where b = e−ηc is a constant. Given that
q = u˜′(x) and thus u˜′(x) = x−ηb we integrate both sides to obtain:
u˜ =
a+ bx
1−η
1−η : 0 < η < 1
a+ b lnx : η = 1
A utility function in consumption and leisure (fixed) which satisfies these properties -
and the initial assumptions placed on preferences - is:
u(x, l) =
x1−ηψ(l)
1− η ; η 6= 1 , ψ(l) > 0 , ψ
′(l) > 0 , ψ′′(l) < 0
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We can readily establish that:
ux = x
−ηψ(l) > 0 , uxx = −ηx−η−1ψ(l)/x < 0 , −uxx
ux
=
η
x
> 0
ul =
x1−ηψ′(l)
1− η > 0 , ull =
x1−ηψ′′(l)
1− η < 0 ; uxl = x
−ηψ′(l) > 0
Notice that strict concavity requires − η
(1−η)ψ(l)ψ
′′(l) > [ψ′(l)]2. Formally24:
uxxull − u2xl = −
η
1− ηx
−2ηψ(l)ψ′′(l)− x−2η[ψ′(l)]2
= −x−2η
{
η
1− ηψ(l)ψ
′′(l) + [ψ′(l)]2
}
> 0
Finally, note that normality of leisure is satisfied because:
uxuxl − uluxx = x−2ηψ(l)ψ′(l)
{
1 + ηx−1/(1− η)} > 0
Proof that χ is convex increasing in C
To proceed, we note that: C˜C = [1−ρ(1+φ)] = C˜/C; whilst σC = ρ(1−ρ)(1+φ)2C =
2σ/C. Taken together we obtain C˜σC = 2σC˜C . It then follows that:
dχ
dC
=
1
2
η
{
AσC − σC˜C
A2
}
=
1
2
η
{
(A− C˜)σC + C˜σC − σC˜C
A2
}
=
1
2
η
{
(A− C˜)σC + 2σC˜C − σC˜C
A2
}
=
1
2
η
{
(A− C˜)σC + σC˜C
A2
}
24Suppose ψ(l) = lα(1−η) α ∈ (0, 1) such that ψ′(l) = α(1−η)lα(1−η)−1 and ψ′′(l) = α(1−η)[α(1−
η) − 1]lα(1−η)−2. Then it is straightforward to check that the condition for strict concavity becomes
η[1− α(1− η)] > α(1− η)2.
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We can now use the fact that σCC = ρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)2 = σC/C to show that:
d2χ
dC2
=
1
2
η
{
A[(A− C˜)σCC + σCC˜C ]− 2C˜C [(A− C˜)σC + σC˜C ]
A3
}
=
1
2
η
{
(A/C)[(A− C˜)σC + 2σC˜C ]− 2C˜C [(A− C˜)σC + σC˜C ]
A3
}
=
1
2
η
{
A[(A− C˜)σC + 2σC˜C ]− 2C˜[(A− C˜)σC + σC˜C ]
CA3
}
=
1
2
η
{
(A− C˜)σC(A− 2C˜) + 2σC˜C(A− C˜)
CA3
}
But of course 2σC˜C = 2C˜σ/C = C˜σC and thus:
=
1
2
η
{
(A− C˜)[σC(A− C˜) + C˜σC − C˜σC ]
CA3
}
and thus finally
(A.10)
=
1
2
η
(A− C˜)2
A3
σCC > 0
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Derivation and sign of dχ/dρ
dχ
dρ
=
1
2
η ·
{
Aσρ − σC˜ρ
A2
}
⇔ dχ
dρ

>
=
<
 0⇔ σρA

>
=
<
σC˜ρ
⇔ (1− 2ρ)(ωH + C˜)

>
=
<
− ρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)C
⇔ (1− 2ρ)ωH

>
=
<
− C
{
(1− 2ρ)[1− ρ(1 + φ)]
+ρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)
}
⇔ (2ρ− 1)ωH

<
=
>
C {1− 2ρ+ ρ2(1 + φ)}
⇔ (2ρ− 1)ωH

<
=
>
C[(1− ρ)2 + ρ2φ]
(A.11)
If ρ ≤ 1/2 it must always be the case that dχ/dρ > 0. Otherwise, dχ/dρ > 0 requires
C > (2ρ− 1)ωH/[(1− ρ)2 + ρ2φ] as stated above and in (5.28).
The derivatives of the critical net wage ωD
Differentiating the definition of ωD in (5.29) with respect to C, ρ and φ yields:
ux[A(ω
D)− χ(A(ωD), σ), 1−H] ·
{
(ωDCH + C˜C)(1− χA)− χσσC
}
= ux(C, 1)
ux[A(ω
D)− χ(A(ωD), σ), 1−H] ·
{
(ωDφH + C˜φ)(1− χA)− χσσφ
}
= 0
ux[A(ω
D)− χ(A(ωD), σ), 1−H] ·
{
(ωDρ H + C˜ρ)(1− χA)− χσσρ
}
= 0
(A.12)
Solving for ωDC , ω
D
ρ and ω
D
φ gives (5.30). We now demonstrate that ω
D
C > 0. Given
that ux(C, 1)/ux(A−χ, 1−H) > 1, it suffices to show that 1 +χσσC > C˜C(1−χA) to
CHAPTER 5. ENFORCEMENT: WELFARE BENEFIT SIZE AND RISK 307
establish ωDC > 0. Substituting in χA = −12 ηA2σ, we can write 1 + χσσC − C˜(1 − χA)
as:
1 +
η
A
σ
C
− C˜
C
{
1 +
1
2
η
A2
σ
}
=
(
1− C˜
C
)
+
η
A
σ
C
{
1− 1
2
C˜
A
}
> 0 (A.13)
because C/C˜ < 1 and C˜/A < 1 ∀ ρ > 0.
Derivation of the Function Γ(ρ, φ)
To derive the function Γ(ρ, φ) we write:
χ ≥ C˜ ⇔ 1
2
{
ηρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)2C
ωH + C[1− ρ(1 + φ)]
}
≥ [1− ρ(1 + φ)]
⇔ ηρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)2C ≥ 2ωH[1− ρ(1 + φ)] + 2C[1− ρ(1 + φ)]2
⇔ {ηρ(1− ρ)(1 + φ)2 − 2[1− ρ(1 + φ)]2}C ≥ 2ωH[1− ρ(1 + φ)]
⇔
{−(1 + φ)2(η + 2)ρ2 + [η(1 + φ)2 + 4(1 + φ)]ρ− 2
2[1− ρ(1 + φ)]
}
C ≥ ωH
⇔
{−(1 + φ)2(η
2
+ 1)ρ2 + (1 + φ)[η
2
(1 + φ) + 2]ρ− 1
[1− ρ(1 + φ)]
}
C ≥ ωH
⇔ Γ(ρ, φ) · C ≥ ωH
(A.14)
where:
Γ(ρ, φ) ≡ −(1 + φ)
2(η
2
+ 1)ρ2 + (1 + φ)[η
2
(1 + φ) + 2]ρ− 1
[1− ρ(1 + φ)] (A.15)
We can immediately establish that:
lim
ρ(1+φ)→0
Γ(ρ, φ) =
−1
1
= −1
lim
ρ(1+φ)→1
Γ(ρ, φ) =
{−η
2
− 1 + η
2
(1 + φ) + 1
}
0
=
ηφ/2
0
= +∞
(A.16)
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The derivatives of Γ with respect to ρ and φ are given by:
∂Γ
∂ρ
=
{
[1− ρ(1 + φ)]〈−2ρ(1 + φ)2(η
2
+ 1) + (1 + φ)
[
η
2
(1 + φ) + 2
]〉
+(1 + φ)〈−(1 + φ)2(η
2
+ 1)ρ2 + (1 + φ)
[
η
2
(1 + φ) + 2
]
ρ− 1〉
}
/[1− ρ(1 + φ)]2
=

−2ρ(1 + φ)2(η
2
+ 1) + η
2
(1 + φ)2 + 2(1 + φ)
+2ρ2(1 + φ)3(η
2
+ 1) + η
2
ρ(1 + φ)3 + 2ρ(1 + φ)2
−ρ2(1 + φ)3(η
2
+ 1) + η
2
ρ(1 + φ)3 + 2ρ(1 + φ)2 − (1 + φ)
 /[1− ρ(1 + φ)]2
=
{
ρ(1 + φ)2(2− η) + η
2
(1 + φ)2 + (1 + φ)
+ρ2(1 + φ)3(η
2
+ 1) + ηρ(1 + φ)3
}
/[1− ρ(1 + φ)]2 > 0
and
∂Γ
∂φ
=
{
[1− ρ(1 + φ)]〈−2ρ2(1 + φ)(η
2
+ 1) + [η(1 + φ) + 2]ρ〉
−ρ3(1 + φ)2(η
2
+ 1) + ρ2
[
η
2
(1 + φ)2 + 2(1 + φ)
]− ρ
}
/[1− ρ(1 + φ)]2
=

−2ρ2(1 + φ)(η
2
+ 1) + ρ [η(1 + φ) + 2]
+2ρ3(1 + φ)2(η
2
+ 1)− ρ2 [η(1 + φ)2 + 2(1 + φ)]
−ρ3(1 + φ)2(η
2
+ 1) + ρ2[η
2
(1 + φ)2 + 2(1 + φ)]− ρ
 /[1− ρ(1 + φ)]2
=
{
ρ3(1 + φ)2(η
2
+ 1)− ρ2(1 + φ)[η(1 + φ) + η + 2]
+ρ[η(1 + φ) + 1]
}
/[1− ρ(1 + φ)]2
=
1
2
ρ
{
η(ρ− 1)(1 + φ)〈ρ(1 + φ)− 2〉+ 2〈ρ(1 + φ)− 1〉2} /[1− ρ(1 + φ)]2 > 0
Chapter 6
Concluding Remarks
6.1 A summary of the thesis
This thesis has focused on an economy where a fraction of the population is unable to
work, whilst the remaining fraction is composed of individuals who are able to work
but differ continuously in their productivity (as in Mirrlees, 1971). The unable subpop-
ulation provides the basis for targeted, or categorical, transfers within this framework.
Indeed, under the strong assumption that categorical status (unable, able) is perfectly
observable, it will be optimal under a utilitarian welfare criterion to target resources
solely at the unable so long as the social marginal value of income (smvi) of these indi-
viduals exceeds the average smvi of the able.1 In reality, however, categorical status is
difficult to identify and this gives rise to classification errors. Further, targeted benefits
are typically conditioned not just on initial eligibility, but also in an ex-post dimension
whereby recipients must comply with certain behavioural requirements or restrictions.
These may also be imperfectly enforced. Taking seriously these real-world facets of
welfare provision allows one to analyse both design and enforcement issues within this
framework.
Part I of this thesis focused on the design issues. The starting point (chapter 2) was
to abstract from tax revenue considerations and analyse the optimal division of a fixed
benefit budget between (i) a tax-free categorical benefit that is ex-ante conditional on
1Whether or not this will be achieved will depend on the size of the budget in place for benefit
expenditure.
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an applicant being unable to work and ex-post conditional on a recipient not working;
and (ii) a tax-free universal benefit that is received unconditionally by all. Importantly,
the categorical benefit is administered with Type I (false rejection) and Type II (false
award) classification errors. The latter error type gives rise to enforcement issues
because individuals who are truly able to work are receiving the categorical benefit.
Whether or not these ineligible recipients will choose to work will depend crucially
on the enforcement of the ex-post condition. In this regard, the two binary cases of
No Enforcement and Full Enforcement were considered. Under the former there are
no effective mechanisms in place to deter individuals from working, such that all able
individuals apply for the benefit. However, under the latter there are fully effective
mechanisms in place. The application decisions of able (ineligible) individuals are thus
endogenous to the benefit size and only those of lower productivity will choose to
apply because they are better off receiving the categorical benefit and not working.
The two enforcement structures yield different results for optimal welfare provision
and, relatedly, the welfare effects of classification errors. Whilst Type I errors are
always welfare reducing, the effect of Type II errors on social welfare may differ across
the enforcement regimes. An increase in the propensity to make Type II errors (i)
unambiguously reduces social welfare under the No Enforcement regime; but (ii) may
increase social welfare under the Full Enforcement regime. The intuition is that under
Full Enforcement ‘leakage’ of the categorical benefit is restricted only to able individuals
of lower productivity and, consequently, may play a redistributive role within the able
subpopulation. Numerical examples where this arises were provided.
The following two chapters (3 and 4) then proceeded to relax the assumption of a
fixed benefit budget and analyse the case where income tax revenue is used to finance
benefit expenditure (and any exogenous revenue requirement for spending outside of
welfare). The natural starting point was the Perfect Discrimination case where cat-
egorical transfers are perfectly targeted at unable individuals. A key result in the
literature is that the optimal linear income tax expression with perfectly administered
categorical transfers can be written as in the uni-dimensional model where individuals
differ solely in productivity (Viard, 2001a,b). This result depends, however, on the as-
sumption that categorical transfers eliminate inequality in the average net smvi across
categorical groups (in our case the unable and able). Yet, if categorical transfers are
financed by tax revenue there may be cases where it is suboptimal to impose a tax rate
that generates enough revenue to eliminate this inequality. This is particularly likely
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to hold if there is a large dependent population in need of transfers and/or the gov-
ernment has significant spending commitments outside of welfare. With this in mind,
the contribution of Chapter 3 was to (i) provide expressions for optimal linear and
piecewise linear tax rates that allow for the persistence of between group inequality at
the optimum; and, importantly, (ii) provide numerical examples where between-group
inequality does indeed persist at the optimum. Analytical examples where between-
group inequality persists at the flat tax optimum were also provided for the special
case where (i) preferences have a constant labour elasticity (see Atkinson, 1990; Saez,
2001); and (ii) taxation is purely redistributive (i.e. no revenue requirement).
Chapter 4 then reintroduced classification errors into the analysis and provided an
expression for the optimal linear tax rate for the case where the ex-post ‘no-work’
condition is fully enforced. The full enforcement assumption ensures that the decision
of an able individual to apply for the categorical benefit is endogenous to the tax
rate. Consequently, an increase in the tax rate generates both direct and indirect
behavioural effects. The direct effect is simply that found in all conventional analyses:
i.e. individuals adjust their labour supply in the intensive margin in response to a
change in the tax rate. The indirect effect, meanwhile, captures the fact that a ceteris
paribus increase in the tax rate induces additional able individuals to apply for the
categorical benefit. This has implications for both the tax revenue side of the budget
constraint (because additional individuals are awarded the categorical benefit and stop
working) and the benefit expenditure side of the budget constraint (because additional
individuals are awarded the categorical benefit). In the optimal tax expression that
results an important term in both equity (numerator) and efficiency (denominator)
considerations is the elasticity of the distribution function with respect to individual
productivity, evaluated at the critical productivity at or below which able individuals
choose to apply for the categorical benefit.
Part II of this thesis focused on individual decisions under risk and contained Chapter
5. This chapter modelled the decision of able individuals to apply for the categorical
benefit, conditioning on whether or not they would choose to comply with the ex-
post ‘no-work’ requirement if awarded it. Drawing on the economics of crime (see
Becker, 1968), working recipients risk being detected with some probability and, if
detected, they are sanctioned. The sanction considered here mirrors that available to
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actual benefit authorities: the fraudulent recipient is required2 to repay the benefit
in its entirety in addition to paying a fine proportional to the benefit size3. The
proportionality of the fine to the benefit size plays a crucial role in the analysis of risk.
Indeed, following Arrow (1970) and Pratt (1964) this chapter captures the risk that
a working recipient faces via the risk premium associated with the variance in benefit
income, the latter of which is convex-increasing in the benefit size. Under CARA
preferences the risk premium is therefore also convex-increasing in the benefit size. The
implication is that there will be a critical benefit level above which no able individual
who would choose to work conditional on receiving the benefit will choose to apply.
Intuitively, this critical level is increasing in the leniency of the standard enforcement
parameters (detection probability, penalty rate). For any categorical benefit set below
this critical level all able individuals in the economy will choose to apply, with those
of higher productivity choosing to work. This result is readily made more realistic
through requiring recipients to spend a fraction of the ‘working’ day at the benefit
office, thereby imposing an opportunity cost on ineligible claimants. In particular, this
places an upper bound on the productivity type at or below which able individuals
choose to apply for the categorical benefit.
6.2 Going Forwards
There are a number of interesting directions in which the framework presented in thesis
could be furthered.
Heterogeneity in disability. Throughout this thesis the unable subpopulation has
taken on a passive role. They are unable to provide any labour and, consequently, do
not respond to incentives of the tax system. A richer - but more complex - model may
therefore consider an economy where individuals differ in the extent of their disability,
as could be captured through differing quantity constraints on labour supply. The
benefit structure and ex-post conditions placed on benefit receipt would necessarily
change to capture the differing degrees of disability. In such a setting Type I errors may
take on a more significant role. In particular, individuals who are incorrectly denied a
2In many cases the financial sanction will be ‘offered’ as an alternative to prosecution.
3In the U.K., for example, fraudulent recipients may be offered an administrative penalty of 50%
of the overpaid benefit (see Department for Work and Pensions, 2015).
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categorical benefit may be forced to work more than they would in the optimum with
no such errors. This would also introduce new equity and efficiency considerations into
the optimal tax expression.
Societal concern for the unable beyond economic status. Under a standard
utilitarian social welfare function an able individual who is voluntarily unemployed
will have the same smvi as an unable individual when both receive the same in benefit
income. It would, however, be of interest to analyse a case where society expressly
cares about the distinction between voluntary unemployment and disability/quantity
constraints. Indeed, it would seem likely that many people would place greater value
on a transfer received by an individual who is unable to work, rather than someone
who can work as much as they wish but choose to be unemployed. Some initial work
in this area has been undertaken by Saez and Stantcheva (2013).
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